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This study draws on environmental history, political ecology and poststructuralist
social theory to critically examine the conflicts over- forest conversion in a
watershed in the Dominican Republic. The upper Rio Yaque Norte in the Cordillera
Central is vitally important to the northern half of the nation as a source of drinking
and irrigation water and hydroelectric power. This mountainous region was once
covered in extensive pine (P. occidentatjs) and mixed brOadleaf forests, though
today the forest cover has diminished significantly. Until the middle of the 20th
century, the watershed was sparsely populated by descendants of settlers who
practiced conucjuismo, the Dominican form of swidden agriculture, and ran cattle
on communal forest lands. During the Trujillo regime (1930-1961), the Cordillera
Central was opened to commercial exploitation of the forests. Logging proceeded
without any form of control or concern for the ecological and social consequences
until the state imposed a cutting prohibition in 1967. The widespread, road
building, and unsustainable forestry practices left behind denuded hillsides, which
were vulnerable to subsequent exploitation by burgeoning numbers of land-poor
farmers and former timber workers. This study examines Dominican agriculture and
some of the political and socio-economic forces that compelled campesinoS to
convert greater amounts of forest, and the resulting conflict they have encountered
with the Dominican forest service, and the Dominican army. Based on facile and
self-interested assumptions about the nature of the problem, the government's
approach to forest conservation in the watershed has relied heavily on
enforcement of the cutting ban. Campesinos have been regarded by the state as
antagonistic toward forest conservation and have been held responsible for much
of the forest conversion. This study questions the validity of such views. This study
also explores the non-governmental and grassroots efforts aimed at protecting and
rehabilitating the watershed.
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PR EFA CE
Many studies on tropical forest conversion focus on the phenomenon on a
grand scale, say for example, as it occurs in places like the Amazon or
Madagascar. My study takes a much narrower focus, and looks at perhaps similar
processes but in a much smaller, and very specific, place. In size, the upper Rio
Yaque del Norte is roughly equivalent to my home watershed, Rattlesnake Creek.
Still it is important to recognize that forest conversion occurs on scales small and
large, and the in ways unique to each place. Regardless of the extent, lives are
affected in the process.
In essence, this study is just the story of a rural people, and their problems in a
particular place. My aim here is not to forward some overarching theory of
deforestation as others have done, nor to make sortie universal truth claim. Nor
do I even seek to make a catergoric statement about the nature of the forest
problem in the upper Rio Yaque del Norte watershed. Rather, through a narrative
of the stories people shared with me it is my intent illuminate some of the complex
forces that have shaped a watershed and its inhabitants. Such an effort inevitably
focuses on the power relations between a variety of actors, from a hillside
campesino to urban elites and beyond. The subtext in this thesis is about power,
and who exerts it and in what ways, and who benefits and who suffers.
My approach is multi-disciplinary. In various places, I draw on sociology,
anthropology, geography, history, forestry and ecology to provide a context for
events in the region. In telling this story, my approach also reflects my journalistic
background and interest in people and their stories. (For their privacy and
protection, I have changed some of the names of the people I interviewed and
places I visited.) In general, I have tried to tread in two worlds -- the academic and
the popular -- by weaving a strong narrative line through a grounded theoretical
and empirical framework.
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In much of this study I discuss the way problems in the watershed are viewed
from an array of competing perspectives. I, too, have my own set of filters with
which I have examined the problems in the watershed. Thus, any "truth" claims I
make here are my own and are based on my study of the situation. My view has
been largely shaped by what I've seen and been told by residents of the region.
Furthermore, I must confess I hold an affinity and admiration for Dominic&n
campesino families, men and women who live close to the earth, whose activities
. feed a nation, whose lifeways provide a counterweight to the leaden forces of
modernity, and whose world is under mounting pressure from powerful forces. I
came by this view during the two years I lived and worked as a community forestry
extensionist with the Peace Corps among campesino families elsewhere in the
foothills of the Cordillera.
But viscerally, the connection runs even deeper than just that experience. The
people of the upper Yaque del Norte live a life in a landscape that evokes the one
where 1 live in Montana. In the field journal I used in the Dominican Republic, I
kept a copy of an old photo of some ancestors of mine -- brothers or cousins,
perhaps, of my Quebecois great-great grandmother. The place is among the
ponderosas near Sixmile Creek in western Montana and the timp is the early 20th
Century. In front of the cabin, there are three of them, all in dungarees and
suspenders and wide brimmed hats, looking proud for the photographer. The
one in the center stands erect, left arm akimbo, right arm holding up a dead
coyote with a thick winter coat. To his left a man has a pistol tucked into his waist
band and a pair of snowshoes on end. To his right, an older man clenches a pipe
in his teeth and props up a rifle, These are mountain people - farmers, hunters,
woodsworkers living in a small watershed in the Northern Rockies. The lives of my
forebears, and those of the campesinos of the Cordillera, overlap in striking ways.
Their lifeways were once on the same trajectory, but diverged long ago. But in

looking at the campesino's present I can in some way imagine my own family's
distant past.
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also grateful to Marge and Gene Downey in Missoula for their kindness over many

years. Finally, I would like to dedicate my efforts here to my grandmother, Evelyn
Cadieux, who has had a profound effect in shaping the way I see the world.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Environmental management and conflicts over the environment are about
... the way groups of people dominate each other, as well as the way they
seek to dominate nature. Not surprisingly, the development, or
continuation of more sustainable livelihood strategies carries important
implications for the way power is understood between groups of people,
as weir as for the environment itself.
Michael Redclift1
The ascent into the upper watershed of the Rio Yaque del Norte in Cordillera
Central of the Dominican Republic begins at a bustling junction on Autopista Duarte
about a mile outside of the burgeoning city of La Vega in the Cibao Valley. It's the
late fall of 1995, and this highway, first built during the American military
occupation between 1916 and 1924, is undbr construction again, this time being
widened into four lanes. It seems the entire length of the highway between the
capital Santo Domingo, and the country's second city and economic center,
Santiago, has been torn up and graveled at once. I am heading north from La Vega
J

in a carro publico, a rusting heap of a Toyota sedan with no windshield. The day
before, according to the driver who talks fast and gestures wildly, a belly dump truck
had kicked up a rock and shattered the already spider-web cracked windshield.
Fearing another spray of gravel, I am pleased when my brief ride ends at the
junction.
, At the foot of the Cordillera Central, the looming mountain range that squarely
occupies the center of the island of Hispaniola, sits a large industrial park, known
commonly as a zona franca.

Here, a predominantly female work force sews and

assembles goods for multinational corporations, Hke Timberland Boots and Ralph
Lauren clothes, and for North American consumers like you and me. Wages are
low, benefits nonexistent, working conditions poor or unsafe, and unions
suppressed. This is the other end of economic globalization.
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Should you arrive here at the end of shift you will be hard pressed to catch a
gua-gua, the generic Dominican name used for public transport. But with luck, or
more likely a little aggressiveness, you might catch a minivan making the half-hour
trip to the.small city of Jarabacoa, the jumping off point for the upper Yaque del
Norte region.
From the junction, the road climbs steeply, and the minivan, with its 15
passengers crammed inside, chugs reluctantly upward through sparsely forested
hills. At roughly 1000 feet above sea level, the first pines appear and the road
enters an undulating valley. The air here cools noticeably, a fact much appreciated
by the affluent residents of sultry Santo Domingo and Santiago. Their summer
homes and tourist cabanas, both palatial by Dominican standards, conspicuously
dot the verdant landscape. Jarabacoa, itself, seems cleaner and more prosperous
than most Dominican towns. This town's fortunes were once tied to the boom in the
timber industry, though today tourism plays an important role. The attraction here,
aside from the cooler climate, is the nearby Armando Bermudez National Park and
Pico Duarte, the Caribbean's tallest peak. But my own destination is the source of
the Rio Yaque del Norte, a place called Boca del Rios, near the village of La
Cienaga at the park's edge.
To reach these headwaters requires yet another gua-gua

ride, this time in the

back of a small pickup truck. The trucks heading upcountry all park outside a small
tavern on the outskirts of Jarabacoa. The street scene is frenetic. Music blares from
all sides: the mournfpl twangy guitar of bachata,

the galloping rhythms of

m erengue, and the syncopation of urban Latino hip-hop all compete for
dominance. In the street, the motores, -

Honda 70s - race up and down hauling

passengers to and fro across town. The sidewalks are crowded with women
coming from the open market, young boys seeking to shine shoes, street vendors
selling chicharron, the deep fried pig skin, and the ever-present tigueres,

the.
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unemployed saw y young men hanging out hoping to hustle a little work or a
passing tourist.
In the Dominican Republic, public transport trucks leave when they fill, meaning
when nearly every square inch is occupied. This king-cab Toyota has five 100
pound sacks of chemical fertilizer, another 100 pound sack of sugar, a 50 pound
sack of corn, and three bound and woebegone live chickens. For human cargo,
there are 15 of us in the back, and another half dozen inside. Everyone in the bed
of the pickup plays Twister for their lives, grasping, groping for something or
someone to hang onto. I am precariously perched on the sack of sugar; one sharp
swerve and I'll fall face first into the pavement. An old man in a felt hat smiled and
says "que Dios nos cuide, " may God take care of us, and I agree.
About a mile out of town we are flagged down by the transit police with their
white pith helmets and revolvers. W e stop, they approach, pleasantries are
exchanged, and a small bribe is passed on. Most government officials, after all, are
poorly paid, and thus unofficially encouraged to be creative in their livelihood
strategies. Without the bribe, a broken headlight becomes a problem, or certain
documents may need to be presented, or the ridiculously overcrowded truck
suddenly becomes dangerous. Dealing with these things could cost time and
money. Consider the bribe, then, a societal lubricant, one that ensures the smooth
functioning of civil affairs.
Onward. Campesinos, the people of the countryside though not necessarily
farmers, take it all with good humor, poking fun at the corruption that pervades their
society. Much can be learned about life in the upper Yaque del Norte listening to
conversations in the back of a pickup traveling upcountry. These rides gather
together folks from throughout the watershed, from the numerous little villages
known as campos. Public transport,, in some ways, serves as a civic forum for the
expression of views.

4
That fall, the coming election, and whether it would be clean, initiated many
discussions. Perennial president Joaquin Balaguer, a former puppet president
under the dictator Trujillo, had by his own admission committed fraudito, a little
fraud, and had stolen the 1994 election from the popular leftist Francisco Peha
s

Gomez. Under enormous domestic and international pressure, Balaguer called
another election for 1996. From dirty politics, talk often drifts to who had recently
returned from Nueva York, the name used to refer to any place in the United States.
There are roughly seven million Dominicans in the world, and a million of them live
on the eastern seaboard of the United States. To go alia, over there to the states, is
the dream of many Dominicans.
Eventually, conversation in the back of the truck always comes around to
agriculture, say the planting of beans or the price of viveres, the various roots crops
that make up the Dominican food staple. These days, in the upper Yaque del Norte
you cannot talk about agriculture without talking about Foresta, the Dominican
Forest Service. Voices rise, and gestures become more animated when the talk
turns to this agency. For small farmers of the region the pursuit of their livelihood -their shifting cultivation known as conuquismo - has been, in effect, criminalized.2
In recent years this deeply rooted act, so very basic to Dominican subsistence and
culture, has become political, almost an act of resistance. Out of legitimate concern
for the dwindling forests of the Cordillera, the Foresta -- backed by the Dominican
army -- has adopted authoritarian measures to protect what remains. Campesinos
are routinely jailed for not only cutting trees, but for burning fields and in some
cases just clearing weeds off their own land. The stories abound: A recent returnee
from Nueva York was hauled off to Plan Piloto, a Foresta jail in Santo Domingo
once used by Trujillo, for cutting seven small pines; an engineer, a woman who
moved with her family to the countryside from the capital, was held at an army post
in the nearby town of Jarabacoa because someone had cut several dozen
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understory saplings on her land to build a support structure for the chayote
cultivation; a mayor and eight others were arrested for cutting poles to bring
electricity to their mountain community; a longtime Foresta employee spent nearly
three weeks in jail after he lent, on orders from his superior, a saw to a campesino to
cut down a dead tree to build a home.
These are just some of the stories you might hear as you begin the winding 40
kilometer climb from Jarabacoa to La Cienaga. Like Autopista Duarte, this road is
*

under reconstruction. The bare hillsides above the road, some of them pushing 100
percent slope, were prone to sliding during the torrential rains of the wet season,
and the government was determined to shore the slopes up in places, and reroute
the road in others. The Yaque del Norte, like most of the Cordillera, is rugged,
straight up and down kind of country. An early foreign visitor in the 1850s, Sir
Robert Schomburgk described the Cibao Mountains, today known as the Cordillera
Central, as "peculiarly formed." These mountains, he wrote, had "so many
interlacings by sharp-ridged offsets, that one who had not seen the'chain from the
distance, so as to form an idea of its longitudinal direction, would find himself
bewildered in seeking the points of the compass to which this backbone of the
island of Santo Domingo really stretches." Schomburgk, a botanist, called the
diverse flora of the Cordillera "one of the finest pictures of vegetation that [he] had
beheld under the tropics."3
The vista once admired by Schomburgk looks starkly different today. In the
Yaque del Norte watershed, the river threads the narrow forested valley bottom,
while the denuded peaks rise steeply in a topographic jumble. In the early evening
light of November, most of the hillsides appear a pastel pink from the inedible
flowering heads of the yaragua grass (Melinis minutiaflora), an exotic forage
introduced by a Spanish priest decades ago. Elsewhere, the slopes look mangy
with scrubby patches of secondary growth dominated by pioneer species such
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bracken fern and guava. The stark bare patches, cleared and burned for planting,
are the conucos., the farmers' shifting cultivation plots. Even more scattered, and .
higher, are the remaining pockets of pines and the broadleaf trees -- the forests that
the campesinos called monteria -- that once covered these mountainsides.
Along the way, there are numerous stops in the communities of the Yaque del
Norte, starting with Pinar Quemado, a campo whose agrarian identity has been
largely overwhelmed by the suburban reach of Jarabacoa; Los Dajaos, where local
community development efforts and attempts to reconceive agriculture stand as a
possible model for its neighbors in the watershed; Manabao, where social
inequities in the region may be their most dramatic; and finally La Cienaga, the
end of the line, both literally and figuratively.
My gua-gua ride ends in Manabao, where I hitch a ride in a stake bed produce
truck heading toward La Cienaga. The driver is heading for a friend's house and an
afternoon of drinking rum and playing dominoes. He lets me off about a mile outside
of the village, and I continue on foot.
On the outskirts of the La Cienaga, some farmers gather under the zinc roof of
the patio that serves as the chapel for the community. The new Japanese truck
parked outside belongs to an agro-chemical distributor from Jarabacoa. The
farmers had come to listen to a sales pitch about the benefits of herbicides, and for
their time, they receive a Tordon ball cap. In the last two decades farmers have
turned to a variety of chemical fertilizers, and pesticides, some of which are banned
in North America, to augment their land's declining productivity.
The rocky, rutted road strewn with garbage enters the village, a less than
pleasant gateway community for the national park. As I pass one of the village's two
colmados, the small stores that sell staples of Dominican life, I see a dog urinating
on the doorway, while across the street several men stand around a large hog with
its throat cut that squeals shrilly as it bleed its way to a slow death. Dogs hang in
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waiting, eager to lick the blood off the cool concrete floor. Near the park's entrance,
in front of house built of brightly painted pine slats and a thatched roof, a young
boy stands naked, his testicles grotesquely enlarged. It is a birth defect I'm told,
and the family can't afford the surgery to correct it. Further on, two dirty-faced little
girls wearing only panties squat along the roadside and beg for money, clothes,
anything. "Give me something. I have no clothes," the one pleads.
This, too, is grotesque. But this is what you must overlook when you are an
ecotourist, one of thousands of urban Dominicans, Germans, Japanese and a
handful of North Americans, who stream through La Cienaga on their way to the
park to climb Pico Duarte. Or maybe you pause, give them some change or even
one of your T-shirts, before setting your gaze on the 10,000 foot peak ahead of you.
But for many locals, to see visitors spend so much to come from so far must be a
brutal reminder of how little they really have. These disparities are compounded by
the fact that in recent years the government has become increasingly restrictive of
most of the traditional uses - such as feral pig hunting, conuquismo, woodcutting
and firewood gathering -- of the area cordoned off by the park boundaries in the
1950s.
At the park headquarters, the road ends and the river begins. Not more than a
literal stone's throw from the headquarters,

two streams, the Rio de los Guanos

and Rio de los Tablones, converge to form the Rio Yaque del Norte, which starts its
twisting 296 kilometer course toward the Atlantic at the Haitian border. From its start
at the park's boundary, the upper river flows through a landscape on the socio
economic, political and ecological margins of Dominican life. In the upper Yaque
del Norte, denuded hillsides and impoverished communities are intricately tied not
only to one another, but to the greater world beyond.
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Background
In this study, I examine the history of the forces that have shaped the physical
and social landscape of the region.

Physically, the watershed has seen its forest

cover recede dramatically Since World War II, which marked the development of the
timber industry and the modern era. Claims about the extent of deforestation in the
Dominican Republic and the upper Yaque del Norte should be viewed critically, as
forest cover data are outdated, or partial at best.

Still, a Santiago group in a 1994

report estimated that roughly 80 percent of the upper Yaque watershed had been
deforested. Quantified or not, it is evident in looking on the landscape that much of
the forest cover in the watershed is gone. How that has happened is one of my
' primary inquiries.
The social landscape I explore here suggests that the campesinos in the region
pursue their livelihoods, principally agriculture, under severe ecological and socio
economic constraints and increasing political pressure.

Farmers in this watershed

work the steep, infertile lands, receive little outside technical or financial support,
and for their labor bring home a fraction of the value of what they produce. Many
campesinos speak of the decline of conuquismo as a way of life in the watershed.
Agriculture in the region dates back to the days of the pre-Columbian days Of the
Arawaks, who practiced a root-crop polyculture in permanent mounds they named
conucos. Centuries after the demise of the Arawaks, conucos still are farmed on
the hillsides, though today they are part of a shifting cultivation system. Up until the
mid-20th Century, conuquismo was relatively light on the land. From 1950 on, an
array of factors -- socio-economic, political, demographic -- converged to shorten or
eliminate fallow periods, thus creating an agricultural system that - by the
campesinos1own acknowledgement region.

has been destructive to the forests of the
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Today, not only are campesinos compelled to farm lands beyond their
productive capacity, but the very practice of agriculture itself brings persecution to
the farmers. Campesinos, those fortunate enough to possess land, have seen their
property rights - particularly rights to trees and forests -- essentially usurped by the
state. In 1967, president Balaguer closed down the sawmills of the Cordillera;
thirty years later the order still stands, in effect prohibiting the cutting of any tree -even on private land -- without state permission. While Balaguer’s decree was
essential to preventing the complete conversion of the nation's pine forests, its
over- zealous application by Foresta today has created innumerable hardships for
the rural residents of the Cordillera. These small farmers, on the cusp of a transition
between the destructive agriculture of the past 30 years and a more benign variety
of the future, face harassment, fines and imprisonment for practicing their
subsistence and small scale market farming.
The pressure exerted on the campesinos by the Dominican forest service is
symptomatic of a widely held, particularly urban, worldview that holds in disdain the
lives and livelihoods of the rural populace. This is particularly true of the Yaque del
Norte, which in its middle stretches flows through Santiago, a major center of power.
Certainly, urban concerns about downstream effects of forest loss are legitimate.
Over its course, the Yaque del Norte drains more than 7000 square kilometers,
making it one of the nation's most important rivers in terms of a water source,
hydroelectric generation and irrigation potential.

One study/showed that topsoil

loss to erosion in seven partially deforested Cordilleran watersheds averaged a
considerable 250 tons per hectare per year. On-farm, this erosion causes declining
crop yields, while off-farm costs are seen in increased sedimentation of irrigation
systems and hydroelectric generators. Irrigators in the country spend $2 million a
year maintaining sediment clogged irrigation systems. On a larger scale is the
damage caused to hydropower generation capacity. The Tavera Dam on the middle
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portion of the Yaque del Norte lost 40 percent of its dead storage capacity to
sedimentation in its first seven years of operation after its completion in 1973.
Reduced water flows, too, result from mountain deforestation. One study estimated
that between 1964 and 1984 water flows in the Yaque del Norte dropped 25
percent once adjusted for rainfall.4
Thus there is a substantial and powerful downriver constituency for watershed
protection. In looking to protect their economic and community interests, some of
these urban groups have found that campesinos make easy scapegoats for such
physical manifestations of greater societal ills. Facile assumptions often give way to
heavy-handed tactics. In early 1995, at the inauguration of a Santiago-based
"stakeholders" junta dedicated to protecting and restoring therentire length of the
watershed, president Balaguer warned that in order to protect the watershed it may
be necessary to evict the area's inhabitants. The deforestation that has occurred in
the watershed is " a barbaric action that on occasion must be responded with
^another barbaric action," said the patriarch of Dominican politics.5 This warning
weighs heavily on the minds of the campesinos; they know that their counterparts in
other ecologically sensitive areas of the country have been displaced in the name
of conservation initiatives.
This is conservation, Dominican-style. As a set of beliefs, practices and
constituents, it shares much in common with traditional North American
conservation approaches. That is to say, it is rooted in urban-based, educated,
middle-class values that manifest themselves through technocracy, the union of
science, managerialism and bureaucracy.6 But in nominally democratic places
such as the Dominican Republic, with its centuries old history of violence and
oppression, this form of conservation takes on an overt authoritarian aspect.
Conservation is often achieved at the expense of social justice.
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The threat of mass evictions has prompted a response from the area's
campesinos, many of whom trace family histories back to before the turn of the
century.

'

In Manabao during the summer of 1995, campesinos formed the

JuntaYaque, a federation of 16 farmer and women's groups from throughout the
upper watershed. President Balaguer was not on hand to lay his blessing on the
this group. They aim to protect not only their watershed, but their livelihoods as
well.

Thesis structure
I have two overlapping objectives: The first is to trace the environmental history
of upper Yaque del Norte to shed light on some of the myriad forces r- social,
economic, political -- that account for its present physical state. The forest loss that
has occurred is the catalyst for both government and grassroots responses. The
watershed's history, which has never been amply told, particularly from the
campesinos' perspective, offers a critical context that accounts for both the
damaging agricultural practices of the campesinos and repressive responses of the
state,7 To tell that story, I sketch the history of agriculture in the watershed -- and the
socio-economic forces that shape it - from the pre-Columbian days of the Arawaks
to attempts today by the farmers to employ new approaches. The first chapter on
agriculture is followed by an examination of the timber industry that operated in the
Yaque del Norte in the 1950s and 1960s. Directly and indirectly this industry,
rooted in the rise and reign of the dictator Trujillo, played a critical role in much of
the forest conversion of much of the watershed.
Thus, this study emphasizes a historical perspective. But it goes beyond the
past and is concerned with the present in the Yaque del Norte. French historian
and philosopher Michel Foucault writes of doing genealogy, which he describes as
the "union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a
historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically
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today."8 Indeed, my work aspires to make use of history to shed light on how
present day problems are constituted. Toward that end, my second objective is to
look at a number of contested views on the nature of the forest problem, and what
to do about it. The fourth chapter explores some of these competing views, the
constituents that hold them and the practices they spawn.
My central argument here is that the prevailing discourse that holds the
campesino solely accountable for the destruction of the forests in the Yaque del
Norte ignores or downplays much of the historical context, and by doing that offers
short-sighted, self-interested and repressive solutions. Throughout this thesis, I
hope to trace the development of this view, its variations and its sources, from its
early proponents to its various adherents in the governmental and
nongovernmental circles today. My work is an attempt to offer a countervailing
account. Sociologist Steven Seidman has called for postmodern social narratives,
ones that provide a practical context for specific events, and that "present critical
alternatives to current dominant images:.."9 In the case of the Yaque del Norte, I
strive to tell a story seldom heard outside the back of the pickup truck; campesinos
tend to be outspoken about the problems in their watershed but their views seldom
find expression in academic theses and journals.
For my methodology, I rely heavily on stories from inhabitants of the
watershed. These stories are drawn from 25 hours of recorded interviews, and
countless hours more of informal talk. Through contacts I made as Peace Corps
volunteer in the early 1990s, I met many key informants -- foremost among them
farmers, former timber industry workers, and community activists, and to a lesser
extent governmental field personnel and regional development professionals. My
research methodology also involved a documents search at numerous Dominican
and American institutions. I draw on numerous US and Dominican government
reports, historical accounts, and scholarly journals not only to flesh out the forest
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history of the region but also to trace the development of the dominant discourse
concerning forest conversion.

Theoretical framework
Although my principal interest is to offer a compelling account, my approach
t

draws on several theoretical frameworks derived from the humanities and the
social sciences. My outlook has been broadly influenced by environmental history,
*

regional political ecology and poststructuralist social theory. That I cross various
disciplinary boundaries is reflective of not only my interdisciplinary graduate field
of environmental studies, but it also suggests that the different disciplines often talk
about similar things in different languages. Complex environmental problems
require interdisciplinary sources to understand them and ultimately to examine
solutions.

This section gives an overview of the intellectual influences that shape

my work with the hope of integrating these diverse strands.
With its Strong historical focus, this project borrows generally from the field of
environmental history. Donald Worster, one of the deans of the discipline, asserts
that in its broadest sense “environmental history is about the role and place of
nature in human life.” t o do such history, as Worster puts it, entails three levels of
interdisciplinary analysis, which form a “single dynamic inquiry in which nature,
social and economic organization, thought and desire are treated as one whole.”10
In general ways, my work addresses, albeit indirectly, ecological, socio-economic
and intellectual concerns. The next chapter opens with a brief account of the
natural history, particularly forest ecology, of the region before moving on to
Worster's second level, which looks at livelihood strategies. The third chapter
continues with socioeconomic realm by examining the timber industry. The fourth
chapter touches on his third level by looking at people's perception of
environmental degradation in the watershed and what to do about it.
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The works of other environmental historians provide further guidance in my
framework.

Dan Flores’ essay, “Place: An argument for bioregional history,”

defines appropriate boundaries for the practice of environmental history. “ In truth,"
Flores writes, "to an extent all history is the history of place. But environmental
history can go beyond traditional history and justify its reputation for new insight if
we follow the lead of ecologists, geographers, ecological anthropologists—and
bioregionalists—in drawing the boundaries of places we study in ways that make
real sense ecologically and topographically..."11 Indeed, the Dominican Cordillera
Central could easily be considered a bioregion unto itself.12 th e mountain range
holds the headwaters of numerous river basins that flow into the Atlantic and
Caribbean. For the purpose of this study, however, I Will focus on the upper Yaque
watershed—the smallest bioregional unit—and with occasional reference to other
watersheds in Yaque del Norte river basin. This basin drains th6 northern and
northeastern portions of the Cordillera Central, and its watersheds, the Bao, the
Mao, the Anima, and others, share much in common with of what will be said about
the upper Yaque del Norte.
In addition to offering useful physical boundaries for environmental history,
Flores' essay also offers good advice on how it should be told. History, in general,
is the discipline with the greatest penchant for narratives, or storytelling.

Flores

argues that, in contrast to many social scientists, “historians communicate
generalities with stories of individuals, whose experiences carry more the scent of
life for readers.”13 I view my study as a grassroots version of environmental history,
one told in part by people who participated in it. The voices included here, with a
few exceptions, are from people who live in the contested watershed; they are the
ones most likely to be affected by whatever actions are taken there. At times,
I

however, conflicting voices will be heard. Campesinos are bound by life in a rural
place, though are divided by socio-economic, political and kinship relations. A
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unified voice doesn’t.exist. What I’ve tried to do here is to present some of the oftvoiced perspectives of people living in the watershed to offer another version of
history.
Environmental history and bioregional approaches lend a valuable, but general,
framework. Regional political ecology can augment those approaches with its
emphasis on the political aspects of environmental issues. By political, I mean not
solely policies, but power dynamics on many levels Of human interactions. In this
study, subsequent chapters suggest that forces that control the watershed—both
past and present—have come largely from outside, from the domestic and
international centers of power. Moreover, the exercise of this power has made
distinct winners and losers of certain groups within this historical struggle, and
undoubtedly left its mark on the landscape. As Blaikie and Brookfield, in their book
Land Degradation and Society,

point out, history shows that "damage to the land

and damage to certain classes in society are interrelated.” 14
Regional political ecology eschews simplistic or deterministic accounts of
destructive land use, that is to say ones that point to a singular cause such as
population pressures.

Furthermore it is useful in defining what constitutes land

degradation: Blaikie and Brookfield consider degradation to be the "loss of
capability to satisfy the demands made upon it.” 15 Indeed, many farmers of the
Cordillera speak of their land’s loss of “force.” While such a definition of
degradation may serve socio-economic ends, a broader, less anthropocentric, one
seems necessary as well. The forests of the upper Yaque and the Cordillera have
seen great ecological simplifications. Once diverse mixed pine and broad-leaf
forests have been converted to poor pastures dominated by exotic forage. |f one
values biological diversity, this process of conversion could easily be characterized
as degradation. By either yardstick, much of the Yaque del Norte and the Cordillera
are worthy of the description.

Political ecology recognizes the possibility of various
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definitions of environmental degradation. “There are competing social definitions of
land degradation, and therefore the challenge of moving away from a single
, ‘scientific’ definition and measurement must be taken up," write Blaikie and
Brookfield." This means we must put the land manager 'centre stage’ in the
explanation, and learn from the land managers’ perceptions of their problems..” 16
This suggestion meshes well with Flores' recommendation about the telling of
history of place.
An overview of the field of regional political ecology has been elaborated by
Raymond Bryant in 1992 article "Political Ecology: An emerging research agenda
in Third World studies."

Like Worster's tripartite notion of environmental history,

political ecology delves into three distinct, though interrelated, areas: the "contextual
sources of environmental change; conflict over access; and the political
ramifications of environmental change."17 These three lines of inquiry are useful for
understanding of the situation in the upper Yaque and the Cordillera.
In recent years, political ecology frameworks have been increasingly linked with
postmodern, and particularly poststructuralist, approaches.18 This is not the place to
address the myriad of forms and concerns posed by post-modern and
poststructuralist thinking, though it is necessary to acknowledge the general
influence they have had on my^work. As a term, postmodernism is vague, meaning
many things to many people, and the body of work is diverse, abstruse, jargpn/

■

ridden and at times contradictory.19 A healthy skepticism toward our major
institutions, paradigms and dogmas - these "totalizing metanarratives" in the lingo
-- is perhaps most often associated with postmodernist thought. Capitalism,
Marxism, science, technology, democracy, or religion - in short any belief system
that constitute modernity - are the stuff of incredulity under the postmodernist
critique. Many of these views are things I've long felt on a visceral level, without
having ever named them. My own skepticism toward technological, bureaucratic,

17
scientific, urban solutions may shine through in this work. This, is not to gainsay any
value at all to these approaches. In places, I will make use of empirical data,
products of the scientific method. Rather it is to suggest they alone may be
insufficient to adequately understand or deal with the enormous complexity and
ambiguity of socio^environmental problems.
Just how we come to know and understand the world is a primary concern of
poststructuralism. My approach is informed by a poststructuralist sensibility in that
it is concerned with the ways language, knowledge and power intertwine in
understanding the construction of problems in the tipper Yaque del Norte, as the
fourth chapter details. Joan W. Scott in an essay describing the value of
poststructuralist approaches in feminist theory, echoes Foucault's notion that
language is central for understanding the workings of social relations, and that a
failure to pay close heed to it only reinforces conventional, and simplistic, notions
about the world in which we live.20
The point is to find ways to analyze specific 'texts' -- not only books and
documents but also the utterances of any kind and in any medium,
including cultural practices-- in terms of specific historical and contextual
meanings....The questions that must be answered in such an analysis,
then, are how, in what specific contexts, among which specific
communities of people, and by what textual and social processes has
meaning been acquired. 21
In looking at the way meaning is acquired in an environmental context,
geographer Piers Blaikie, among others, calls for the recognition that landscapes
and environmental change are social constructions, that is to say that how they are
viewed stems from a variety of experiential, cultural, technical and other filters 22
Typically environmental problems have been looked at within the scientific
framework, what Blaikie calls the “structural” understanding, one that assumes
reality can be perceived thorough empirical, quantifiable, deductive means. It
assumes that there is an “objective world whose essence can be reliably
measured by different observers with the same results.” 23 Blaikie, however,
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describes the move in the social sciences toward a more “interactionist” approach in
which “there is not an objective reality, but many subjective ones which are
provided by different people who see their ‘real’ landscape in their own ways.” 24
Thus in the upper Yaque del Norte, a landless campesino, a community activist, a
!

health promoter, government forestry official, a North American graduate studenteach with their unique lens on the world - all may perceive a problem in the
watershed, though from distinct points of view and arrive at dramatically different
conclusion^. These competing versions of reality vie for dominance in the political
r

realm, and consequent implementation in the “real” world. But Blaikie points out that
this competition in the political arena is played on a field that is far from level, that
some viewpoints are backed by greater power ideologically and materially than
others.
Defining problems and proposing solutions - in short policy-making' - are
inherently politicaf acts because they involve the exercise of power. Maarten Hajer,
in his book The Politics of Environmental Discourse, argues that investigating the
social construction of environmental debates and policy-making - in his case the
one over acid rain in Europe — requires a discursive analysis, which "investigates
the boundaries between the clean and the dirty, the moral and efficient, or how a
particular framing of the discussion makes certain elements appear as fixed or
appropriate while other elements appear problematic. "25 Hajer points out the
salient features of policy-making: First it necessitates that the social phenomenon
be defined - typically by self-designated experts -

in a manner that solutions can

be found. Parameters are set through the following questions. "Within what domain
do we have to find our solutions? What institutional commitments have to be
respected? Which social conditions are malleable, which ones are fixed?"26
These questions are germane to this study of problems in the upper Yaque del
Norte in that they help put boundaries around the issue. What is to be allowed in
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the realm of consideration? For example, if farmers are pushed to clear
mountainside forests because inequities in land tenure preclude the use of good
arable land, is the problem then unsustainable agricultural practices or is it skewed
patterns of land distribution? Another example: is the small-scale agriculture of the
Cordillera -- which provides a significant portion of cheap food for the urban working
poor - less important than the export-led commercial agriculture of the lowland
valleys? Or yet another: Should Foresta, and other government agencies, continue
to hold a lock on the management of the nation's forests, or are other alternatives
possible?
Answering these questions may be well beyond the scope of this thesis. What is
important, however, is that they are at least raised and brought up for consideration.
This thesis aims to serve as a forum for examining the problem in the watershed in
its full context; in other words, to point out the privileged interests that have
dominated the region's history and unprivileged interests that seek recognition
today. The hope here is to broaden the boundaries of the debate over what is to be
done in the contested Cordillera, and to open up spaces for new approaches
toward the protection of rural lands and livelihoods.

CHAPTER 2 Conuquismo: The Shaping and Shifting of Agriculture in the Yaque del Norte
Moro rises early in the dark, and I hear the murmur of his morning prayers in the
next room. He passes through the room where I sleep, pausing to touch the statue
of the Virgin Mary and make the sign of the cross.

In the kitchen outside, I hear him

start a fire and a quick breakfast of strong sweet coffee and ponche, an egg shake
of sorts. With the coffee on, I get out of bed. We leave the house shortly after
daybreak and head up the valley from the village of Manabao. November
mornings dawn clear in the Cordillera Central of the Dominican Republic, though
by afternoon, billowy clouds knot up, portending evening showers. Here in the
upper watershed of the Rio Yaque del Norte, the river that drains the northern half
of this massif, it is time for preparing mountainside farms, still known by the
Arawak word conuco, for planting red beans.
We leave the valley bottom, and climb first through a coffee plantation and then _
old conucos, now in various stages of secondary growth. In these votaos, as
they're known, Moro points out a few trees and their uses: Calmito produces a
sweet black fruit at Christmas; mala mujer gives you good firewood; and the
pinillo has a strong wood, one that “Will outlive you,” he says. Forty years ago,
these old conucos were all monteria. Just before arriving at Moro’s conuco we
pass through a piece of land thick with bracken fern owned by a local forest guard
with Foresta, the Dominican forest service. A year before, a fire set he set to clear
the land for planting raced through the dry weeds beyond the conuco and
burned three acres of sparse pinelands and a portion of Moro’s bean field. I ask
him about this irony, and whether the man paid for Moro’s losses. He smiles and
shakes his head no. It was an accident, and wouldn’t be fair for one poor man to
place such demands oh another. “All of us are poor here," he says.
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Near the ridge top, we arrive at his conuco, a gently sloped depression
covered in yuca, bananas, plantains and sweet potatoes. Moro’s wife, Amalia,
inherited the land from her father, who worked it 40 years ago. Moro has worked
these 20 tareas, (roughly three acres), for the past two years.1 Even though the soil
is tierra caliente, a relatively infertile red clay, Moro believes he'll be able to work it
another couple years before giving it a rest.
With a hoe he begins to clear a patch of cadilto, considered a weed by most
farmers. Once piled, he leaves them to dry in the intense Caribbean mountain sun.
He moves on to older piles of weeds, shrubs and trees such as guava. He puts a
match to one and it ignites swiftly, cracking, popping and sending up great pillows
of white smoke. With a machete as a digging tooL Moro will plant red beans on this
quarter acre.
This is the agriculture Moro has practiced all of his 49 years. It is the agriculture
his father practiced and his grandfather as well. But today it is a practice under
pressure. In the last 30 years, shifting cultivators have been blamed by domestic
and international institutions for substantial, forest clearing in the upper Yaque del
Norte. Undeniably, farmers have been the physical agents, the actual hands, of
much of forest conversion. I find this view, however, is simplistic and incomplete.
Still, in the 1990s the Foresta has clamped down on conuquismo, the traditional
agriculture of the Dominican campesino. “Nowadays," Moro tells me later, over a
noonday plate of rice and beans, “to work in agriculture you have to do it
clandestinely, not publicly, because if

you do it openly you can land in jail with the

Foresta. They don’t let anyone work. For a padre de la familia (the father of a
family) has to look for a way to support his family.”
How to support a family is a universal preoccupation. In the upper Rio Yaque
del Norte, the livelihood strategies employed by the campesino have long been
adaptable and diverse. To survive requires more than agriculture. "You would fail,"
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Moro says. Cash provides for the myriad of domestic needs unmet by subsistence
production. For the past 35 years, Moro has guided tourists in a nearby national
park. In the past, many campesinos worked part-time in the timber industry, as
loggers, oxen teamsters or millworkers, and still maintained their conucos.
The livelihood concerns in the Yaque del Norte are elemental and immediate,
and often times mere survival has led to destructive practices. But these practicesdo not occur in a social and political vacuum. They have been shaped by a chain of
socio-economic factors and political events by actors still around today. In other
w

f

words, they have a history. So the question that arises is does blame for
"deforestation" in the Cordillera rest with the campesinos or does it only reflect
symptoms of more persistent and deeply rooted societal problems? Indeed;
Campesinos make an easy scapegoat. How this blame, this discourse, gets to be
accepted as the dominant version, and how it gets put into practice, is also a
concern of this thesis. As will be shown later in this chapter, Simplistic and
axiomatic assumptions about campesino destructiveness can be traced back to the
1920s, when the first urban-imposed restrictions were placed on campesinos in the
watershed.
To tell the story of agricultural change in the Yaque del Norte requires a brief
overview of the natural history of the region, with a focus on the fire ecology of the
Hispaniolan pine, a tree that has played a key role in shaping the Cordillera's
history. Farmers' activities, particularly burning, at one time expanded the range of
the pine forests; today the same activities, practiced under different circumstances^
are some of the primary forces causing forest loss. In the subsequent section,
farming practiced by the Arawaks offers a glimpse of a past agricultural model
that exhibited longevity and productivity, two possible criteria for the slippery
notion of sustainability . Next, the chapter looks at the settlement and changes in
agriculture in the watershed. The final two sections place agriculture in its societal
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context and examines ways the farmers themselves are attempting to change their
agriculture.

The Pine Forests
Armando Bermudez National Park and its neighbor Jose del Carmen
Ramirez National Park form a 1500 km^ block of protected wild lands, out of which
flow a dozen of the nation's most important rivers.

The very headwaters of the

Yaque del Norte are found here in the saddle between two of the Caribbean's taller
peaks, La Rusilla and Piquito del Yaque.

Here Aguita Fria bubbles out of the

ground to form the primary tributaries for both the Rio Yaque del Norte and the
Yaque del Sur. What the Yaque del Norte is to the northern half of the nation, the
Yaque del Sur is to the southern half.
The trip to these headwaters offers some idea of what much of the upper Yaque
del Norte might have once looked like a scant century ago. This is not to say that
the park is some pristine remnant of highland forest untouched by human hands.
Recent history shows that scores of families were ousted from the newlyestablished park when it was created in 1956. Other evictions have preceded
these. Deeper history shows that the Cordillera Central was inhabited by
indigenous people of Arawak origin, known popularly as the Taino. Further back
were indigenous societies of which nearly nothing is known, though mounds they
left behind dot the Cordillera.2
Even with the long human history of the region, the lands cordoned off by the
park's boundaries offer some sort of baseline notion of forest types once present
throughout the watershed. It is representative in many ways: Elevations in the park
run from 1,000 meters at La Cienaga to more than 3,100 meters atop Pico Duarte,
and precipitation

varies between 1000 and 4000mm. The park includes four of

Holdridge's subtropical life zone classifications found in the watershed.3 Much of
the park, in the subtropical lower montane wet forest zone, is covered by a multi-
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storied flora, one dominated by an overstory mix of broad-leaf trees and pines.
The greatest diversity is found among the broad-leaf trees, with the tallest being
the stone fruit, Prunus occidentalis.

Also mixed in are mountain palms like

Prestoeea montana , tropical cedars like cedrela odorata

as well as numerous

others that may sound best in Spanish: palo santo, temblador, palo amargo.

The

river bottom of Rio Los Tablones is lined with the bamboo-like caha amarga, and
the trees laced with spiraling lianas. In damper sites at higher elevations, the
fronds of tree ferns lean over the trail.

Many broad-leaf trees cradle epiphytes,

bromeliads that look like pineapple tops. Pines stand draped with old man's beard.
These pines are all of one kind, the Hispaniolan Pine (Plnus occidentalis) the
only native on the island.
Along the steep and badly eroded trail, at about 2400 meters, pure pine forests
start to predominate. At this level on the trail to Pico Duarte, the line between the
mixed forest and pine forest is distinct, looking like an old burn. Indeed, some of
the larger pines show fire sign. The pine forest here consists of an uneven age mix
of size classes, from seedlings on up to trees 30 inches at breast height. Trees in
the overstory stand more than 80 feet high. Their boles are straight and branchless
nearly three quarters the way up their height before crowning out into a needled
broccoli-like head. To look on the sloped of the highest peaks in the Caribbean -Pico Duarte, La Pelona, La RuSilla, Pico Yaque -- is to be reminded the gentler
ranges of the Northern Rockies.
The pine has played an enormous role in the history of these mountains and
the country as a whole. Dominican botanist Rafael Mpscoso suggests that a
Hispaniolan pine log washed down a Cordilleran river to the sea and from there ,
was swept to the Azores on the Gulf Stream, where it was found by Columbus, thus
confirming his belief that land lay beyond the western horizon.4 In more recent
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times, the pine was the object of extensive commercial exploitation, which is
explored in the next chapter.
The relationship between the pine and the campesinos is essentially the
narrative thread of this thesis. If the two share anything it is adaptability.
Elevationally, the Hispaniolan pine ranges from less than 300 meters above sea
level to more than 3000. Those limits are influenced by two forces, fire and ice. On
the upper end, hard frost, and even occasional snow, has permitted relatively little
incursion by subtropical broad leafed trees. At lower elevations, these same trees
would invade and eventually crowd out the pine, except in thin and infertile soils,
frost-prone microsites and on the ridge tops.5
Pinus occidentalis

has a strong grassland association, and consequently a

relatively high adaptation to fire. In the higher elevations it grows with a bunch
grass (Danthonia domngensis)

while at lower sites it’s occasionally found with the

exotic yaragua (Melinis minutiflora)., and the bracken fern, (Pteridium spp).
Growing among such fast fuels, the pines have developed thick barks and selfpruning branches, rendering themselves more resistant to fire.
The effect of anthropogenic fire on the pine's, biogeography is of special
interest in that it suggest the relationship between humans and pines has not
always been destructive . In the 1940s, forester Leslie Holdridge linked the pine's
distribution on the island to human fire. "As soon as man entered the area,
occasional fires began the process of pushing back the hardwoods from the
sections which the pines were able to invade because local sources of seed were
available and to hold because pines are quite fire-hardy except when young."6
Geographer William Denevan further argues that the southern limit of pine in the
Americas may have been extended by anthropogenic fires.7 In Nicaragua,
Denevan argues that native peoples may have encouraged the spread of pine (P.
oocarpa and P. pseudostrobus) through fires set to hunt and to make milpas, their

,
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form of shifting cultivation. These fires were irregular enough to permit regeneration
and generally coincided with the end of the wet season.8 Similarly, on Hispaniola,
i

the Arawak used fire to clear land for their mound agriculture and also burned
grasslands to hunt the rabbit sized rodents known as huitias (Plagiodontia sp.),
one of the few native mammals on the island.
Fire interval is a critical factor in Hispaniolan pine ecology. Fire benefits the
pines by creating a suitable substrate, and by excluding the subsequent broadleaf
invaders. Fire promotes vigorous regeneration, typically of a dense mat of
seedlings, much like lodgepole pine regenerates in the Rockies.9 But it can also
hinder regeneration if it comes too frequently. Fire intervals between five and 20
years are ideal for the establishment and maintenance of pine forests; any shorter
would prevent regeneration and allow the eventual conversion to savanna or
pasture, while anything longer than 20 years would permit the conversion to
hardwood forests.10
Physically, it is that shortening of the fire interval that has converted much of the
forest in the upper Yaque del Norte. Burned year after year to create and maintain
pasture, the forest seed source has been eliminated in many places. Again, these
shorter fire intervals have largely been determined by the social acting on the
biological. Still, fire has always been a part of farming systems on Hispaniola. The
history of agriculture in the upper Yaque del Norte and the Cordillera Central
predates the arrival of Colon in 1492. The next section briefly examines the
agriculture practiced in Pre-Columbian times.

Historic Agricultural Practices of the Arawak
Unlike many nations of Latin America, the Dominican Republic has no
remaining indigenous people, nor has it for centuries. The first European
encounter with native America proved brutally inept and casually genocidal. The
early inhabitants of Quisqueya, the Arawak name for Hispaniola, are believed to
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have come from the South America mainland, the Orinoco region specifically. In
their canoes, another word of Arawak origin, they brought with them to the Greater
Antilles a root crop based polyculture that was amazingly productive. But Arawaks
were all but extirpated by the middle of the 16th Century And as if to vex their
Spanish persecutors, the last Arawaks to die took their agriculture with them. Of
Arawak agriculture today little remains but the name for the subsistence plots,
conucos, and the campesino predilection for certain roots crops.
The Arawak tribes practiced extensive mound agriculture throughout the
island except for some poorly drained coastal lowlands. Geographer Carl Sauer
wrote that if soil was sufficiently present, the AraWaks lived in the highlands and
farmed rtiany of the mountainsides. Early Spanish accounts, and numerous
Cordilleran archeology sites, including ones near Manabao, indicate wiidespread
settlements in the mountain valleys.11 Just how populous the entire island was at
the time of the arrival of Columbus is uncertain, and estimates vary wildly, from
60,000 to seven million. Of the middle range figures, an early colonial count put the
number of indigenous people at just over one million. Father Bartolome de las
Casa, the chronicler of the native lifeways and their demise, said there were as
many as three million people on the island.12 The numbers of indigenous people
are significant, for it shows that traditional agriculture perhaps provided
sustenance for millions of people.
Regardless of the number of mouths it fed, Arawak agriculture was very
productive for the labor involved. Most of the work of Arawak conuco making went
in at the beginning. Fires were part of the process. To clear land, the Arawaks
girdled or felled trees and burned them once dry. Soil was then piled in round
heaps, montones, up to two feet high and several across in diameter. The
arrangement of the montones impeded sheet erosion. These mounds were
planted principally in root crops such as yuca, (cassava) and batata (sweet potato)
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and other tubers that occupied different layers. While the yuca grew well over three
feet, the batata sprawled at ground level like an ivy. Aside from the root crops, the
conucos grew squash, another ground cover, and nitrogen-fixing crops such as
peanuts and to a lesser extent beans. The corn-beans-squash polyculture of Meso
America, known there as the milpa, was practiced as well but Sauer believed it
was a relatively late arrival.13
The sharpest distinction between conucos of today and the pre-Columbian age
is that the former are part of a shifting cultivation system while the latter were not.
The mounds were permanent, and in fact, endured after the Arawaks' passing,
eventually returning to monte. Sauer explains that the mounds were labor
intensive to establish but required minimal work after. The yuca and sweet
potatoes demanded little from the soils, and weeding was limited because the
sprawling sweet potatoes and squash warded off competitors.14
Aside from their conucos, the Arawaks had forest gardens, a variety of trees,
shrubs and plants they tended around their circular thatched houses or bohios. <
Around these homes grew bixa, a small tree whose seeds could be used for red
dye, the mamey,

a prized fruit even today, a species of cotton tree, tobacco, the

pineapple, two kinds of hot peppers, and innumerable edible and medicinal plants
and herbs.15
Sauer avers that the Arawak conuco rivals any form of agriculture in terms of
productivity. Arawak agriculture, as described by Sauer, exhibits many of the
features of the so-called sustainable agriculture so often sought today:
The mixed planting system gave the greatest range of terrain usable
without regard to steepness or regularity of slope. The plants grown were
neither demanding nor exhaustive of soil fertility, and were relatively
indifferent to soil acidity. They needed no special means of storage, had no
critical time of harvest, and were in production at all seasons.16
i

Except in one critical aspect, the conuco of today bears some resemblance to
those of the Arawak age. The name remains the same, as do many of the crops

29
and their arrangement, but the mounds are gone . For most part, the conuco today
is associated with shifting cultivation, tumba y quema, or the so-called slash and
burn agriculture. Now migratory, and the conuco's sustainability has suffered for it.
Equally important, the conuco has become a unit for market production, further
straining ecological limits. It is important to keep in mind, however, that once a
widespread and enduring hillside agriculture was practiced, one which helped
feed large populations with relative ease.
After the genocide of the Arawaks, the Cordillera and Yaque del Norte
remained largely uninhabited by humans until the 19th century As the following
section notes, feral cattle and pigs first brought Spanish settlers, and a new,
migratory agriculture, to the Cordillera. Settlement brought with it small-scale
market production agriculture, The way of life developed by these small holders in
the mid-1800s endured nearly a century. Equally important, it was this period that
•

.

1

saw the emergence of the urban contention that the campesino and the forest are
two irreconcilable enemies.

Settlement in the Yaque del Norte
Historian Alfred Crosby has noted that as the native population on Hispaniola
declined precipitously , the number of dogs, pigs and cattle on the island grew
exponentially.

Livestock took well to the land without predators but with such an

agreeable climate. One colonial official estimated in 1518 that if 30 or 40 head of
cattle strayed off, their number would grow tenfold in as few as four years.
Similarly, within a few short years of the arrival of Columbus hogs ran wild in many
parts of the island. The feral pig, the puerco cimarron, became a "fast, tough, lean,
self-sufficient greyhound of a hog much closer in appearance and personality to
wild boar than to one of our twentieth-century hogs," wrote Crosby.17
The feral hogs that took to the mountains of the Cordillera were soon followed
by Spanish and Afro-Hispano settlers and hunters, known as the monteros.

Some
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Dominican historians speculate that many Spaniards retreated to the highlands
during Haitian invasions in the early 1800s and also during the Haitian occupation
from 1822 to 1844. 18 The earliest settlers ran their cattle semi-wild in the forests,
and farmed small conucos

During that time, population was low, and much of the

land fn the upper Yaque del Norte was held communally in a system known as
terenos comuneros.
This colonial system dates back to the 16th Century when the Spanish crown
would grant an Amparo Real to a settler. This gave the holder permission to use
the king's land, provided it was either built upon, farmed or most often, stocked
with animals. When the original recipient died, the Amparo Real was divided into
shares and distributed among the heirs. These new holders of acciones de pesos
could graze cattle or farm anywhere in the granted land. Each new generation of
heirs would further subdivide the original ranch. Until the late 19th Century terenos
comuneros functioned well because of sparse population, cheap land prices, and
the lack of surveyors; furthermore it assured all the heirs would receive equal
access to water, forage, shelter and land on the ranch. Over the generations, the
pesos were further divided, sold, or traded, so much so that the exact number of
shareholders was never known, nor was there a group effort at management.19
This situation would become problematic at the end of the 19th Century when land
values rose, and along with them the incidence of fraud.
Many of the community names in the upper Yaque del Norte owe their origin to
the first monteros.

E! Dulce, for its abundance of wild honey bees, Los Dajaos,

for a type of fish in the stream, Pinar Quemado, for the burnt pine stand, and La
Cienaga, the bog. Save for a few monteros, the upper Rio Yaque del Norte was
sparsely populated until the mid 1800s. An early account of the watershed comes
from North American geologist William Gabb, who in 1870 was sent' to carry out a
three-year geological survey of the nation for some New York mining interests.
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At that time, Gabb described Manabao as the last community in the Yaque, and
even then there were only two or three families. Gabb admired the people of the
Cordillera, calling them a " independent, hardy race of mountaineers."20 In
Manabao, people, tended cattle, and hunted wild pigs but mostly grew tobacco,
which they rolled into cylinders called andullo and sold.21 The pungent andullo ,
still widely smoked by campesinos, provided cash for goods that could only be
bought. By the 1860s, commercial agriculture had begun to make in-roads into
Jarabacoa and the upper Yaque. The livestock economy based on hides and meat
found it difficult to market goods internally and externally. Tobacco production, and
to a lesser extent beans, became the major source of income for the residents of
Jarabacoa and the upper Yaque del Norte. In the Cibao Valley below, and in the
city of Santiago in particular, export tobacco had created a relatively prosperous
commercial elite and peasant economy based in equal parts on subsistence and
market production.22
The way of life noted by Gabb in the 1870s persisted largely intact in the upper
Yaque del Norte until the 1950s when the first logging roads were built into the
drainage. The activities of the early residents of the Yaque del Norte, however,
were not without effect on the watershed, nor did they go unnoticed by the larger
society. In the mid-1920s, the Santiago lawyer and national civic leader, Dr. Juan
B. Perez, along with Dr. Miguel Canela Lazaro, was hired by the Dominican
government to explore and report on the headwaters of the Yaque del Norte. Their
mission was to report on the possibility of establishing the nation's first forest
reserve. Perez's report is valuable for several reasons: First it gives an account of
early "deforestation" in the watershed; second, it marks the genesis of an
environmental discourse that holds up the campesino as the problem; third, it
reflects the urban bias of many conservation efforts and advocates strong
measures tbat are still prescribed today.
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In his 1926 report, Perez described how campesinos had cleared forests in the
Yaque del Norte river bottom, the flattest and most fertile land, in the first two
decades of the 20th Century. He also noted the fires set to improve pasture. The
montero, according to Perez, is "by profession a layabout" who doesn't work the
land except in scarce instances. He
lives"23

is a "threat to the forests in which vicinity he

Perez goes on to frame the issue in a way that is still echoed today:

The case in the Yaque del Norte is clear and precise. From the Yaque, live
half of the Republic. Should the interest of this great nucleus of population
sacrifice itself to the misunderstood interest of a half dozen poor wretches
... who without mercy are destroying the very sources of this indispensable
and legendary river?24
Perez urged the government to establish a protected area around the
headwaters of the Yaque del Norte. To do so required the removal of the
campesinos - 15 families with a total of 95 people. Perez suggested that the law of
t

eminent domain could be invoked, and that land could be acquired cheaply. He
even mentioned that some residents were squattefs who could be expelled without
pay, though he added it would be worthwhile gesture to compensate them.25
Perez and Canela - widely considered the patriarchs of Dominican
conservation -- were among the first Dominicans in a lineage that runs to date to
call for the removal of the campesinos from parts of the Yaque del Norte. Trujillo

, would incorporate the, first protected area into the national park; today groups in
Santiago call for the enlargement of the park, and relocation of the area
inhabitants, in order to protect the watershed. The reach of the urban conservation
discourse will be examined in the last chapter; suffice to say here that Dominican
urban groups have typically viewed campesino livelihood in a disparaging light,
and have been able to impose their wishes. In particular, the conuco has been
demonized. The prevalence of such a view warrants an examination of today's
conuquismo. How and why the conuco has changed is critical to this study. How
to "settle" the conuco once again is of equal concern. The next section gives a brief
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overview of shifting cultivation systems in Latin America, and then narrows in on
how it is practiced, and has been modified, throughout history in the Yaque del
Norte.

Conuquismo
In describing what they label "agrodiversity," Brookfield and Padoch note the
"number and variety of farming systems in the world exist because farmers have,
over centuries, devised them to fulfill their needs in relation to the physical,
biological, social, economic and political environments that they manage."26
Shifting cultivation's ubiquity in the Tropics is as great as its diversity.

Whether it is

practiced on a benign or destructive basis is determined in large part by the
greater societal context in which it is embedded. The narrative line through this
chapter offers that socio-economic and political forces have prompted agriculture
in the watershed to change, for better or worse, and that such conditions may now
be spurring another change. But there is a tendency among the media,
governments and other institutions to lump the numerous forms of campesino
agriculture together in one destructive category: "slash and burn" agriculture. In
less pejorative terms, this form of agriculture is known as swidden, long or short
fallow shifting cultivation. It would be an equally serious mistake to romanticize, or
even accept uncritically, the practice of shifting cultivation. Not all farming practices
are ecologically benign or productive, nor do all farmers within a region possess
the same levels of farming knowledge and resources.
In writing about the Amazon, geographer William Denevan describes four
shifting cultivation patterns-- all of them evident to some degree in the upper Yaque
del Norte 27 Just as the ecology of Pinus occidentalis is tied to the length of fire
intervals, so the degree of destructiveness of shifting cultivation depends on the
length of the fallow period. Short cultivations in small plots widely dispersed
followed by long fallows of 20 years or more mimic natural disturbances and allow

34
the most substantial forest regeneration. In some places in the upper Yaque, pine
stands now grow in the conucos of the past. Short fallows are less ecologically
sound as they give a farm plot four to 20 years rest, permitting some scrub and low
forest regeneration. Bush or grass fallows are frequently seen in the Dominican
Republic. These last as few as four years, with the fallow dominated by weeds,
grasses and maybe guava. Farmers forced to work grass fallows can somewhat
augment their soil's meager fertility organically through manures, compost, and
ash or, as more often is the case, through chemicals. Indeed, as the fallows
shorten the usage of fertilizers and pesticides increases.
Perhaps the most prevalent pattern throughout the watershed is what Denevan
calls terminal shifting cultivation. He writes that it is associated with pioneer areas
where roads have recently been built, and its practitioners are often new
immigrants inexperienced in farming.28 Cultivated too long and fallowed too short,
these conucos basically collapse and become overrun with weeds and pests. In
years past, the farmer would move higher into the forests and begin the cycle
anew. Denevan again describes the aftermath of terminal cultivation in many parts
of the Americas, one especially apt of the Yaque del Norte:
Land deterioration, is permanent. The cover is grass and shrub with little or
no rotating with either crops or forest. The recovery of the forest is
prevented intentionally by burning and chopping, unintentionally by fires
set for a variety of reasons, by the invasion of aggressive grasses or
bracken ferns, and by a deteriorated soil structure and nutrient level. This
'savannaization' is often extensive, and sources of seeds for regeneration
of primary tree species become unavailable.29
The story of the modern conuco seems one of declension, of gradual slide
toward oblivion. The conuco's roots are found in poverty and oppression, and
ironically, those roots dog its image today. Farmers wanting to be modern look
down on the conuco as the embodiment of the culture of poverty. Today's conuco
is essentially African in origin, though plant combinations and the very name are
indigenous. Enslaved Africans were allotted little space by the Spaniards for their

35

own food production, and out of necessity developed a diverse multi-storied
system, the stacked structure of the Arawak conuco. Both imitated a forest
ecosystem with its stratified crowns and roots, its nutrient cycling through litter drop,
and its diversity of both annual and perennial plants.30
North American Robert Werge studied Dominican conuquismo

in the

Cordillera Central in the 1970s and found that despite its pernicious reputation, it
■\

has "its own internal logic and consistency. "31 Werge estimated 20 tareas per
year, a little more than a hectare, were cleared by each family to plant conucos.
These 20 tareas, however, were divided into several parcels often great distances
apart. The diversity of sites, as well as the diversity of crops help minimize risks
faced by the farmer.
As a production unit, the conuco is unlike many swidden agriculture systems,
which produce for subsistence primarily.

Dominican conuquismo

includes

subsistence and market crops such as red beans and, in the last 20 years,
vegetables such as cabbages, potatoes, tomatoes, cauliflower, The surplus root
crops such as yuca, sweet potatoes, yautia and rabano, are often sold in town as
well.
The fallows, according to Werge, averaged eight to ten years, though that
depended on land availability and demographic factors. These cycles of cultivation
and fallow continue until the soil becomes too exhausted or eroded away, leaving
degraded sites to convert to poor pasture and savannas, the terminal end of
shifting cultivation.32 The old conucos most often become poor pasture for stringy
cattle. The conversion of forests to conucos isn't necessarily a permanent one; the
conversion of old conucos to pasture, however, may be much more enduring.
Dominican farmers, themselves, have watched -- and participated - in this
process over the decades. Among campesinos old enough to remember the days
before the advent of the timber industry and all the roads in the 1950s, there is a
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tendency reminisce warmly about life in the Yaque del Norte. Teofilo and
Augustine are neighbors and compadres, godfathers to one another's children.
With their families, they have lived in a small valley outside of La Cienaga for most
their lives. They remember during la epoca de Trujillo33 when the hills were
forested, when a farmer could work the land without worrying about the forestales,
when livestock roamed the hillsides, and when they could hunt wild pigs with their
pack of dogs.

"For forever," says Teofilo," all our lives, people have hunted pigs.

Now it is prohibited."
Along with the loss of traditional hunting rights, campesinos have lost their
rights to timber harvesting, and seemingly even the right to farm. "In our property,
we can't fall a tree or prune. If we cut down a tree to use for some work in a kitchen
or house, it's jail," Augustine says. Over the years, the foundations of campesino
livelihoods have been systematically undermined.
Aside from political restrictions, Teofilo and Augustine say they've seen
agriculture slip into a long, slow agronomic decline. The soils supporting the
mountain forests of the Cordillera are shallow and relatively infertile. Once exposed
to the elements -- the torrential rains and winds and even occasional hurricanes -the topsoil begins to run downslope, or leach out its nutrients; the soil compact
under the feet of the farmer or stock; in the intense Caribbean sun, the humus
cooks up and moisture goes with it; crops quickly claim the remaining nutrients.34
After a good initial harvest, soil fertility declines and the weeds, the colonizers of ^
the degraded, invade. These processes are exacerbated with each successive
cropping cycle. In his own agriculture, Teofilo has seen this firsthand:
This has degenerated. Before when we could cut down trees, we used to
. go to the hills, when the Foresta wasn't like it is, we could make conucos
without adding anything....Today you can't do that. You have to work the
same land, and it always loses its force."
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To recoup some of that force, la fuerza, many campesinos have turned to
chemical solutions. While the benefits Of the Green Revolution have mostly
bypassed the small farmer, the chemical byproducts -- the fertilizers and
pesticides -- have assumed a place in their agriculture. Forced to farm fewer sites,
and for longer periods, farmers have increased their usage of chemical fertilizers,
herbicides, and pesticides. And while this adaptation has bought them some time,
these chemicals are expensive and each planting cycle requires greater inputs as
fertility continues to decline: And this mentions nothing of health consequences
associated with agrochemical use.
Stationary, the conuco seemed a model of agroecological good sense. But the
mounded conucos of the Arawak are long gone. Migratory, the conuco becomes
more problematic as fallow periods shorten. The end of Spanish colonialism and
the abolition of slavery in the early decades of 19th Century gave greater mobility
to people and their agriculture. Under low population density with an abundance of
land, a migratory conuco probably was light on the land in the long term, those
conditions broke down during the 20th Century. Indeed, the working lives of
Teofilo and Augustine span a critical period in Dominican agriculture. They began
them at the end of the pioneer era and now see that way of life in eclipse. Farmers
have been made criminals; Teofilo has already"spent time in jail for clearing land.
Gone are the days of ample land, and the land they do own continues to lose its
remaining capacity to produce, as Augustine describes:
Every day we fall further behind. And the law get stronger, and less and
less production, and less and less land to work because the little bit of
lousy land they let us work, the Foresta wants to take it from us and plant
trees on it. And like I said if it were fruit trees, or something useful it
wouldn't be bad but more and more it is pine they want to plant. And
there's no one here that eats pine.
No one that eats pine. That says much about the elemental existence for many
campesinos in the watershed. As currently conceived, forestry projects, with a
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material return that comes in decades, offer little appeal for many campesinos
faced with more pressing needs at the rural margin.
At.this point in the study of the agriculture in the Cordillera, I think it is
necessary to look at that 'margin and pose some questions.

Why do farmers work

the mountainsides? Why don't they use soil conservation measures? Why must
they farm land until it collapses ecologically? These are resource management
questions with social and political answers. To answer these questions warrants a
return to Manabao and Moro, a farmer who has survived in a world ordered by
others.

Agriculture and the socio-economic context
Economist Rosemary Vargas-Lundius, in her book Peasants in Distress: poverty
and unemployment in the Dominican Republic, argues that national development
strategies have "systematically neglected the agricultural sector in general and the
peasantry in particular. "35 Land and credit are controlled by a relative few. As a
result of such inequities, unemployment and underemployment are widespread in
the countryside. Landless and jobless campesinos migrate to the cities, where they
encounter a whole new set of problems. In the cam po, a common refrain captures
this scenario: Aqui, no hay vida -- here, there's no life.
Here, in this case, is the river valley of the Rio Yaque del Norte near
Manabao. The valley bottom widens in this area, and as a consequence much of
the best arable land in the watershed is found near the village. This land,
estimated at roughly 40,000 tareas, (25 square kilometers), however, belongs not
to the locals, but to a dozen or so families living in Jarabacoa. To prevent local
use, these owners have fenced off their land, which is reserved instead as pasture
for a few head of cattle. This fact does not escape the attention of the campesinos,
who have long had to farm the hillsides above the village. "Walk around Manabao
and you won’t see a yuca plant anywhere on the flat land," says Moro, a third
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generation resident of the area. "Today this land has nothing growing but weeds,
and produces nothing but a little grass."
Long ago much of the land around Manabao was communal. Over the years
the land passed into private ownership, though it never had much value until recent
times. Some thirty years ago land sold for 2 1/2 pesos a tarea; today land cost run
as high as $15,000 pesos a tarea. 36 "The rich took advantage of those times to get
land," Moro says.
Moro's observations have a history. Early in the 20th Century, the
dismantlement of the terenos comuneros system, further discussed in the next
Chapter, marked the start of a major shift in the land distribution and tenure
structure. The rapid growth of foreign-owned sugar cane plantations initiated the
breakdown of communal ownership, and the consequent increase of land values. It
also played a role in the rise of the predatory Trujillo regime. These factors all led
to vast disparities in land ownership patterns.

Today, the system of latifundio-

minifundio, that of many small farms and few large estates, prevails in the
Dominican Republic as it does throughout much of Latin America. Exactly how
skewed the distribution is today is unknown; the last agricultural census was in
1981. That year 82 percent of the farms were smaller than five hectares, and
accounted for only 12 percent of agricultural land. On average, these farms were
one hectare in size, and in 1981 there were almost a quarter million of them on
land best suited for forests. Conversely, large farms, ones greater than 200 ha.,
occupied 36 percent of the farm land but represented only 0.3 percent of the
farms.37 And not surprisingly, most of these were cattle ranches. A 1976 study
showed that large farms, those greater than 30 ha., devote 76 percent of their land
to pasture and only eight percent to crops.38
A study using satellites found that between 1972 and 1986 conversion to
pasture accounted for 78 percent of the forest clearing in the western Dominican
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Republic, the region occupied largely by the Cordillera Central.39 Forest
conversion accelerated from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, averaging
36,000 hectares a year.40 And this process hasn't been just happenstance. It
coincides with the creation of legal incentives, as well as the booms in the national
and international beef markets. It is noteworthy that in 1972 the Balaguer
government passed laws selling state lands with the proviso that they be used for
cattle ranching; in 1979 further legislation geared toward supporting the cattle
industry was passed 41 A new class of cattle ranchers has developed in the last 25
years: the urban professionals eager for an investment with low labor costs, and
one that carries long standing prestige 42 In the upper Yaque del Norte, a. common
pattern was for absentee owners, generally from Jarabacoa or Santiago, to allow
campesinos to clear forestland for a crop cycle or two before fully converting it to
pasture through repeated burnings.
A related land tenure problem is the lack of clear titles to the land farmers
already cultivate. In the Dominican Republic, figures on who actually has a title to
their land are non-existent. It is widely acknowledged, however, that many, if not
most, of the farmers in the upper Yaque del Norte have no clear title to the land
they work. The insecurity stemming from this is problematic: With no certainty that
they won't be run off their land, farmers are reluctant to invest the large amounts of
labor need for soil conservation measures. Nor are forestry or agroforestry
projects likely to be launched without guarantees of title security 43 Yet another
problem is that without a clear title to land farmers are unable to put it up as
collateral for much needed loans.
Compounding the inequalities in land holding is the vast amount of land that is
not in use or is underutilized. The World Bank cites estimates that 13 percent of the
country's farm land - 350,000 hectares - are not under cultivation. And half of
those lands are government-controlled.44
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This too is known by Moro. "The government can't give jobs to ail the farmers in
this country." What it can do, he says, is buy unused lands in the region and
distribute them to the campesinos. "If the poor people could have 30 or 40 tareas
of flat land to work and support themselves, they wouldn't be on the hills farming,"
he says.
In the past in the upper Yaque del Norte, dispossessed campesinos have
been relocated to other parts of the country in an attempt at agrarian reform. Moro
expresses some skepticism at such efforts. He recalls one attempt after the
shutdown of the timber industry in the 1960s that relocated some 20 families to the
northeastern part of the Cibao Valley, near San Francisco de Macoris. These
families were given a small parcel of land to plant rice. They fared poorly in the hot
lowland valley.

Many sickened because of bad water, and most gave up and left

for the towns or the capital." We would have to see if life would be easier there,"
Moro says. In the past they took people from here and they suffered from hunger
and misery worse than they had here."
Vargas-Lundius argues that agrarian reform in the Dominican Republic has
been a myth , an outright failure. If anything, the inequities in landholdings have
deepened since reform was first initiated. These failures can be traced to built-in
limitation of the reform laws; neither sugar cane plantation nor cattle ranches can
be expropriated, thus eliminating most of the latifundios. Furthermore, VargasLundius writes that ambitious laws encounter poor administration by government
officials who may themselves be large land holders. "Many of the radical laws that
have been issued could not be applied, since some of those who were in charge pf
their application would be affected by them."45
Nor has the government been any more supportive in giving credit. "There's no
help for the small farmer from the government," Moro says. "They won't lend to
campesinos. Moro says the government bank, the Banco Agricola, occasionally

42
will make small short-term ( three to four month) loans, mostly to bankroll a bean
crop. Longer term loans, to plant yuca, plantains, or coffee, aren't made to
campesinos. Again Vargas-Lundius' research documents that small farmers with
little or no land also receive little credit from Dominican banks.46 For large farmers,
credit is needed either to pay for inputs such as seeds, agro-chemicals and labor;
for small farmers credit pays for the family necessities in the lag time between
planting and harvest. Large and mid size farmers, with the best land and
consequently the best collateral, receive low interest loans through the Banco
Agricola. Government lending accounts for 57 percent of all agricultural loans,
while the private lenders account for 28 percent. Interest rates paid in this informal
sector are much higher than at the bank. Private lenders range from store owners
who let farmers run a tab, to truckers, intermediaries and representatives of the
agro-industries. This latter group gives credit, technical support, and inputs in
return for a portion of the harvest.47
Yet another problem is the marketing of what is produced. Campesinos in the
upper Yaque often sell their beans, vegetables, coffee or viveres to an
intermediary, often someone with a small pickup, who then takes them to market in
Jarabacoa or La Vega. Campesinos often lament that as producers they receive
the smallest rewards for their labor.
Thus, the socio-economic context in which conuquismo is practiced is
characterized by profound inequities in agricultural land distribution, land tenure
insecurities, the unwillingness of the government to extend credit to small farmers,
and a marketing and transport system that favors the intermediaries. Politically, the
climate is equally harsh. The Foresta crackdown on the small farmers is explored
at length elsewhere in this thesis. In short, it is in no way hyperbolic to say that
agriculture in the upper Yaque del Norte is an endangered way of life, a fact Moro
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recognizes. Two decades ago, there were maybe one hundred farmers in
Manabao. Today, maybe ten continue to farm.
For me it's difficult to imagine agriculture here in ten years because when
you used to look at the hillsides, you'd see 15 or 20 conucos, but now you
can't count not even one. Too many have disappeared. Foresta stops you
from clearing weeds to plant your viveres. The farmer is always scared to
work because he doesn't want to land in jail for working. If he's jailed, his
family is going to suffer even more.
The pressure on the farmers affects not only the families, but could ultimately
have repercussions for the wider society. Moro points out that the towns depend on
the same agriculture that the campesino produces." If there's no agriculture, the
towns are going to suffer from hunger as well," he says. The expanding free trade
zones known as zona francas are creating a low paid worker class, one
dependent on cheap food costs. With the best agricultural lands often devoted to
export crops or ranching, the hillsides are what remain for the nation's subsistence.
Just how important the nation's conucos .are has never been studied. The
dependence, however, of the newly industrializing towns on regional hillsides
portends serious difficulties and possibly unrest should that agriculture be
undermined by soil erosion or loss of fertility or even worse a complete prohibition
and eviction of its practicioners in the region.48
Moro speaks his words directly, yet without resentment. He is an affable man, a
deeply religious one. When he speaks of los ricos, the rich, it is not as some
Marxist revolutionary; it as a man who has struggled to support a family, and has
managed to do it well.

He is a farmer, a campesino, and that is more than a

livelihood. It is the source of his identification, his culture. "I am 48 years old and
I've worked agriculture since I was ten. Sowing, harvesting. I've had lots of failures.
I've had, as well, the fruit God has given me to tend. I've produced. For that reason
one feels very emotional about working in life. I never get tired of it."

44
And despite the enormity of the forces arrayed against him and other
campesino families, Moro is neither cynical nor passive. He belongs to two farmers
associations, and another for park guides. One of his groups recently planted
250,000 pines near the park entrance. He says he likes to work with groups, and
the church, and believes that the recent formation of the JuntaYaque, a grassroots
federation of 16 farmer and women's groups in the watershed, is an important
move in protecting their livelihoods.49 "I think when groups unite, unify, study, work
, it's always possible to see benefits... For a person alone, a thing might be heavy ,
but for many it is not."
In recent years, farmers in the watershed have begun to organize themselves.
Their efforts have been aimed at education, and the reorientation of the old ways.
In the nearby village of Los Dajaos, some five miles from Manabao, one farmers'
group has shown some success in trying to put agriculture on a more sustainable
footing. The next section examines the efforts of ASADA and its attempts to effect a
new agriculture for the upper Yaque del Norte.

ASADA and the new agriculture
On the acre behind the house of Jose and Naty Cruz, bands of coffee and
nitrogen-fixing shrubs form live barriers that hug the contours of the gentle hillside.
In between the barriers, rows of strawberries arch with the bow of the hill's slope:
Several double dug terraces are densely covered in corn, vegetables andviveres.
The plantains and bananas grow tall with regular applications of compost made on
the farm. Scattered throughout the acre are both tropical and temperate fruit trees,
ranging from the familiar citrus and papaya, peaches, plums, and apples to the
lesser known like kandangq, nispero, and granadillo. On the acre is a duck pond
with stocked with tilapia, and a couple of goat huts built on stilts. Cuttings from the
calliandra, and other crops residues; help feed the goats while the manure is
returned to the field. Above the farm, closest to the house, Naty maintains a brilliant
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variety of ornamentals and fruit trees. Below i t , two milk cows graze in a small
pasture. Across the stream at the bottom of the hill is a thickly forested slope
covered in a mix of pine, the shade tree guama, and coffee.
On this small parcel, Jose has established his model of what a more permanent
agriculture might look like in the upper Yaque del Norte. Whether this model is
attainable by others in the community is a good topic for inquiry. Jose and Naty are
not typical residents of Los Dajaos; even by North American standards they would
be considered middle class. But they came from the city to reclaim their campo
roots. Jose is the son of a farmer from Salcedo in the northern Cibao while Naty
was born and raised in a campo outside of Jarabacoa.

In Santo Domingo, Jose

used to make wrought-iron furniture. They first came to Los Dajaos twenty-five
years ago, at first just for the weekends, then for longer periods. About nine years
ago, they decided to take up coffee growing, and make the move permanent.
Though relative newcomers, Jose and Naty are perhaps the best friends the
community could have. With his old Toyota Land Cruiser, Jose has often been
called on to drive a sick or injured neighbor down the valley to a Jarabacoa
hospital. But even more important, he's been active in numerous community
projects. He brings with him a good deal of influence, and among his many
friends, Jose counts NGO representatives, government officials, army generals and
university professors. Only half jesting, they call their elegantly simple farm home
the Embassy of Los Dajaos.
Motivated equally by community-mindedness and enlightened self-interest,
Jose is part of the community drive toward a new agriculture, and a better life in
general. Recent years have seen a flurry of community development projects in
Los Dajaos, beginning with ASADA and its work. The women's group of Los
Dajaos, with the help of a Peace Corps volunteer, launched a latrine construction
project and built a pharmacy and a medical consulting office. The Catholic church-
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affiliated Obra Social Para El Progresso de Los Pueblos, based in Jarabacoa, has
helped with school construction and health promoters. ASADA, and Los Dajaos in
general, has received a good deal of attention -- in terms of financial and technical
assistance -- from outside the watershed. From international sources, ASADA has
received funding from the Falconbridge Foundation, the donor agency of a
Canadian mining company that mines ferronickel some 50 miles away, the InterAmerican Foundation, and the Canadian consulate. In the early 90s' Peace Corps
was an active participant in many community efforts. A group of Spanish doctors,
affiliated with a university in Madrid, have volunteered their services in the
community. Two universities from Santo Domingo, the Universidad Nacional
Pedro Henriquez Urena (UNPHU) and the Instituto Tecnologico de Santo Domingo
(INTEC) carried out a Rapid Rural Evaluation of community resources and
problems.
in varying degrees and differing manners, nearly all the activities involved JoSe
and Naty. Thus, the direction of community development efforts in Los Dajaos have
been facilitated, if not shaped in outline, by one couple. Still the work achieved by
ASADA and other community groups is the result of many campesino families. To
its credit, ASADA's membership and its directive include small holders as well as
larger ones like Jose. For example, ASADA's treasurer Hector has lived all his 35
years in Los Marranitos, a poor mountain top community 1000 feet above Los
Dajaos. These two communities may be at polar ends of the socio-economic
spectrum in the upper Yaque del Norte. Hector's resources, in comparison to
Jose!s, are many times more modest.

Nonetheless, ASADA offers space for both

interests; both live in a place where forest conversion jeopardizes their livelihoods,
and both face political pressure for a possible eviction from the watershed.
Los Marranitos affords the perfect vantage on a large portion of the watershed.
Even in the last 20 years, Hector has seen many of the hillsides cleared.

But in the
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last decade people have also realized their effect. "People are aware of .how
things were before and how they are now. They have compared. There was
always a lot of water, as well as a lot of forest. Today there is little forest, and little
water."
Hector says much of past agricultural practices -- especially cultivation of red
beans and corn on steep slopes without erosion-reducing measures -w e re to
blame. New crops, such as the chayote, the strawberry, the potato, may offer less
destructive alternatives. "Our vision is to try to change traditional agriculture for a
new agriculture...We have a greater awareness that we have to take care of the
forest, and we are trying to develop new crops where we can work less soil and
witb less erosion." But changing deeply ingrained ways is never easy, he says.
The biggest obstacles for the farmers trying to change livelihoods are the l^ck of
economic resources, and education. "Things are changing, but step by step," he
says.
Change, indeed, may come incrementally, and in fits and spurts. The first
farmers group in Los Dajaos began in late 70s or 1980, but was never very active.
ASADA's work began in earnest in the early 1990s, at a local inititiative. "We have
got to look for a lot of alternatives," Jose says, speaking of alternatives in
agriculture, as well as alternatives to agriculture. Ecotourism, however ill-defined,
may be one possibility as the watershed still offers some impressive vistas of the
park, and a cool pleasant climate. Crafts may prove to be another. Recently, a
group of Spanish ceramics instructors spent several weeks in Los Dajaos giving
courses on how to make figurines based on traditional Arawak designs. All irony
aside, ceramics was a small obsession for many in the village, including Jose.
Their works were displayed at a small gallery at the bus depot in Jarabacoa. "If 20
people in the watershed dedicated themselves to producing ceramics, that is 20
/

fewer that are not going to attack the forests. And it is the same for tourism."
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Still the group’s focus is on agriculture. ASADA’s first project was an aqueduct
for a gravity flow irrigation system. Thus far, seventy farms receive water from the
project. And it's going to reach more,

Jose says. With a dependable supply of

water, harvests have improved. In the past, farmers depended on the rain, or had to
push higher on to the hillsides." It was a necessity," says Jose. "I think in time, they
will be able to continue working the same land for many years because it has
water.”
Water is one important factor in developing a settled agriculture in the upper
Yaque del Norte. Protecting and slowly rebuilding soil is vital if agriculture to
continue in the watershed. Roughly 50 members of the association are practicing
soil conservation measures, such as live and dead barriers and drainage ditchqs.
To receive loans from the group’s rotating fund, members must employ some form
of soil conservation; roughly 40 families have loans with ASADA. There exists,
however, a gap between the word and action. Many campesinos may speak of
soil conservation or organic methods, and yet seldom use these methods in their
bean fields. As their cash crop, beans grown by farmers in Los Dajaos rely on
chemical fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides.50 Again short term exigencies
continue to outweigh long term "sustainability" concerns.
ASADA received a substantial boost in 1994 when the Falconbridge
Foundation donated $12,000 to farmers in Los Dajaos with the hope of initiating a
model for watershed protection in the country. This grant came about as a result of
Jose's connections with the foundation. The following year, the Inter-American
Foundation donated money to the group. With all its backing, the community
established.a nursery for producing timber and fruit trees, coffee and bamboo.
ASADA, on its own initiative, planted more than 200,000 trees at the headwaters of
streams, on roadsides, and private property. Some members say they would plant
more trees if they knew Foresta would permit them to some day make use of them.
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With the international support, ASADA also expanded the irrigation system an
additional 300 tareas, and built an in vitro laboratory for strawberry and flower plant
production.
The lab, a rather sophisticated operation for the countryside, was set up with
the help of Jose's friends. "The laboratory came about as we were searching for
alternatives to reduce the area in crops," says Jose. In the past, strawberry plants
came from the United States and were difficult to obtain, expensive and would
sometimes arrive in poor condition. “We decided to try to produce the plants here.”
The recent gains by ASADA have been recognized throughout the Dominican
Republic. Campesino groups from the neighboring Cibao Valley and the southern
part of the country have visited Los Dajaos. “Above all,” he says, “we want to be a
model for our neighbors, those that live in the watershed."
Out of the efforts of ASADA, a new group, the Junta Yaque, was formed in the
summer of 1995. This group unites 16 farmer and women's groups in the
watershed. But how appropriate is ASADA as a model for the other groups of the
JuntaYaque? This question is not intended to denigrate the efforts of ASADA;
rather it is to point some critical differences in the communities of the upper
Yaque. The other farmers groups, from Manabao or La Cienaga, have not had the
resources nor connections that ASADA has. Whether the ASADA model is
replicable would depend on if other groups could find equivalent levels of support.
And unlike its neighbors, Los Dajaos , doesn't have serious problems with land
distribution. Perhaps in a testament to greater community cohesion, the landless in
Los Dajaos are often lent land to work by their neighbors and relatives.
Another concern with ASADA is inclusivity. Farmers, or even campesinos, are
not a homogenous, unified group; rather they are likely to be stratified by class
divisions. While ASADA membership spans the spectrum of small to large
producers, it has no landless members. In the 1970s, anthropologist Kenneth

50
Sharp described four distinct classes, with gradations, within a campesino
community on the north slope of the Cordillera.51 Landless or nearly so, the
agricultural day laborers echar dias (to throw days) for the equivalent of three or
four dollars pay in order to buy their subsistence. The next group, the small
holders own enough productive land to provide for much of the household needs,
but still must find wage labor to meet all their needs. Middle holders have their
i

coqucos but rely on coffee production for their cash income. With the most land,
large holders grow coffee and raise cattle and plant conucos. In the community,
large holders, like Jose, are the ones who hire the day laborers.52
These socio-economic classes are useful in that they suggest who is most likely
to undertake "sustainable" agriculture measures. Anthropologist Susan Stonich
notes this in her political ecology of land degradation and the campesinos in the
pine highlands of Honduras, a societal and environmental context .similar to that of
the Dominican Cordillera. She found that landless campesinos, renters, and small
holders farmed their land with the most impact, using the shortest fallows, and
burned the most often. But as land security increased, so did more benign
practices. It's not surprising then, that Stonich found that medium and targe
holders were the most the likely to employ more, sustainable practices, such as soil
conservation, lengthier fallows, and less burning.53

If sustainable practices are

linked to socio-economic standing, then the most "destructive" farmers will always
be the least likely use them. There is the danger then that groups like ASADA will
not reach the farmers they need to the most. The worse scenario is that the
potential exists for the creation of new local elites, and the further
marginalizination of those already at the margin.
It is not a perfect world. Despite some potential problems, ASADA and its work
is something to build on , and the group is young yet. In trying to change their
agriculture, ASADA members seek to address much of the history that has led to
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their predicament. Their goal of producing more valuable crops on a smaller piece
of land is essential if agriculture is to persist in the watershed. In terms of education,
ASADA has achieved much in raising awareness in the community about forests
and farms. The next step is to see that this awareness is put into practice
throughout the community.
ASADA's initial gains seem to illustrate the integral role played by connections
and resources. One often leads to the other. Such connections and resources
would be key to making similar advances in other communities. To that end,
outside support may be further justified. The task facing ASADA, and other groups
of the watershed, is enormous, complex and expensive. Small communities alone
are unlikely to be able to muster the resources to manage their watershed. The
challenge, then, is for these groups to find assistance they need and yet be able to
maintain direction of their efforts.
This chapter began with the pine forests of the upper Yaque del Norte, which up
until the mid 20th Century, were compatible with a certain level of pressure from the
human presence. From the mound agriculture of the Arawak's conucos

in 1492 to

the double dug terraces of Jose's farm of 1995, agriculture has undergone great
changes in the intervening five centuries. Once a long-lived and productive.
subsistence agriculture was practiced on the hillsides of the Cordillera. But more
recently, agriculture in the region has been practiced with only immediate survival
in mind, and the results have caused serious degradation of the mountain forests.
Placing destructive agricultural practices in their historical and societal context
undermines prevailing notions about who is ultimately responsible for the
conversion of Cordilleran forests. Campesino actions are largely reactions, or
even adaptations, to the conditions imposed by the greater society. Mounting
pressures on the campesino communities of the watershed may bring yet another

52
shift in agriculture. If it doesn't, the prospects for agriculture, and the families that
depend on it, in the upper Yaque del Norte appear doubtful.
This story of agriculture in the Yaque del Norte, as told to me by farmers like
Moro, Teofilo and Augustine, has been briefly outlined, and is still incomplete.
Agriculture in the last 30 years has also been shaped by the Dominican timber
industry that preceded it. Much of the Cordillera was opened to agriculture by
logging roads built during the decades between World War II and 1967, the year
the sawmills were shut down and the cutting prohibition imposed. Population in
the watershed more than doubled during the same period. The industry itself was
marked by a frontier rapaciousnesS. These conditions help set in motion much of
the forest clearing in the last 30 years. The next chapter, examines the
development and operation of the Dominican timber industry and its
consequences in the Cordillera.,

CHAPTER 3
A Dictator and his Forests: The Timber Industry in the Cordillera Central
With his chin up, looking proud, don Manuel probably stands five feet tall. He is
72, and to call him spry would be to slight him, as he is fitter than men half his age. I
learn that well the day we hike more than 40 kilometers of muddy trail in the
Cordillera Central of the Dominican Republic. That December morning we set out
from the village of Los Dajaos in the upper Yaque del Norte watershed for the
Constanza Valley in the neighboring Yuna River basin. A gray lid of clouds
obscures the peaks of the surrounding Cordillera. In a steady drizzle, we head up
the furthest reaches of Arroyo Grande, a tributary of the Rio Yaque del Norte. Don
Manuel wears a blue wind breaker, a pair of mock Italian loafers, slacks and a
freebie ball cap emblazoned with the name of a herbicide manufacturer. He seems
dressed for town, Jarabacoa, and a Sunday stroll through the parque . W e’re on
no stroll, though; don Manuel moves quickly up the trail, picking his way through
the ruts and puddles.

He takes clear pride in himself as a walker. Many rural

Dominicans travel on horseback, or on mules; Manuel has always preferred to go
on foot.

In 1953, he walked the 40 kilometers from his campo, Jumunuco, to Los

Dajaos to find work in the timber mills. Over the next 15 years, he held nearly
every job possible in the forests of the region. Once the jefe de la loma , the hill
boss, he knew the industry, from felling the great pines with axes and skidding
logs with oxen, to milling rough hewn lumber. From Los Dajaos in the east to Rio
Limpio near the Haitian border in the northwest, don Manuel has walked and
worked the woods of the Cordillera.
After more than an hour, we pause, and from the old logging road we travel,
don Manuel points to what is now a small pasture down by the stream. This area,
known as El Dulce, was home to a sawmill until 1967. The mill here was one of the
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last of hundreds that operated in the Cordillera between the 1930s and 1967.
<

Today no sign remains that a mill ever existed in this place.
For signs of the mill's existence, you must look up to the hillsides that drop
steeply from 7,000 foot peaks. From El Dulce we climb the scrubby divide
between the Yaque country and the Yuna basin. This was once all "monteria,"
Manuel says.

W e arrive at the uppermost reaches of the drainage, a placed

named for the increasingly scarce Hispaniolan parrot, La Cotorra. Unlike Los
Dajaos, where pine forests cover much of the land not occupied by farms, La
Cotorra is a denuded landscape. Hills there are covered in the yaragua grass, the
ubiquitous bracken fern, and the colonizing shrub known as escoba for its value
as a broom.

An enormous charred stump toppled in the midstof a hillside farm, a

conuco, reminds us of what once occupied this land. This tree, palo de viento,
has long competed skyward with the pines for overstory dominance in the mixed
pine and broadleaf forests that covered the Cordillera. Here that ecological
struggle has ended;

the red beans, the sweet potatoes and the yuca

have won

for now.
Don Manuel says the area had been logged until the mills closed, though that's
not what accounts for the landscape. "The mills did a lot of damage to the forest,
but the farmer has bone more. The mills, what they did, was cut a lot, but they didn't
set fire. The farmer burns, he burns the forest." Indeed, that combination of logging
and conuquismo has physically converted major portions of the Cordillera's forests
to poor pasture, or early successional brush patches. La Cotorra offers a stark
illustration of what occurred throughout the Cordillera Central.
Down the trail, we pass a man and a barefoot woman, probably seven months
pregnant, planting sweet potatoes among blackened stumps in a burned over
field. Further on, we come across a smoldering stump of a recently -- and illegally -felled tree. Adjacent to it, acrid smoke wafts from a charcoal pit. The manufacture of
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charcoal, illegal under the law, is an industry of and for the poor: The rural poor
carry out the hot, dirty work; the urban poor use it in place of gas stoves. The only
ones who make money aFe the intermediaries, derisively known by some
campesinos as the chupa sangres, the bloodsuckers. A quarter mile ahead of us,
we see a man with children leading a mule loaded ,with charcoal down the
mountainside toward the town of Constanza. Manuel says they'll wait on the
outskirts for nightfall, when they're less likely to encounter forest guards from
Foresta. That campesinos take high risks for paltry returns says much about their
lot in life. In La Cotorra, the means of subsistence are meager, and often illegal.
There is a direct interrelation between degraded physical and social landscape
of today and timber industry of the past. In the two decades following World War II,
the highland forests of the Dominican Republic suffered a dramatic decline. These
forests had seen some pressure from early settlers who have practiced shifting
cultivation since before the turn of the century. Still, most of the pine forests of the
nation's highlands remained largely intact prior to the war; in 1939 an estimated
750,000 hectares of pinelands were found in the Cordillera Central, and in the
Sierra de Bahoruco in the southwestern part of the country.

In 1967, following

nearly three decades of intensive commercial (largely export) logging, those
pinelands had dwindled to 215,000 hectares.1 In this chapter, I examine the history
of the mill era and its ramifications in the upper watershed of the Rio Yaque del
Norte. During the timber era, the forests of the upper Yaque watershed fed
numerous sawmills. Their rise and operation, as well as their effects on the
physical and social landscape, are worthy subjects of examination.
In the Cordillera, that kind of inquiry must include an examination of the role
played by US imperialism and the Trujillo dictatorship. Nearly like bobkends, the
two American invasions (1916 and 1965) delineate the timber era. The first US
occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916 set into motion a series of events
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that eventually facilitated the exploitation of the pine forests. Foremost, the
Americans trained and established a Dominican National Guard that would
become the private army of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina. Arguably Latin
America's most brutal and corrupt dictator, Trujillo ran the Dominican Republic as if
he owned it for 31 years until his assassination in 1961. The lumber mills of the
highlands -- whether under his direct or indirect control -- were but a small part of
his ill-gotten empire valued at more than $500 million in 1961.2 After Trujillo's
death, four years of political instability ensued, ending with the second US
invasion. That action, in essence, restored moderated Trujilloist forces to power,
thus perpetuating an authoritarian political culture.
The rise of commercial lumbering converged with demographic factors to iead
to subsequent deforestation in the Cordillera. Census data show that in the Rio
Yaque del Norte watershed, the population more than doubled between 1935 and
1960. With Trujillo's death came the freedom to move, and the burgeoning
numbers of campesinos took advantage of it to claim new land. This was
compounded by the collapse of the logging industry when many of the former
woodsworkers turned (or returned) to their conuquismo. The thin-soiled slopes of
the Cordillera did not hold up well under increasing demographic pressure.
Hillsides denuded of their pine forests were then denied an opportunity for hatural
«

regeneration by land poor campesinos.
The intent of this chapter is not necessarily to wag an accusatory finger at the
culpable; rather it is to illuminate the genesis of Dominican forest policy. This policy
has engendered conflict between the campesinos and Foresta in the upper Yaque
and other parts of the Cordillera. Borrowing generally from a regional political
ecology perspective, this chapter seeks to remind us that the forces that cause
deforestation are enormously complex and interrelated. In the attempt to protect or
restore the ecological health of the upper Yaque del Norte watershed some
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simplistic assumptions hold currency among important institutions about the nature
of the problem and its solution. The Dominican forest service, like other domestic
institutions and some international aid agencies, has laid the blame for the
degradation of the Cordillera at the feet of the campesinos. Even some campesinos
themselves, like don Manuel, situate responsibility for the forest loss with the
farmers.

While small farmers make a visible scapegoat, they alone cannot

account for the forest conversion that has occurred in the Cordillera. The previous
chapter explored the societal context in which a destructive agriculture has been
practiced. Assigning blame to the campesinos also absolves Trujillo and the millowning Dominican elite of any responsibility for the forest degradation. Part of the
intent here is to shed light on the factors often overlooked by the dominant
discourse, to connect the present landscape with past events. To make some of
those connections, one must begin with a look at the nation's tumultuous history.

The occupation forces
Dominican history is marked by a past dominated by colonial and imperial
forces, a past noted for cycles of invasions and occupations, revolutions and
dictatorships. Spain's first possession in the New World, the colony known as
Santo Domingo was poorly administrated and neglected by a mother country
more interested in the riches of Mexico and Peru. In 1822, Santo Domingo was
invaded by its neighbor, Haiti, which ruled until 1844. By the early 1860s, fear of
another Haitian invasion prompted Dominican rulers to ask Spain to reannex the
nation. Governed poorly once again, Dominicans revolted against the Spanish,
and won independence in 1865. Until 1882, the nation was run by regional
warlords, the caudillos. From 1882 to 1899, the dictator Ulises Heureaux
controlled the country with the backing of foreign loans. His assassination was
followed by 22 governments in 17 years.3
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By 1905 the Dominican Republic owed $40 million to mostly European banks
and companies. Fearing European intrusion in the hemisphere, the Roosevelt
administration took control of the collection of custom duties in 1907. This
receivership paid off its European and North American creditors, and turned over to
the Dominican government 45 percent of the money collected. While warding off
possible European intervention, tbe move only increased the, instability in the
Dominican Republic. As James Ferguson notes in his study of Dominican politics,
Bevond the Lighthouse:
Political pressures from Washington fueled a further round of coups,
revolts and assassintations. In 1915, the US proposed taking overall
Dominican finances and replacing the army with a US-trained
. constabulary. Dominican indignation at the suggestion forced the
resignation of the president. On 15 May 1916, the first detachment of the
US Marines landed at Santo Domingo, beginning an eight-year
occupation.4
Initially intended as a show of force to extract Dominican concessions, the
occupation was formalized -- partially out of security concerns -- on the eve of the
U.S. entrance into World War I in late 1916. Military law, as enacted and enforced
by the U.S. Navy, ruled the nation. The military mission, according to Dominican
historian Frank Moya Pons, was to "correct the economic, political, and social life of
the country according to the U.S. Navy's conception of a more stable order." To
that end, the military government took decisive steps. The constitutional rights
Americans cherish most were among the first to be abolished under military rule.
The government, under Captain Harry S. Knapp, forbade the possession of
firearms and imposed a stringent censorship on the press, prohibiting the
expression of "unfavorable opinions to the United States of America or to the
military government in Santo Domingo."5
To recast the Dominican Republic as a model of naval efficiency, the American
military government embarked on a series of ambitious projects. Various public
works, planned prior to the occupation, were launched. Between 1917 and 1920,
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hundreds of schools were built, allowing for student enrollment to increase from
20,000 to 100,000. Health and sanitation projects were also carried Out or
imposed. The most significant of the public works , however, was construction of a
network of roads that connected the most important regions of the country. The
military government borrowed freely from American banks -- $1.5 million in 1918 -to build three major highways. The first, the Duarte Highway, linked the capital with
Santiago, while the other two highways fanned out to the east and west of Santo
Domingo. Road construction had numerous beneficial impacts: it allowed for the
political unification of an atomized nation; it facilitated transportation of goods and
produce within the country; and, it improved mail service.6 Duarte Highway played
a key role in opening the Cordillera to timber exploitation. Although the highway
doesn't pass directly through the Cordillera, it does cross the Cibao Valley at the
foot of the mountains. One o f the cities it passes through in the Cibao is La Vega, a
gateway to Jarabacoa and the upper Yaque del Norte.
In addition to developing a national infrastructure, the Americans also sought to
modernize the land tenure system. Under the American occupation, centuries old
land ownership patterns were further usurped by private ownership. Originating in
the 1500s at a time of low population density, the colonial system of terenos
comuneros

allowed for communally held property. Dominican and foreign

business, interests considered the system counterproductive to the growth of
sugar, coffee and cacao industries in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. As
early as 1907, the Dominican government had taken steps toward the registration
and partion of communal lands. In 1920, the military government passed the Land
Registration Law. This law required all lands to be surveyed and registered at the
expense of the owner, many of whom could not afford it. Unclaimed lands were
awarded to the state or were sold at bargain prices.

The upshot of the change in

tenure patterns was that foreign, especially American, companies and a small
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Dominican elite began, to dominate large, portions of the best agricultural land, a
trend that became aggravated under the Trujillo regime. The inequities in
Dominican land distribution today in part can be traced back to this era.7
The human toll of the loss of communal lands manifested itself in the eastern
part of the country where sugar cane displaced many campesinos. "The expansion
of sugar plantations had left many families with barely enough land on which to live
or had forced them to move to the less fertile lands of the small mountain chains in
the east."8 In those mountains, armed resistance rose against the American
occupiers. From 1917 until 1921 the U.S. Marinesr along with the newly-created
Dominican National Guard, waged a brutal campaign against peasant guerrillas
known as the gavilleros.

In their attempts to subdue the "bandits," the Marines

committed numerous atrocities, among them summary executions, torture and the
burning of villages. Particularly notorious for savagery was one Captain Merckle.
Historian Melvin Knight in his study , Americans in Santo Domingo, recounts
testimony at Senate Hearings in 1921-22 that described some of the brutalities
carried out in the eastern provinces:
/

Dr. Coradin, of Hato Mayor, testified that he had seen two men killed
offhand. One of them, a man eighty years old, had first been dragged at the
tail of a horse. The other "appeared to have made some remarks that
offended Captain Merckle," whereupon the officer "took him to a corner of
the house, drew his revolver, and shot him in the left ear
Emilio Saurez,
drafted as a guide in April 1918, described such tortures as cutting off ears,
burning a wounded leg,and putting acid fruit juice in slashes made in a
man's chest.9
Captain Merckle eventually faced charges for his excesses, though he killed
himself before his trial began. Merckle is significant not only because he
represents the brutality inherent in gunboat diplomacy, but also because of one
Dominican who served under him: Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molinas. Dominican
journalist German E. Ornes, who fled the Dominican Republic in the 1950s, asserts
that Trujillo served as a guide and informant for Merckle. Trujillo --who had been
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a guard at an eastern sugar cane plantation -- proved to be a "keen, proficient
disciple" of his role model, Merckle. "He learned that military rule cannot bear
criticism and how to deal with offenses against authority. Moreover, the late
Captain's forms of torture and arbitrary "justice' have been perfected by 'the Chief’
and used on a larger, more terrifying scale."10
Trujillo entered the Dominican National Guard as a second lieutenant in early
1919. He saw combat against the gavilleros and was highly commended by his
American superiors. After a' brief stint in officer's school in 1921, TrujiHo became a
captain and a company commander. Ornes writes that in 1923 Trujillo engineered
the murder of his chief rival -- a major involved in an affair with another officer's
wife. Trujillo informed the cuckolded husband of the tryst and its whereabouts,
resulting in the death of the couple. With his competition eliminated, Trujillo was
promoted to major in early 1924, lieutenant colonel in late 1924, and colonel and
commander of the National Police in 1925. In 1927, that force became the
national army, with Trujillo as its brigadier general.11 Three years later, in
February of 1930, a bloodless coup brought Trujillo to the highest office in the
country, the presidency.

The Era of Trujillo
"I am sure there is something in destiny for there are forces outside of us,"
Trujillo told his sycophantic American biographer Lawrence de Besault in 1936.
"But destiny does not shape men's careers. The efforts and decisions of a man
himself make him or break him."12 Indeed, Trujillo's rise illustrates what cunning
and ruthlessness - and one lucky break from outside forces -- can do for a person.
"In the Dominican Republic itself," wrote Ornes, "it is common belief that without the
American occupation Trujillo would have sunk into oblivion as a minor underworld
figure."13 For a man who had been a petty thief and forger in his youth, Trujillo, at
39 years old, became a thief without rival.
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Trujillo’s dictatorship was notable in many respects, for its systematic
imposition of terror on the populace, for the all-pervading propaganda machine, for
his megalomania and the cult of personality that elevated Trujillo, not only the
Father of the Fatherland but also the Benefactor of the Fatherland, to deity status.
Trujillo's brutality merged with his racist views and took form in the massacre of
18,000 Haitians in a matter of days in early October of 1937. With the use of terror,
espionage and propaganda, Trujillo established "a noncollectivist totalitarian
political system without parallel in any other country in Latin America."14
Central to this study, however, were the avarice and business acumen
displayed by Trujillo and his favored few associates. "From the beginning," writes
Moya P ons," Trujillo’s government was a regime of plunder organized to furnish
him with total control of every economic enterprise existing in the country."15 The
t

Jefe first set out to establish monopolies; salt, dairy and meat products, fruit,
banking and prostitution were among the industries controlled by Trujillo.

In 1934,

after only four years in power, Trujillo was the wealthiest man in the nation.16
Aside from monopolizing existing industries, Trujillo launched or took control
over new ones prior to and during World War II. In wartime, all imports and exports
had to be licensed, providing a windfall for the profiteering dictator. Still it was a
boom time. Santo Domingo grew as a major new industrial center, and the
industrialization created an economic roar for the generalisimo and the nation:
Between 1938 and 1960 the number of manufacturers doubled, the work force
grew 250 percent, and annual industrial sales rose from $13 million to more than
$164 million. By 1947, the'economic boom allowed Trujillo to retire the nation's
$16 million external debt, thus earning him yet another official title: Restorer of
Financial Independence.17
The flourish of economic activity and modernization would also reach the
Cordillera during the war years.

Trujillo had continued the public works programs
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initiated under the American occupiers. New post offices, telephone lines, and
radio telegraph lines all advanced communications within the country. The
expansion of the road network opened the long-remote Cordillera to exploitation.
The pine forests of the Cordillera had remained largely untouched as long as they
remained inaccessible. Nationwide, in the first six years of his dictatorship, more
than 1600 kilometers of roads were repaired or reconstructed, and an additional
235 kilometers of new roads were built.18 In 1935, Trujillo built a spur from the
Duarte highway, connecting Jarabacoa and La Vega. From Jarabacoa, logging
roads would snake up the Yaque del Norte and emaller drainages. Other roads
opened access to watersheds on the north slope of the Cordillera. The new roads
served two purposes, the first political, the second economic, as the ecologist
Gustavo Antonini points out: "Though this road improvement program was
prompted by the government's desire to maintain political and military control over
the populace, nonetheless it did provide the basic infrastructure required to begin
the exploitation of the country's vast pine resources."19
In this political and economic climate the logging industry mushroomed from a
small, decentralized industry into a rapacious one with far-flung social and
environmental consequences. Although a small part of Trujillo's overall empire,
the timber industry emerged as a result of the dictator's methodical extraction of
the nation's wealth. In upper Yaque del Norte, and other parts of the Cordillera,
the legacy of that extraction can be seen in today's physical and social landscape.

Into the Cordillera
Although lumbering in the Cordillera grew dramatically in Trujillo's era, the first
commercial milling of pines in the Dominican Republic began in the Yaque del
Norte river basin in 1906 in San Jose de las Matas. These watersheds on the
north slope of the Cordillera, a region known as La Sierra, have a longer tradition
of lumbering than in the upper Yaque del Norte. In some drainages, such as the
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Bao-Jagua and Mao-Anima watersheds, a decentralized timber industry was in
swing by 1920, providing a minor boom for the millowners and the muleteers who
provided the transportation. Prior to the arrival of the road grid, logs were shipped
down river to the processing centers. During high water, these rafts of logs would
occasionally overshoot their destination in Santiago and be carried down river to
the mouth at Monte Cristi and then the Atlantic beyond.20 In the upper Yaque, oldtimers remember log rafts taking two weeks to cover the 20 kilometers between
Manabao and Pinar Quemado, a small town just outside Jarabacoa.
Most of the early timber came from either terrenos comuneros or state land,
though at that time there was little difference between the two. Eugenia Georges, in
her study of migration in a northern Cordilleran village fictitiously named Los Pinos,
found that villagers had long assumed a communal use of the surrounding forests,
Communal forests provided timber to build homes and land to run free-range
cattle, goats and pigs.

Despite long-standing attempts to register ownership of

lands, remote parts of the Cordillera remained unsurveyed, and thus, traditional
land tenure prevailed until the mid-1930s, when Trujillo first turned attention to the
forests of the Cordillera.
That attention paid to the forests of the Cordillera is perhaps illustrative of
Trujillo's systematic approach to controlling the nation's resources. Despite earlier
assessments, no estimate of the pine forest's economic value had been made until
1937 when a Venezuelan forester named Carlos Chardon embarked upon a
week-long reconnoitering of the Cordillera Central. In the employ of the
Generalising, Chardon had been charged with studying the nation's mineral and
forest resources. In his account of that trip, Chardon seemed clearly moved by the
landscape he traveled through. As Chardon and his party climbed from the valley
floor of the Cibao, they caught their first glimpse of the interior pine forests near
"magnificent spectacle of the valley of Jarabacoa." The road ended at Jarabacoa,
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where they continued on horseback. "Beyond there, ahead, as far as sight allows,
high mountains can be seen, this time more rugged, covered in a continuous forest
of pines," Chardon wrote. "In the valley bottom, on both sides of the path, the
tropical vegetation remains impenetrable, but on mountainsides and the peaks, the
Pinus occidentalis

[stand] proudly below the fresh and pure air of this beautiful

subtropical region."21
But Chardon was not paid to wax eloquentlly about the scenery. His job was to
assess and describe the nation's natural wealth. And in the Cordillera, along with
spur ranges in the southwest, Chardon found the greatest forest resource in all the
Antilles. In his report, Chardon estimated that there were 7,200 square kilometers
of pine forest in the Cordillera, with an additional 300 square kilometers of pineland
in the Sierra de Bahoruco.Chardon calculated an average of six pines per tarea
for total of 72 million pine trees in the nation. And at .60 cents apiece, these trees
were worth $43,200,000. Chardon's estimate, as he admits, was a conservative
one.22
Even before Chardon's report, Trujillo already had begun to develop the timber
industry in the Yaque del Norte basin. Either through companies he owned
outright, or through fronts, Trujillo bought the rights to timber on more than 110,000
hectares of communally-owned lands in the Cordillera 23 Georges argues that in
some communities Trujillo simply stole land from families, in Los Pinos in the mid1930s, Trujillo, through an army captain, voided all land titles and laid claim to all
communal lands under the guise of a cadastral survey. With the exception of
Trujillo cronies, most of the residents in Los Pinos lost their access to the pine
forests, which covered 374,431 tareas in the area. Compounding this landgrab,
were the threats of imprisonment for those who continued to use the forests.24
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On the lands Trujillo controlled, the Generalisimo sold concessions to build
mills. Numerous old families benefited handsomely from their ventures with the
jefe. The dictatorship also created a class of nouveau riche, particularly military
officers. Bermudez, Espaillat, De Leon, Nunez, and Bautista were among the more
prominent family names in the timber industry. The families that controlled the
mills of the Cordillera are still among the wealthiest and most powerful in the
nation.
Under Trujillo and his proxies, the mills proliferated. In 1940, there were 20
mills operating in the country. But by the end of the war in 1945, there were 75
mills, most of them in n the Cordillera.25 In the towns that ringed the mountain
range, lumber trading centers laid the groundwork for exploitation. These centers
served as intermediate stops between the forest and the market, and many of the
centers were served by two to three mills deeper inside the Cordillera.26 The mills
of the interior provided a boom for formerly sleepy Cordilleran towns such as
Jarabacoa, Constanza, Moncion, and Restauracion.
National lumber production jumped dramatically as the number of mills
increased. In 1940 native pines produced between seven and eight million board
feet a year for the dpmestic market. During World War II, the Dominican timber
industry began to offset some of the imports of American southern pine, imports
worth as much as a $1,000,000 annually. By the end of the war, production had
increased to 13 million board feet, and the nation no longer imported timber27
The increase in timber production not only satisfied domestic needs but it also
spurred a growth in exports. Beginning in 1936, those exports climbed during
World War II when pine was exported to other islands in the Caribbean, such as
Puerto Rico, Aruba, Curcacao, Martinique and Venezuela. In the wartime export
market, pine wood found a far better price than in the domestic one; whereas a
thousand square feet of pine lumber would fetch $34 in the Dominican Republic,

67
the same amount would bring $84 in its pine-less neighbor, Puerto Rico.28
Dominican timber exports had focused'on mahogany and other precious
hardwoods in the first two decades of the 20th Century. Thus, the growth of pine
r

exports represents the tapping of a new resource and the decline of an earlier one.
FAO figures show that between 1940 and 1946 the country exported eight times
as much pine as it did hardwoods, and that the value of the pine was six times that
of the nearly depleted hardwoods.29
Pine exports not directly controlled by Trujillo were still subject to his taxes. Prior
to the war, sawmill owners initially paid the government $5 per thousand cubic feet.
But when wartime prices skyrocketed, Trujillo boosted the tax to $18 per thousand
cubic feet, of which $15 went to the Oficina Particular del Generalisimo. "These
payments," write Darrow and Zanoni in their study of the Hispaniolan pine, "were
to ensure the continuation of the contracts, and for the permission of the sawmill
*

owners to ignore regulations that prohibit the felling of trees less than 20 cm in
diameter, and as well to allow them to ignore rules requiring the planting of 10
trees for each one cut."30 Indeed the absence of regulation may be the most salient
characteristic of the logging era in the Cordillera. So long as the jefe received his
share, the mills operated unhindered.

An industry unrestrained
In a 1941 report, Carlos Chardon issued a traditional forester's plea for
judicious management of the forests for the "economic future of the country." He
urged the eventual expansion of a national forest system to cover all forests above
1200 meters, the perceived upper limit of agriculture. Furthermore, the Cordilleran
forests should be exploited in an "orderly and scientific" manner to ensure steady
supplies of lumber for the domestic market, and to assure natural regeneration.,
Laws dictating the allowable size of tree to be cut would be needed. With good
management, pine forests could regenerate every 30 to 40 years. "If in addition to
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these measures, a certain amount of research could be carried on," Chardon wrote,
" forestry in the Dominican Republic would be firmly established on a permanent
basis and could serve as model and provide valuable experiences to the rest of the
Antilles."31
Indeed forestry law under Trujillo seemed to advocate at least the concept of
good forestry. The forest law of 1934 declared national forest reserves, banned the
use of fire, and prohibited cutting in the higher reaches of mountain ranges, near
waterways, and on the summits of hills. The law gave hillside farmers one year to
abandon their land or show "that its cultivation is indispensable to their livelihood."
To enforce the new forest law, Trujillo created the first forest service in 1934.32 In
1940 there were only 40 "guardabosques" -- forest guards -- nationwide. In a
country with more than three million hectares of forest, these 40 men were
responsible for "regulation of cuttings, fire prevention, reforestation, regulation of
stream flow, soil erosion control, and investigation."33
For the entire upper Yaque and neighboring Yuna watersheds there was only
one forest guard based in La Vega. Campesinos, the older ones at least, fondly
recall the ease with which they could take from the forests what was needed,
whether a clearing for a conuco or timber to build a house. Unlike their neighbors
in the Sierra, the campesinos of the upper Yaque never suffered the full wrath of
Trujillo's economic plans. The social effects of the dictatorship and the timber
boom were far more benign in the upper Yaque than they were in other parts of the
basin. For example, the upper Yaque escaped the land seizures, evictions and
violence that occurred on the northslope of the,Cordillera. Many old-timers
remember the Trujillo era as a time of plentiful and cheap food. Goats, pigs, cattle
ran loose in the hills as they always had. If a farmer worked his ten tareas, as
mandated by law, kept his identification card current, and most of all, kept quiet his
opinions about the nation's state of affairs, he had few problems. "He (Trujillo)
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used to protect the working man, el hqmbre del trabajo," said one resident of the
watershed. "But the campesino never knew what Trujillo was doing.".
Thus older campesinos in the watershed often have warm memories of Trujillo's
guardabosques, particularly when contrasted with the forest guards of today. The
hands-off approach of the guardabosques may have been good social policy,
but environmentally it was disastrous. The practice of Dominican forestry could not
have been further removed from the recommendations of Chardon or any notion of
sound forestry. The techniques employed by Trujillo and the Dominican millowning families exemplified the unabated cut and run forestry practiced in the
American West and upper Midwest at the turn of the century. From the beginning,
the logging and milling went essentially unregulated. A U.S. Forest Service
forester sent to investigate fire problems in the Cordillera in the early 1960s could
not resist commenting on the logging industry and its practices in the Cordillera.
The sawmill and timber harvesting people have a very definite
responsibility to the nation. They cannot operate on a cut and get out
basis. They must become vitally concerned with proper land use.34
To what extent was the timber industry concerned with "proper land use" and did it
assume its "responsibility to the nation?" What were the ecological consequences?
To answer these questions, we must return to the upper Yaque, to La Cotorra to
examine the logging and forestry practices of the era.

Work in the woods
The forests surrounding La Cotorra were opened with the establishment of the
sawmill in El Dulce in 1962. That mill was one of at least nine that operated in the
upper Yaque in the timber era. The mill was average sized, employing about 40
people from the area. Loggers, oxen teamsters -

the bueyeros, -- bulldozer

operators, truck drivers, and mill sawyers were all part of the work force. Women
found work cooking huge pots of rice and red beans for hungry loggers and
sawyers. Most logging work was hard, physical labor, trabajo fuerte,

as don
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Manuel calls it. Huge pines, some 40 meters high, were felled, limbed and bucked
with axes and machetes. Some trees were big enough to yield seven or eight logs.
Logs were hauled by teams of brawny oxen to the roads that led to the mill.
Bulldozers punched in new roads to gain further access to timber.
The emergence of the timber industry brought wage labor to the mountain
valleys. Farmers found a new source of cash, though many continued with their
agriculture on a smaller scale. Don Manuel, for example, worked six days a week
timbering and in his conuco on Sundays.

Good paying jobs in the timber

industry drew outsiders, campesinos from neighboring areas, and workers from
the towns such as Jarabacoa, La Vega, Santiago and the capital. "They came from
all over," Manuel remembers. Much of the timber work paid according to
production: trees cut, logs hauled, board feet milled.

El Dulce owners paid 90

centavos per thousand board feet, and a mill could produce 12 to 13,000 feet in a
day. Ten pesos a day was good money in early 1960s. Work, however, was not
always steady. Mills operated from February until November, and closed as
Christmas holidays approached. Mills would also close during the rainy season,
when mud made roads impassable.
With good timber jobs, some communities in the upper Yaque enjoyed a mild
prosperity. With money made in timber, Manuel bought land, as did many other
workers. Socio-economic benefits, however, were accompanied by ecological
consequences. The effects of logging were apparent as early as 1940, when
American forester J.G. Scarff expressed concern about the unsound forestry
practices he observed. He noted along the Duarte Highway in the Cibao the pines
were disappearing at a rapid rate:
As one of the principal highways in the Republic is through this region, much
cutting has occurred here during the last 15 years; and, at present rate of
exploitation, the remaining stands of pine can last little longer, except in highly
inaccessible locations. It is not, however, so much the amount cut as the
accompanying bad practices, that endangers the forest type - such practices as
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clear-cutting large blocks of timber with no thought to the growing stock or
reproduction and allowing fires to burn over the mountain sides unchecked.35
From the outset, the Dominican timber industry practiced a profligate forestry, one
marked by waste and degradation from start to finish. A FAO report on the
Cordillera in the late 1960s found that a "lack of control in the exploitation permitted
a brutal treatment of the forest."36 Silviculture in the Cordillera left much to be
desired. Sustained yield was not a concern. Timber was never cruised (marked)
by officials. Typically forests were highgraded, thus removing the largest and
finest genetic stock. Another American forester in the early '60s advised against
the practice: "Many large trees are in excellent health and vigor and should not be
cut as they are like money in the bank and are growing and paying interest."37 His
advice went largely unheeded.
, The lack of concern for regeneration, in part, stemmed from the fact that the land
/

’ belonged to the state. During the logging boom, the state owned roughly 70
percent of all the nation's forests. Dominican forester Alberto Rodriguez argues that
the companies had no incentive nor interest in conservation of lands they didn't
own. On private lands, however, an ecologically sounder approach to forestry was
taken. Qn some of these lands, millowners would leave seed trees, control access
of subsequent users, and prevent fires. Qne mill harvested secondary growth
pines that had regenerated following an initial cut 30 years prior.38 Such lands
proved the regenerative powers of the forest if allowed protection.
Logging techniques were wasteful. With no crosscut saws, the loggers relied
on axes, thus leaving stumps 2-1/2 to three high. For each tree harvested, at least
another suffered damage to its crown or trunk from careless felling practices.39 To
make the hauling easier, logs were tapered on one end, a further waste of wood.
Skidding logs straight down hillsides with oxen also caused significant gully
erosion. Slash, the limbs and branches stripped from the trees, often found its way
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into creeks, clogging them and causing washouts, stream bottom scouring and
damage to downstream bridges:40
In the late 1950s, the advent of heavy machinery, like the bulldozers in El
Dulce, opened up new areas of the Cordillera to logging, and added new ways of
transportation. And as Rodriguez notes, this addition exacerbated impacts of
logging. "It's probable that this boom was a negative factor from the point of view of
natural resource conservation and environmental protection, given the lack of
technical personnel and the absence of rational standards for the use of the
forests."41 Logging roads created by bulldozers in the Cordillera were also a
source of watershed degradation. Most the roads were poorly located and
constructed on grades too steep without adequate drainage.42 Once abandoned,
these roads form deep washes and gullies. During the torrential rains of winter,
clay roads run Hke red rivers, washing away embankments, causing slumps and
plugging culverts.
Safety, waste and environmental problems were equally prevalent once the
logs reached the mill- During a 16 day assessment of Dominican mills, U,S. Forest
Service forester Rufus Page detailed the markings of a fly-by-night industry.
Most of the sample mills were inefficient, the lumber was inaccurately cut,
and the equipment was in poor shape. Many were underpowered.... Most
sawyers lacked a fundamental knowledge of the care and maintenance of
mill equipment. Only at a very few mills were the men safety conscious. 43
Indeed Manuel knew men that died in the woods. Aside from the dangers , the
mills were also unproductive and wasteful. Page estimated that an additional 25
percent of lumber could be obtained from the same amount of logs if they were
felled and bucked with crosscut saws instead of axes, and if the logs were properly
processed. At one mill, nearly 65 percent of the lumber was cut either too thick or
I

too thin or simply miscut. Most mills, located along streamsides, dumped sawdust
and others wastes directly into the streams.44
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Once the original forest cover was removed, the sawmills -- most of them small
enough to be portable -- would move on to the next site. With increased
mechanization and road building, logging crept deeper into the Cordillera in the
1950s. Despite nearly twenty years of commercial logging, forest management
never called for methods that would ensure natural regeneration of reforestation.
And that lack of good forestry carried with it increasingly apparent ecological
ramifications in the watersheds of the Cordillera. Sociologist Eugene Georges
describes some of these impacts:
Mechanized lumbering also diminished the forest canopy of this region,
profoundly altering the volume and regime of larger rivers. This situation
was further aggravated by the agricultural activities of farmers, many of
whom were attracted to the area by the building of new roads and by the
extension of the lumber industry. Severe floading in the rainy season
began to alternate with the near disappearance of rivers during the driest
months.45
Eventually concern about the effects of deforestation in Cordillera on the lowland
agricultural valleys prompted Trujillo to designate the highest reaches of the
mountain range as J. Armando Bermudez National Park in 1956. Rather than
change rapacious forestry practices at the root of the problem, Trujillo evicted
hundreds of campesinos from the deepest part of the Cordillera to create the new
protected area 46 Two years after the park's creation, the timber industry in the
Cordillera cut more than 32 million board feet, the peak during the Trujillo years.47
As Georges and others have noted the destructive lumbering methods were
aggravated by the small farmers who followed. Logged areas were vulnerable to
\

these subsequent users, whether the conuqueros or the campesinos who pulled
stumps to extract the resin for turpentine production. The damage caused by these
users became increasingly clear as the era of Trujillo drew to a close in the early
1960s.
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The post-Trujillo Era
After reigning more than 30 years, Generalisimo Trujillo, met an end consistent
with his rise and rule. On May 30 1961 while.on his way to his mistress' house
outside the capital, Trujillo and his limousine driver were overtaken and sprayed
with machine fire. Trujillo was killed in the ensuing gun battle. The period following
his assassination is marked by transitional governments, coups, elections, more
coups, civil war and U.S. invasion.48 This instability coincided with a time of
internal migration, which had been tightly controlled under Trujillo. The vacuum of
authority coupled with demographic factors led to more forest degradation in the
Gordillera. Beginning with Trujillo's death, a new force began to drive
deforestation. Known in the northern Cordillera as "la zafra" or the harvest, this
forest clearing came at the hands of land poor campesinos. "It has been suggested
by planners and policy makers that this harvest phase represents a true peasant
revolt against the dictator's inhuman policies," wrote the ecologist Gustavo
Antonini. "In the eyes of the peasants, however, the invasion of company lands and
the indiscriminate cutting of the pine forest had a more basic purpose: to obtain the
land needed to grow crops and to satisfy increasing demands for food by growing
numbers of families."49 Subsistence not resistance more likely spurred the Cutting.
With the timber boom, work took greater numbers of farmers from the farm to the
forest. The sawmills lessened the numbers of farms, .but accelerated the rate
deforestation by arriving at places the campesinos hadn't. While the mills were
operating, there were fewer conucos but when the mills closed, workers either
returned to their lands, or acquired land from friends, family or compadres. Many
just occupied marginal lands.
The large-scale peasant clearing of Cordilleran forests in the early 1960s
reflects demographic trends as well. During the Trujillo regime, large families were
encouraged in order to meet the labor demands of the industrializing nation.
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Countrywide, the population more than doubled between 1935 and 1960, when it
reached three million people. In the 1935 national census, the communities of the
upper Rio Yaque del Norte counted 3,200 residents while 25 years later the same
area had grown to nearly 7900 residents.50
Despite the political instability of the period, the short-lived governments in the
early '60s recognized the mounting pressures on the forests of the Cordillera and
enacted legislation. In 1962, Law 5856 created the Direccion General Forestal
(DGF), the Dominican lorest service most commonly known as Foresta. Still the
major forestry law for the nation, 5856 charged the agency with management of all
timberlands, regulation of all timber cutting, reforestation, control and transport of .
firewood and charcoal and the prevention and suppression of forest fires. The
latter became the agency's initial preoccupation as more than 56,000 hectares
burnt in the Cordillera and Sierra de Bahoruco in 1962.51
One who remembers well the drought and arson fires in the upper Yaque near
Manabao that year is don Tomas.

In 1962 he left his farming to fight fire with the

new agency. For the next 25 years, Tomas worked as a forestal,

then a catch-all

job title that covered patrolling, forestry work, trail building and firefighting. Today,
at 67, Tomas is recently retired from the Dominican park service, where he spent
the last ten years as a ranger. Like his parents, Tomas was born in Manabao,
"poor from the cradle," he says smiling. " In my early years, during the era of
Trujillo, I worked in agriculture. The headwaters, streams, rivers, lakes ... I always
had feeling for them, and always treated them with great consideration ... I was
born, wanting to be a friend of the forest..."
The fires that burned in the upper Yaque in 1962 troubled him personally.
"That was sad, compadre," These arson fires began with the establishment of
Foresta, continued for about 6 years after its formation. That first year, Tomas
recalls spending three sleepless days fighting fires. Some mill owners closed mills
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and sent workers to fight fires. Don Tomas attributes many of these fires to the
resentment created by the new Dominican forest service.

The woods had long

been unregulated. Moreover, jobs as forestales were one of the few sources of
steady salaried work at the time. The new jobs created envy in the community; at
60 pesos a month, the forestales were viewed as ricos.

Resentful "criminal hands"

expressed themselves at night with matches. "They'd light a hillside, say 500 or
2000 or 3000 tareas of pines; this was nothing to them."
Following the fires of 1962 came the first genuine attempts to regulate the mills
came. Mills now needed permission from the Secretary of Agriculture to take up to
500 pine trees. For the first time, forest workers cruised timber, marking the ones
that could be taken. The millowners, however, often took more than what was
marked. The initial effort to control the sawmills was short-lived. When Juan Bosch
became president in 1963, he tried to close the mills.52 Bosch's center-left
government, however, along with his forest policy, lasted only seven months when
he was overthrown in a coup.

His elected government was replaced with a junta

representing the Dominican business and legal elite. That government lasted until
April 1965, when tensions between the left led by Bosch and the military
dominated by Trujillo's men erupted into urban civil war in Santo Domingo. Just as
the Trujilloist army appeared to be defeated, Lyndon Baines Johnson sent in the
US Marines - 42,000 of them. The United States had supported Trujillo - a
conveniently vociferous anti-communist -

through most of the dictatorship.

Launched ostensibly to protect American interests, the US invasion aimed to
prevent a "second Cuba," and to divert American attention from a more remote
Third World conflict: Vietnam. Historian Frank Moya Pons points o u t: "In April 1965
there were only 17.000 U.S. Marines in Indochina while in December that number
had risen to 245,000, a fact that went by unnoticed by the American people."53
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The second US intervention was brief. The occupation forces rejuvenated the
old army, established an interim government and called for elections in June of
1966. Seeking the presidency were both Bosch and Joaquin Balaguer, who had
been Trujillo's pet intellectual and puppet president. During the violent five-month
campaign in 1966, more than 350 Bosch supporters were killed by the Dominican
military. Balaguer won, and began a 12-year regime known for its violent
suppression of its political opponents. Bosch - who weathered the Trujillo
dictatorship in exile-- once again left the country for Spain.54
*

Despite the upheaval in Santo Domingo, life in the Cordillera remained largely
tranquil. The logging continued with even fewer impediments. The production
zenith of the logging era came in 1964 when 39 million board feet of pine were
cut.55 Ip the logger’s wake came the campesinos, claiming state and former
communal lands. And fires followed the farmers. In 1967, drought again dried the
Cordillera for the third time in a decade, and arson plagued the woods. That year,
Balaguer administratively transferred the Direccion General Forestal from the
Secretariat of Agriculture to the Dominican Armed Forces. That move, according
to a USAID report, was made to "strengthen its ability to protect the forests of the
country against invasion by transient farmers and illegal cutting." And with an
executive order, Balaguer closed the nation's remaining sawmills, and assumed
control over the processing and transporting of forest products. The imposition of
the logging ban closed roughly 200 mills and put an estimated 3000 people out of
work in the Cordillera.56 The owners of the mills, and to a lesser extent, the
workers, were indemnified for the closure by the government. The owners received
some relief for the investment in equipment, while the workers received a small
severance pay

The Balaguer government put some of the millworkers to work in

government nurseries, where they worked for a short while. This, however, was
scarcely sufficient to offset the loss of a reasonably well-paid timber job.

I

Unemployed woods workers returned to their conucos , exerting further
demographic pressures on the mountain forests.

For roughly thirty years, the

forests of the Cordillera suffered a tandem assault: the first from the logging, the
second from subsequent campesino agriculture. For next thirty years, the
campesino would be viewed as the chief agent of deforestation in the Cordillera.
El enemigo del bosque., the enemy of the forest.

Undoubtedly, under mounting

demographic pressure widespread traditional shifting cultivation has not been
well-suited to the steep Cordilleran slopes. What is not considered in this view,
however, is the context that created this dynamic, nor those who skated away
without blame.

The aftermath
When the mills closed don Manuel returned to Los Dajaos from the Haitian
border. After the mills, he farmed his conuco, planting red beans, squash and
cassava and later, market produce such as tomatoes and cabbage. Good with his
hands, he also worked in carpentry and masonry, in 1980s, he was hired by
Foresta as a forestal.

He's worked hard and done better than many in the

watershed. "Now I'm old, I don't need to kill myself working. You gotta conserve
your life," he says grinning.
The story of Manuel's life tells much about the forest history in the Cordillera.
The logging era , per se, did not cause irreparable damage to the Cordilleran
watersheds. Even with the poor practices used by the logging companies, the
mountainsides would likely have regenerated. Outside of thb national park, much
of the forest that exists in the upper Yaque is secondary growth. We should not
underestimate resilience of forest lands allowed rest. But when coupled with
subsequent activities ~ particularly conuquismo

and fires -- logging proved to the

first step in the degradation and the conversion of Cordilleran forests. It was
logging that created the initial disturbance and opened new areas for settlement
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and exploitation; it was also logging that helped create socio-economic conditions
that prompted campesinos to clear forest.
In a sense, the history of the timber industry in the upper Yaque began with the
arrival of Captain Merckle and ends yesterday with the rhythmically dull thud of an
ax striking pine bark. The US intervention played a critical role in shaping the
watersheds of the Cordillera. The assisted rise of Trujillo as the absolute ruler of a
predatory regime later permitted the mining of the forests without regard to the
consequence. But Trujillo neither open the Cordillera nor reaped all the rewards of
its exploitation alone. Thirty years after the closure of the mills, the political and
economic players from the logging era are still around. These actors are no less
central to much of the forest loss in the Cordillera than the campesinos
themselves.

The era of the mills in the Cordillera marked a significant period in

the region's environmental history. It represents a major acceleration in the rate of
deforestation. The cut-and-run approach exemplifies the squandering of a
resource base for the short-term gain of a few

It marks the integration of remote

watersheds with the world market economy. It also established the socio
economic and environmental conditions for subsequent deforestation by
campesinos.

Finally, it prompted a well-intentioned though poorly conceived and

implemented forest policy. In effect, that policy wages low-intensity war on the
farmers of the region.
The farmers who remain today practice their agriculture under the vigilant gaze
of Foresta and the army.

But the relationship between the campesinos and

Foresta wasn't always so adversarial. "When I was a forestal, " don Tomas recalls
of his work in the agency, "I used to feel good working; I was giving life and I was
conserving. But nowadays, I don't see that. They're putting a lot of men in jail,
they're putting forestales in jail. I don't look on that very well. I couldn't be a
forestal now for that reason."
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But don Manuel, a campesino like Tomas, holds a more sympathetic view
toward the forest service.'The farmer here has done the most damage to the forest,"
he says. "If Foresta ceased to exist, the country would be finished. Foresta has to
exist. The problem with Foresta is that we, the people, we're very ignorant. We want
to do things where they shouldn't be done. For that reason we have problems with
Foresta.... Never, never, have I had a problem. I do things as things should be
done, according to Foresta’s laws. I know the law."
Don Manuel's view is not unique among campesinos in the upper Yaque. It is
important to remember that campesinos should not be expected to speak with one
voice. Like many others, Manuel recognizes that much of the damage done to the
Cordilleran forests have come at their own hands. Campesinos have felt the
pressure to change ways, to leave the young pines , to abandon the burning, to
build dead barriers, to plant trees. Yo soy amigo del bosque, many a farmer says.
A friend of the forest. To prove their point they've organized. In the upper watershed
of the Yaque last summer, a confederation of campesino groups --the JuntaYaque
- formed to protect their livelihoods and their watershed. "We have to find
alternative to support ourselves," says Manuel, a new member. "That's what we're
looking for now."
The previous chapter looked at efforts to change traditional agriculture through
the farmers' group of Los Dajaos, AS ADA. Out this group has emerged the
JuntaYaque. This group is only one of several involved in the watershed. The next
chapter examines what is being done by a variety of institutional and grassroots
actors to protect and restore the upper yaque del Norte watershed.

Chapter 4
The Contested Watershed: The Institutional and Grassroots Response
After five decades of living and farming in the upper Rio Yaque del Norte,
Aquiles Jimenez has seen much and has not forgotten. With no formal education,
he has nonetheless been an astute and analytical observer of the changes in his
world. He remembers as a child riding six hours on a mule to town to sell the red
beans his father had grown. He remembers when the roads arrived, not to serve
the isolated mountain villages but rather to ease the transport of logs. He
remembers watching the mills arrive and depart in a span of roughly 20 years, and
notes their consequence:
The mills.came to finish off the world. These [mill owners] didn't have a
mind that thought of the future but only the present. The campesino saw
that he couldn't take care of the trees. Why? Because other people Came,
instead of the campesino ,.. to take advantage of them. And the only thing
you are left with are the weeds...If the campesino, for example, had been
the one who benefited from the pines - more than those ... millionaires
who put up the mills here and hauled away fortunes and left disaster then he would take care of the pines.
In decades between the end of World War II and 1967, the timber industry
flourished in the upper Yaque del Norte. As the previous chapter has shown,"the
industry exemplified a cut-and-run ferocity. Aside from the ecological impacts of
destructive logging practices, the timber era brought an influx of people to the
watershed, which was left wide open to further exploitation with the vastly
expanded road network. Landless farmers, and newly unemployed woodsworkers,
began to farm mountainsides previously too remote to reach.
The 1967 mill closure brought on by Law 211 also made illegal the harvest Of
trees and put a tax on imported wood. The actual effect of the move, still standing in
place, was to negate all property rights to trees on both state and private lands.
Balaguer's decree was a momentous event in that it marked the shift of
responsibility for the destruction of Cordilleran forests from the timber industry to
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the campesinos. The enforcement of the cutting ban is essentially the core of
Dominican forest policy, almost to the exclusion of other elements. This heavyhanded response has created not only animosity among the rural residents of the
Cprdillera, but also has nearly eliminated any incentive to care for the forest.
Aquiles explains a view widely held among residents in the upper Yaque del Norte:
The people in this campo have been the enemy of the pine because the
pine has always brought them trouble with Foresta. If on my farm, ten pines
sprout, then I have ten enemies, because if a friend of mine passes by my
farm and cuts a pine, Foresta thinks it was Aquiles that cut it. And they haul
me off to jail. And then what happens, perhaps I spend a month or two in
jail and later... when I come back from jail I'm going to cut them all so as
not to have this problem again. For that reason people feel themselves
enemies of the pine because Foresta hasn't educated them to take care of
them, that you could live off them. If I have those ten pines, and a forest
guard passes by and tells me 'Aquiles don't cut those ten trees because in
the future you'll benefit from them. But he doesn't tell me these words. No
the words he tells are 'if you cut a pine you'll land in jail. A forest guard
shouldn't be a person that pressures bur rather one that educates other
people. The forest guard should simply be educators of the campesinos.
With pressure they don't gain anything.
The pressure exerted by Foresta, and by extension the Balaguer government,
is just one of the numerous institutional responses to the problem of forest loss and
conversion in the upper Yaque del Norte. The situation has also drawn the
attention of regional and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs);
church-affiliated groups, international aid agencies, private foundations and
universities. The list of institutional actors is long: governmental agencies such as
Foresta, the National Parks Directorate, the Secretary of Agriculture, Institute for
Agrarian Reform; non-governmental organizations like Plan Cordillera, Social
Work for the Progress of the Villages, the Junta Salvaguarda; international
agencies such as the Canadian Consulate, the Inter-American Foundation, the
Peace Corps and private foundations such as the Falconbridge Foundation; and
numerous grassroots farmers and women's groups.
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Among these groups there is no disagreement that a problem exists in the
watershed; what that problem is, and what to do about it, however, are subject to
numerous interpretations. These interpretations, which are often served up as
truth, are essentially social or cultural constructs: Whose truth are we talking about
when we speak of the problems in the upper Yaque del Norte? Is there, then, but
one objective reality, or does that reality reflect the values, perceptions and
agendas of the observer? Early on, I made known the nature of my filters. In other
words, the truth claims I make are my own rather than some objective truth. In
recent years, the social sciences have begun to address the ways in which the
social reality is constructed. Barbara Deutsch Lynch, for example, in writing about
environmental beliefs in the Hispano-Caribbean, notes the value of a social
constructionist view.
To accept the environment and environmentalism as cultural
constructions that vary according to context does not deny the reality of
the physical landscape or negate the importance of concerns about its
destruction, but rather, suggests that attention to difference in
environmental constructions may offer new possibilities for creating more
habitable places. Conversely, failure to understand the cultural contexts in
which environmentalisms are embedded all too often perpetuates, if not
aggravates, social injustice as well as environmental degradation.1
In this chapter, I explore some of the interpretations of the problems in the
upper Yaque del Norte. The various actors involved bring with them distinct
perceptions of the problems and consequently widely divergent solutions. This
begs the question of who defines the problem and who proposes the solution. A
hillside farmer, a forest guard and a hydroelectric engineer have competing and
generally conflictive interests. Whose interest shall prevail? These questions are
political because they address power relations, as Greider and Garkovich note in a
recent article:
In the political arena of environmental issues, self-interests are embodied
in a group's definition of itself as reflected in its landscape. The particular
landscape that comes to dominate and thereby influence social actions
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and the allocation of social resources is the one that represents the group
exercising the greatest degree of power.... Three key factors underlie
power in these processes: the ability to define what constitutes information
(i.e. the ability to construct knowledge), the control of this sociallyconstructed information, and the symbolic mobilization of support'2
In this study I've tried to pay a good deal of attention to the words - both
written and spoken -

behind what is "known" about forest conversion in the upper

Yaque del Norte. Language is central to discourse, and as Arturo Escobar points
out the latter is the "process through which social reality inevitably comes into
being."3 The prevailing view of "deforestation" (itself a value-laden and problematic
term) in the upper Yaque del Norte, as well as the Dominican Republic in general,
holds the campesino largely responsible for the condition of the watershed.
Undeniably, much of the forest conversion in the region has come physically at the
hands of the small farmers. But as geographer Lucy Jarosz notes in her study of
small farmers and deforestation in Madagascar: "Abstracting shifting cultivation
and population dynamics from specific regional contexts and omitting a
consideration of external processes ... may serve an ideology of repression, feed
the fires of prejudice and fear, and promote what are exactly the wrong kinds of
solutions."4
Indeed the widely held understanding that campesinos are the problem in the
upper Yaque del Norte requires scrutiny. What makes such a view problematic is
that it ignores contextual factors, excludes other interpretations, reinforces
technocratic solutions and serves as a basis for proposed official actions. While I
do not wish to portray this view as monolithic, it nonetheless, in various ways and to
varying degrees, pervades the mindset of not only governmental agencies such as
Foresta, but also some local and regional non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and international aid agencies.
My intent in this chapter is to delve into some sources -- from the international
down to the local -- of the view that holds the campesino solely culpable for the
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current state of the watershed in the Rio Yaque del Norte, and to show the ways
that such a definition of the problem manifests itself in the actions of governmental
and non-governmental actors. As previously stated, the range of institutional actors
in the upper Rio'Yaque del Norte is a wide one; in this chapter I focus on the
Foresta and a non-governmental urban-based "stakeholders" group, the Junta
Salvaguarda, formed to protect and restore the watershed.

Traditionally, power

elites from urban centers can bring to bear far greater influence over contested
landscapes than the rural residents of the region. The campesinos, while far from
powerless, struggle to enter the debate from the margins. In response to the
environmental degradation they themselves recognize, and the perceived threats
to their livelihoods, some campesinos have begun to organize on a watershedwide basis. Their attempts to control their land and livelihoods reflects a new
approach to environmentalism, that of community-based conservation. Ultimately,
the aim is to show that the campesinos have their own discourses, their own
stories, and by doing so broaden the debate over what to do in the watershed by
amplifying voices least often heard, those of the campesinos of the upper Yaque
del Norte.

Conventional wisdom
In the search for ways to counter environmental degradation in the Third World,
the conventional response has reflected a technocratic bias. In this view,
environmental problems are essentially physical and thus have technical
solutions, which can be administered by the appropriate agencies. Largely
excluded from this view are social and political factors. Randall Baker points out
that the technocratic approach overlooks important causal factors such as
inequitable access to the natural resource base, the deleterious effects of exportled agricultural economies and the "short-term asset stripping for a quick profit by
those who make, or are beyond the control of, the laws." Worse yet, he argues, the
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technocratic approach not only displaces blame onto its victims but also creates "a
serious illusion of concern on the part of those really to blame and to allow them -in the name of environmental protection -- to tighten the screws on the
marginalised poor." 5
This description applies to the situation in the upper Yaque del Norte and
elsewhere in the country.

Dominican social scientist Pedro Juan del Rosario

asserts that in regard to deforestation the society at large has traditionally viewed
the campesino as either the evil-doer or more often the good fool who knows not
what he does. No ope, he argues, exhibits these views more than Dominican field
technicians, ones often trained in North American methods mostly inappropriate to
the highland Tropics. "The agronomist, confronted with the field reality and the
impossibility of applying many of his learned technologies, has two choices,
recognize the inadequacy of his knowledge or establish as an axiom the 'stupidity,1
the 'ignorance,' or the 'laziness' of the campesino.6 Most often chosen, according
to Rosario, is the latter.
Thus, there is a tendency among some -- though certainly not all -

domestic

and international resource professionals to hold ill-founded stereotypes about
campesinos. Michael Redclift finds that much of the resistance to development
programs, environmental projects in particular, stems from the programs' source, its
root in the countries of the North. Derived from a knowledge base alien to their
own, this agenda causes people to resist in subtle ways. "Frequently, people who
are relatively powerless, because their knowledge systems are devalued, or
i

,

because they do not wield economic power, resist in ways which look like passivity:
they keep their own counsel, they appear ‘respectful’ towards powerful outsiders,
but they simply fail to cooperate.”7
Northern and urban views of campesino agriculture have long been
disparaging. A North American forester sent to assess the Dominican Republic's
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forest resources during the US occupation in the early 1920s found that conucos
"served a temporary progress of providing a few scanty crudely cultivated
agricultural crops," and urged steps to "correct the destructive tendency."8 In this
assessment, survival becomes equated with "temporary progress." The failure to
recognize explicitly the elemental concerns of the rural poor characterizes a
technocratic approach. As I noted in chapter 2, the first domestic calls to restrict
conuquismo

in the upper Yaque del Norte also came in the 1920s when

Dominican geographer and man of letters Dr. Juan Perez, a native son of
Santiago, warned about the forest destruction along the river bottom, and called for
the removal of some of the headwaters' inhabitants.9
Escobar points out that this type of assessement focuses on the obvious, the
plainly visible, and obscures as much as it reveals. Escobar characterized such
views in this way:
Over the years, ecosystems analysts have discovered the 'degrading' activities
of the poor, but seldom recognized that such problems were rooted in
development processes that displaced indigenous communities, disrupted
people’s habitats and occupations, and forced many rural societies to increase
their pressure on the environment. Now the poor ard admonished not for their
lack of industriousness but for their ‘irrationality’ and lack of environmental
consciousness. Popular and scholarly texts alike come to be populated with
representations of dark and poor peasant masses destroying forests and
mountain sides with axes and machetes, thus shifting visibility and blame away
from the large industrial polluters in the North and South and the predatory way
of life fostered by capitalism and development to poor peasants and ‘backward’
practices such as slash-and-burn agriculture. 10
This technocratic view of swidden agriculture has evolved over the years to at
least acknowledge in passing some of the societal factors behind forest loss and
conversion. A 1969 study by the Organization of American States, found th a t" for
various reasons, chiefly of a socio-economic nature, the farmers have for the last
few years been engaged in almost systematic destruction of the forest in a
desperate effort to find new land for the establishment of a precarious subsistence
agriculture."11 These latter words, "a precarious subsistence agriculture" are
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rhetorically softer than "scanty crudely cultivated agricultural crops" though they
carry still a pejorative ring. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), itself the
embodiment of technocracy, in its Forestry Action Plan describes environmental
deterioration brought on by "marginal agriculture" in the upper watersheds of the
Dominican Republic. Still, the plan recognizes that the "marginal agriculture" of the
mountainsides and interfnountain valleys provides 80 percent of the nation's beans
/

■

as well as a large percent of the country's viveres , the tubers and root crops that
form the staples of the Dominican d ie t.12
When I returned to the Dominican Republic in the fall and early winter of 1995,
I initially had in mind an investigation of the environmental effects of the fall of the
*
dictator Trujillo. My stateside research indicated that following his assassination in
1961 began an intense period of forest conversion that continued up until today.

A

USAID 1981 environmental profile, prepared by a team of North American experts,
found that the main life zone found in the upper Yaque del Norte (Holdridge's
subtropical lower montane moist forest) had been "deforested or seriously
degraded by slash and burn agriculturists." The report offers this account of how
that happened:
Serious watershed degradation probably began in earnest during the 19611967 timber boom when loggers and campesinos made massive advances into
the pine forests of the Cordillera Central. Although the forced closure of all
sawmills in 1967 brought an abrupt halt to logging, it did not lessen the
campesino demand for new land. The continued high rate of population growth
and unequal land tenure patterns have pushed the small farmers even higher in
the Cordillera Central watersheds, almost invariably onto steep, highly erodable
slopes incapable of supporting annual cropping. Pressure for land has taken
small farmers up to the boundary of the two national parks in the Cordillera
Central, (sic) thus there is literally no more unoccupied land available for
colonization in the Cordillera Central. 13
This appraisal, while mentioning some of the socio-economic and demographic
factors that spur damaging land practices, fails to acknowledge fully the
complexity of the problem. "Serious degradation," I later learned, began not with
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the death of Trujillo, but rather, as the previous chapter has shown, with the
development of the timber industry in the 1940s. Profligate forestry practices and
extensive road-building account for much of the destruction that occurred in the
early and mid 1960s. The "high rate of population growth" too began in the Trujillo
years as the dictator encouraged large families to provide a larger labor pool for
the industrializing nation. The "massive advances into the pine forests" made by
the campesinos implies that these lands were legitimate property of the late
dictator, when, in fact, they were once owned communally. Even the mention of
"annual cropping" suggests a Northern bias and a dim view of traditional
agriculture. Finally, to say that no land is available for colonization overlooks the
fact that most of the best arable land in the watershed is hot under cultivation,
and is owned by outsiders.
Domestically, similar types of assessments are widely made. In looking
specifically at the upper Yaque del Norte, an engineer from a government
hydrology agency, INDRHI, not only echoes the prevailing discourse but also
reflects its constituency:
The activities of the population that live in the Yaque del Norte watershed have
brought to more than half the grand extension of mountains a situation of very
serious degradation and this degradation not only reduces the quality of life for
the inhabitants of the upper watershed, but also has severely affected activities
of development, like hydroelectricity, and has impacted adversely the
population that lives in the lower parts, reducing in quantity and quality the
water for human and animal consumption, for irrigation, industrial development,
and has deteriorated the environment. The major impact of the degradation of
the upper Yaque del Norte watershed on the western Cibao Valley can be
measured not only from an environmental point of view but also from the
development of sustained economics in agricultural activity.14
Inevitably, such pronouncements work their way into policy and practice. A
National Forest Management Plan for the Dominican Republic, prepared by the
USAID, Michigan State University, and the Dominican Secretary of Agriculture
offered this directive: “Further intrusion into publicly-owned forest areas by hillside
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farmers must be prevented. Patrols and similar activities should be pursued to
arrest the practice.”15
How this dominant view of the campesinos and the forests becomes visible in
the actions of governmental and non-governmental sectors is the subject of the
following sections, f examine the government response to forest conversion in the
Cordillera by giving an institutional overview of Foresta, before returning to the
upper Yaque del Norte for an on-the-ground look at discourse in governmental
practice.

The Foresta
In the Dominican Republic, the primary forest law of the land is law 5856,
Passed during the tumultuous years after the fall of Trujillo in 1961, this law created
the General Directorate of Forests (DGF), most commonly known as Foresta. Law
5856 placed the agency in charge of managing all the nation’s forests; such a
charge entails enforcement, fire prevention and suppression, control of timber
harvesting, reforestation, and regulation of the transport and sale of firewood and
charcoal. In 1967, the five-year-old agency was transferred from the Secretariat of
Agriculture to the Secretariat for Armed Forces, thus giving military backing to a
formerly civilian function. Although since 1982 the agency has answered directly to
the Office of the President, it is still headed by an army colonel, as it has been
throughout the 1990s.
Despite its political proximity to the presidency, Foresta has long received low
budgetary priority. According to a 1984 USAID report, the DGF was a “weak,
neglected stepchild", of an institution, whose mandate was broad and its resources
thin.16 Between 1983 and 1989, funding for all the agencies involved in forest
management received 0.3 percent of the government’s annual budget.17 .What
money Foresta does receive goes mostly to pay its employees. In 1989, the DGF
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spent 85 percent of the $1.7 million it received for its operations on salaries and
wages, leaving little for actual project work.18
With too few resources to actually carry project work or even forestry extension,
the Foresta has focused o,n enforcing the cutting ban. Out of 2,100 Foresta
employees, 1,200 are forest guards, known as forestales. (By comparison, the
agency has one forester trained at the bachelor of science level, and 45 forestry
techrlicians.)19 The guards -- sometimes armed -- patrol their assigned regions,
searching for violations of the forest law. While not members of the military
themselves, the guards can rely on the backing of the local army detachment.
Foresta's disproportionate attention paid to enforcement has long been
recognized as counterproductive. The1984 USAID report found that even
enforcement itself was identified as a task too large to effectively carry out:
All forests cannot be patrolled constantly and, when an inspection shows a
violation which is prosecuted, the enforcement appears arbitrary and at the
convenience of the agency. This does not help the DGF’s image as a technical
, organization, nor its ability to assist in such areas as private forest plantation
and agroforestry management. 20
Well over a decade has passed since that assessment was made, and in the
intervening years little has changed. If anything, Foresta has stepped up its
enforcement efforts in recent years, partly because of internal and external
pressures. Dominican conservation groups, particularly the national network of
ecological societies, began to echo calls made earlier by international voices. A
noticeably stricter enforcement of forest laws began in the early 1990s, when
Colonel Pedro Candalier headed the Foresta. Once in charge of policing the
Haitian border, Candalier gained the enmity of the campesinos and the admiration
of the urban middle classes for vigor in which he embraced his job. A tale oft-told
by campesinos throughout the Dominican Republic is how Candalier swept down
out of the sky in his helicopter on an old carbonero, a charcoal maker, killed and
burned his mules laden with charcoal and hauled the old man off to the Plan Piloto
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jail in the capital. Candalier, to his credit, took on big as well as the little. He was
removed from his post by Balaguer when he began to jail powerful interests
responsible for industrial pollution in the nation's rivers, including the Yaque del
Norte. He has since been moved to the National Parks Directorate.
As an institutional actor, Foresta maintains a presence at the local and regional
levels in the Yaque del Norte watershed. While many of its activities are highly
centralized, the agency has a district office in Jarabacoa, and a field office in
Manabao.

Forest -- Manabao
The Foresta office in Manabao sits on a knoll surrounded by exotic Caribbean
pine. The spartan room - a radio, a desk, a file cabinet and a bulletin board with a
lone poster urging parrot conservation -

was empty, except for Altagracia, the

cook and cleaner. The supervisor, she said, was on his way from Jarabacoa, some
twenty miles away. He was new to the job, an acting director. Two weeks prior, the
former supervisor, and a nursery foremen were arrested for allegedly running a
small mill in the hills above town.
I chat with Altagracia while waiting. She has a broad smile and is easy to talk
to. She’s in her early fifties, and a native of Manabao. The mother of 11 children,
she says her oldest is my age, and like many rural Dominicans, is desperate to get
to the United States, most often called Nueva York. Her husband is a farmer,
though that line of work is getting tougher all the time because her employers,
Foresta, won’t let farmers clear land to plant conucos. “They tell us to plant trees,
plant trees, plant trees, but who can eat a tree?"
After two hours, the interim supervisor, Francisco, arrives on his motorcycle. I
explain my purpose and he graciously agrees to an interview. He deftly skirts the
issue of the “small inconvenience” with the former supervisor, and instead delivers
the official line of Foresta’s mission: preserve the forests of the watershed. Foresta
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came into the watershed, he says, to halt the “almost total devastation” brought on
by the mills that operated in the area.
He soon shifts the interview’s focus from enforcement to reforestation,
recounting past projects in the area. Most occurred in the late 1970s and early 80s’
near Manabao.The dense stands of exotic pine (Pinus caribea), an import from the
Caribbean lowlands of Honduras and Belize, are the result of those years. More
recently, Foresta began a “right to cut” program. Currently, only the president and
chief of the Armed Forces can permit the harvest of any tree on state or private
land. Under this relatively new program, DGF nurseries will ostensibly donate
seedlings to small and medium size producers. Once the seedlings are planted,
the farmers receive a certificate of plantation, a guarantee of the right to one day
harvest. “We have used it a lot and it has given us good results,” Francisco says.
“There are farmers who have changed their agricultural crops to timber crops
because it is more profitable."
The “right to cut” program, begun in 1988, is certainly an advance for the
agency. Still it poses problems, ones unrelated to the everyday constraints faced
by campesinos. That is to say that assuming a campesino has the land, the time,
and labor resources to plant trees, he, or in rarer cases, she, faces the following
difficulties: First, the bureaucracy involved can be intimidating, time-consuming and
costly for small producers. Much of the paperwork is done at the district level in
Jarabacoa, necessitating frequent visits to town. Ultimate approval comes from
central offices in Santo Domingo. Foresta is understaffed, which means it is often
difficult to get a technician to visit farm sites. (Forest guards lack the training and the
authority to grant certificates.) When, or if, available, the “donated" seedlings are
sometimes sold to campesinos by enterprising - and poorly paid -- nursery
supervisors, The greatest worry, however, for farmers is whether such certificates
of plantation will be honored years or decades later when trees reach a
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harvestable size. Foresta, like many Dominican agencies, is known for its
institutional instability. In assessing the forestry sector, the FAO found that
personnel turnover at all governmental levels is so high that it is "practically
impossible to confer continuity and consistence to policies and programs for a time
period long enough to secure any achievements.” 21 Thus, for many campesinos,
the program poses many practical obstacles.
Francisco tries to assuage such concerns by saying that farmers have legal
protection. “The law protects them totally,” he said. “But you know, almost no one
believes it, and this is one of the problems here in this country.” Such distrust
seems the essence of the relationship between the Foresta and the small farmers
of the Dominican Republic. I ask if the eampesino is an enemy of the forest.
I don’t believe it. What is missing is a lot of forestry extension, a lot of
forestry education. What is missing is coordination, communication and
education. We have to make the farmer, the eampesino, a friend of the
forest. I think if you teach someone what they should do, it would be very
difficult for them to commit an infraction.
For the farmer who abides by the forest laws, and solicits the requisite
permission for clearing land, there is no problem, Francisco says. Even for first
time offenders, he says, the agency shows some leniency, putting them to work in
the nursery. The problem is that there are many people who repeatedly commit
infractions of the forestry law. "And when a person repeatedly violates the forestry
law, it is necessary to punish him so that he sees'he can’t do it again. When he
returns from that jail, he comes back with a new outlook.”
As an interim" supervisor based in the Jarabacoa, Francisco is at Jeast
physically removed from the people he feels need educating. To see the day-today workings of Foresta personnel, I asked to accompany a forest guard on his
patrol. One who interacts daily with the rural inhabitants in the watershed is Rubio,
one of 17 forestales in the watershed. For more than a decade, he’s worked as a
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forest guard in the upper Yaque del Norte. Three days a week he patrols the hills
above Manabao looking for signs of illegal activity. These days illegal activities
include just about anything a farmer might do in the field. Typically he oversees the
permit process for land clearing, for making conucos. If a farmer, on his or her own
land, wants to clear a field of weeds and shrubs for planting, a permit from FOresta
is required. The farmer first solicits the forest guard, then approaches the
administrator in Manabao, and then an application is made to the district office in
Jarabacoa. This cumbersome process, however, had largely been frozen in late
1995. "Right now, they are not giving any permits," he says.
As we walk briskly along old logging-roads, Rubio explains that the recent
clampdown resulted from a spate of charges of violations, ranging from the
discovery of several small mills in the area, and an incident where a Foresta
supervisor, a nursery foreman and a farmer were all arrested for illegal cutting, and
the arrest of a large landowner who paid workers to clear land for pasture. Much of
the land we pass through seems to be in early successional stages, covered in
great expanses of bracken fern. This area, he says, was forested up until the
1980s, and when I ask what happened, he answers "lo1campesinos."
"Campesinos are cutting too many trees. One can't put his trust in the
campesinos for that reason," he says. "The campesino's destruction and Hurricane
David have lessened river flows. For that reason we have Foresta's repression. To
*

conserve the rivers so that they don't dry up, so that what happened in Haiti won't
happen here." Well-known in the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere, is the
environmental degradation that has occurred in Haiti. The neighboring nation is
often held up as a specter of what awaits the Dominican Republic should it fail to
conserve its dwindling forest base. Despite the important nature of his work, Rubio
struggles at times with the authoritarian tactics of his agency, and where that puts
him in his community.
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I look for every way possible to avoid jailing people. It is better if one doesn't
create hate in the community. I would always like to help the poor, the poor.
eampesino. But the situation we're in, I can't help because what happened
to the chief, and the forestales -- the ones they had to fire for doing favors -would happen to me.
Indeed, Foresta policy holds the forest guards responsible for any illegal
activity that occurs within their jurisdiction. Not only are their jobs at stake, but also
their freedom. Forest guards are routinely jailed for violations that occur under their
watch. No one knows this better than Trinidad, the recently fired nursery supervisor.
I first met Trinidad in the back of a crowded Toyota pickup as he was returning from
Plan Piloto.

During the winding ride up from Jarabacoa, I listened quietly as he

told his friends and neighbors about his experience. His supervisor told him to
loan a saw to a farmer, who wanted to cut a dead tree to build a house. "I am just a
little guy," he said, and did what he was told. For it, he would be fired, arrested, and
jailed for 22 days.
I met with Trinidad a week later for an interview at his home, a small, three
room, wood framed, dirt-floored house he shares with his recently widowed sister
and her three children. He was born and raised in Manabao, and remembers a
time, roughly twenty years ago, when most everyone dedicated themselves to
agriculture. With the Foresta, Trinidad expressed frustration, but no bitterness. He
spent many years with the agency, earning about $115 a month, and still takes
great pride in having participated in the reforestation projects from the late 1970s
and early 80s' that surround the hills closest to Manabao. "In all that I had a hand."
He's also seen dramatic changes within the agency. Only in recent years has
Foresta become "so drastic, so hard," he says.
In part it's right. We cant be so predatory, finishing off nature. Although,
on the other hand, man has to work to liv e... Right now things are such
that for cutting a cadillo plant you'INand in jail. In Foresta's prison, the
largest part are farmers... Most the farmers that worked this area have had
to emigrate toward Santo Domingo, or La Vega, looking for a way to earn
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a living because they can't work here. There's no way to produce food for
the Dominican nation if things continue the way they are.
Trinidad says he sees little resolution to the conflicts between Foresta and the
remaining farmers of the watershed. The farmers will continue to face difficulties
with Foresta for practicing their agriculture above the valley floor where Manabao
sits. The good land around the village, he says, is owned by outsiders, mostly
people from Jarabacoa, and is devoted to pasture. "Thousands and thousands and
more thousands of tareas are occupied by five head of cattle. Most of the people
here have no more than the little piece where they live. Land here belongs to the
powerful."
As to his own situation, Trinidad hopes to find work as a park guard in the
national park. Failing that, he may have to follow his neighbors. "Maybe I'll go to the
capital as well. We will see. You know, I don't like it, but neither can I let us die of
hunger,"
Such are the exigencies of life for some residents of the upper Yaque del *
Norte. These elemental demands have hardly been recognized let alone
accommodated by the government's response. Despite the best intentions of some
field personnel, Foresta's approach has only alienated residents and exacerbated
existing problems. The inadequacy of the governmental efforts has in part spurred
non-governmental initiatives in the watershed.
Like many Latin American nations, the Dominican Republic has a vibrant NGO
movement. These groups represent the breadth of concerns, of discourses. One
umbrella group, the Junta Salvaguarda, has been formed to address the problems
in the Yaque del Norte river basin. The next section looks at some of the
constituents of this urban-led attempt at watershed conservation. And while the
approach of the NGOs is more constructive than that of the government, some of
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them nonetheless embrace the notion that at the root of the forest problem is the
eampesino.

Junta Salvaguarda
It is almost arguable whether Santo Domingo is the actual capital of the
Dominican Republic. As a center of bureaucratic power, Santo Domingo is
undisputed; the presidential palace, the Congress, the executive offices are all
found in the 500-year-old city. But if you look for the real power, the economic and
political clout that sets the nation's direction, you must look to the north, to the
nation's second city, Santiago de los Caballeros. Located on the northwestern end
of the fertile Cjbao Valley, Santiago is an agricultural and industrial center of the
nation. It is home to the old landowning oligarchy, and many of the most powerful
families in the country.
After tumbling out of the Cordillera Central, the Rio Yaque del Norte flows north
to eventually part the city before banking to the northwest and emptying into the
Atlantic Ocean near the Haitian border. For the residents of the upper watershed
this geographic fact perhaps shows their plain bad luck. To be precariously
situated above the nation's center of power is not an enviable spot. Affect those
below you and expect reaction. The divisions are evident: Center/periphery,
urban/rural, lowland/highland, prospering/struggling, powerful/powerless. As the
last chapter has shown, the marginalized communities of the Cordillera have had
their destinies controlled by powerful forces from the outside, oftentimes from
Santiago.
It was then perhaps an occasion for concern for the residents of the upper
watershed when in early 1995 a group formed in Santiago with the aim of
protecting and restoring the health of the watershed. The Junta de Directores del
Proyecto de Salvaguarda del Rio Yaque del Norte brings together an array of
so-called stakeholders, among them community development NGOs,
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environmental groups, industry, commercial agricultural interests, government
agencies, municipalities and universities. Conspicuously absent were grassroots
eampesino groups. At the junta's inauguration, then-president Joaquin Balaguer,
the blind octogenarian who got his political start as a puppet president under
Trujillo, warned that the nation's attempts to protect the watershed's forest would be
in vain if its inhabitants continued their traditional practices, and thus it may be
necessary to remove the residents. Deforestation, he reminded the directors, is "a
barbaric action that on occasions ought to be responded with another barbaric
action." 22

N

In Spanish the word is desalojar, to evict. It's powerful word among
campesinos, people who know its meaning well. Elsewhere in the country, entire
eampesino communities have been uprooted to make secure park boundaries, or
in other cases to clear room for expanding mines. Balaguer's admonition weighs
heavily on the minds of campesinos in the watershed.
Fortunately, however, Balaguer's view may not be wholly representative of the
junta itself. Among those most active in the junta is Dr. Domingo Carasco, director
Department of Natural Resources at Institute) Superior de Agricultura (ISA) in
Santiago. Balaguer's decree gave official status as the protective body for the
Yaque del Norte to school after it had begun its study. Thus far the group has
been designated, though "remains unfunded. "It's one thing about our country," Dr.
Carasco observes in his paneled air conditioned office on the outskirts of Santiago.
"Laws are passed to execute activities or take specific actions, but they don't make
resources available to implement them." .
The goal of Junta Salvaguarda is to look at the entire watershed, from its,
headwaters to the mouth. More specifically it aims to inform, to concientizar, the
country of all the environmental problems of the Yaque del Norte. Another study
could easily examine industrial and agricultural contamination of its middle aind
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lower stretches as it passes through Santiago and the northwestern portion of the
country. Dr. Carasco, who has a doctorate in watershed management from a North
American university, says the group strives to bring together disparate attempts at
protecting the watershed. “What is the result of these isolated activities? Nothing
and the environment continues to degenerate." Salvaguarda, then, takes a
participatory stakeholder approach to addressing problems in the watershed, says
Dr. Carasco.
We understand that (past efforts) haven’t been sustainably because the
people, the stakeholders, haven’t been consulted to see how they
perceive the problem, to see how they perceive the solutions, So we said,
well, this paradigm isn’t working, let’s use a paradigm that is participatory,
where everyone participates in the identification of the problem and as
well as the identification of the solutions. This is the process we have
followed. W e want the people to participate in such a manner that when
the implementation is finished, the people can continue with the activity.
In the upper part deforestation and soil erosion have been identified as
problems. "Traditionally we have attacked the symptoms, and we haven't attacked
the problem. We put a band-aid on it but really the problem has not been cured," he
says. One of the problems is that roughly 80 percent of the people depend on wood
or carbon for cooking fuel, which comes from the forest. Another is that many
campesinos have no title to their land. "If I'm not the owner of the title, I don't have
a strong incentive to better the quality , or maintain the quality of soil for many
years." Yet another problem with soil conservation measures is the long time
frame in which participants will see benefits.
The problems seen in the upper watershed affect the lower watershed. "For
example," Dr. Carasco says, "if there is a high degree of deforestation, and
consequently a loss in the volume of the rivers, because there isn't a high degree
of infiltration or there isn't sufficient percolation ... if there isn't sufficient water to
produce electricity, there's no electricity in the lower part. Nor is there sufficient
water to irrigate in the campos where there is agriculture dependent on irrigation."
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One member group of the Junta Salvaguarda particularly concerned about
such interrelations is the Association for the Development of Santiago, a long
standing community group. (ISA itself was formed more than 20 years ago by the
association.) In 1994 the group undertook its own study of the problems in the mid
and upper watersheds. Its conclusions and recommendations reflect a markedly
different set of concerns than those held by residents in the upper watershed.
The author of the report, Ing. Ramon Isidro Rodgriguez,' adds his own figures
to the debate. He estimated the remaining forest cover the upper Yaque to be only
20 percent of the 1,288 square kilometers watershed. The watershed is the source
drinking water for 700,000 inhabitants in the Cibao Valley as well as irrigation for
33,000 hectares, and produces through the Tavera-Bao dam 200 million kilowatt
hours annually. 23
Of greatest concern, according to Rodriguez's report, was the sedimentation of
the dams and the potential for downriver flooding. In 1979, Hurricane David, which
caused enormous damage to the forests and farms of the upper Yaque, brought
flooding to Santiago, and caused water to come within five feet of spilling over the
dam at Tavera. To lessen these worries, the report calls for construction of the
Manabao-Bejucal hydroelectric project on the upper river. That project, first
proposed by president Jorge Blanco and his Partido Revolucionario Dominicano
(PRD) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, would place a small dam on the upper
Yaque del Norte near the community of Los Dajaos. When Balaguer returned to
power in 1986 after an eight year hiatus, he scrapped plans for the dam, opting
instead to build the Higuey-Aguacate Dam elsewhere in the southern Cordillera
Central.
The ideal solution, the report continues, is to reforest the watershed, but the
costs of such reforestation projects may be prohibitive. Plan Sierra estimates the
cost of reforesting one hectare to be roughly US$753; with nearly 1,300 square
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kilometers in need of planting, total costs would run about US$97 million. Realizing
that it is already perhaps too late for that, and indeed enormously expensive to
carry out such extensive work, the group offered these suggestions: Create one
institution to coordinate restoration activities; conduct a natural resource and
agricultural inventory; suspend agricultural and pastoral activities except in some
areas already, using soil conservation measures; and begin some forestry
projects.24
Most worrisome for the residents in the upper Yaque del Norte, however, was
the Santiago group's recommendation that calls for the eventual enlargement of
Armando Bermudez National Park. This move would add 600km2 to the park -which now covers only 429 km2 - in order to encompass the headwaters of a
dozen tributaries of the Yaque del Norte. Engineer Rodriguez suggests that the
lower elevational limit of the new park reach down between 500 and 700 meters.25
What this would mean for the residents of Los Dajaos, Manabao, La Cienaga and
other communities -- all of them above 700 meters - of the upper Yaque del Norte
is unclear and not spelled out in the report. When such recommendations are
coupled with stern warnings from the highest governmental levels, the concern
about an eviction expressed by many residents of the region indeed seems wellgrounded.
Engineer Rodriguez's report exhibits the concerns of urban and downriver
interests. Away from the center, in the upper Yaque del Norte, rural and upriver
interests may have to be content with less than authentic voice in the Junta
Salvaguarda. In the Junta, campesinos are represented through groups such as
Plan Cordillera and Plan Sierra. It is questionable whether these groups -despite
their beneficial work for and with campesinos -

can truly represent eampesino

interests. The former is church affiliated while the latter is a quasi-governmental
agency 26 Plan Cordillera merits brief examination in that it is the vehicle through
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which the rural residents of the upper Yaque del Norte ostensibly air their
• '

\

concerns.
Plan Cordillera is a Catholic church-affiliated NGO based in Jarabacoa. At the
group's newly-built office and nursery, I met with the director, Francisco Antonio
Rosario. A former longtime Foresta employee, Rosario said the 12-year-old group
began with financial support from the Foresta and international donor agencies,
though reorganized about five years ago and became affiliated with the diocese
from La Vega, a mid-sized city at the foot of the Cordillera in the Cibao Valley. The
backing of the Church, both financial and moral, has lent credibility to the group's
efforts, says Rosario. "We all know that almost all development programs in the
country have become politicized and have ended in failure," he says. 'The

,

participation of our campesinos in religious activities has helped us penetrate with
them. And they have more trust in us with development programs." Rosario says
Plan Cordillera projects draw heavily on community involvement, undertaking
projects "only when the community participates directly in our work," Rosario says.
"We don't give anything to anybody If we put a latrine in a community, or to a
school that needs it, the community has to pay the value in reforestation or nursery
work."
Although the group is involved in apiculture, latrine projects and aqueducts, the
focus of Plan Cordillera is primarily forestry projects. Rosario cites oft-quoted
figures that 67 percent of the country - because of its rugged topography - is better
suited to forestry than agriculture. Rosario says they strive for an integrated
approach that involves forestry project work with educational efforts.
We believe education is the most basic thing in the program. Our
education program aims at integrating man with natural resources. We
want that a man knows a tree is a renewable resource, that there are times
and places where and when you can't make use of that tree ... But there
are other sites where it is possible to develop forestry programs that will
benefit the eampesino. We don't believe reforestation is a.burden; on the
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contrary, we believe that reforestation is going to solve the world's
problems.
Whether reforestation alone is the answer is debatable.

And while it is not my

intent to undermine the work of any group working toward environmental
protection and betterment of living conditions for rural poor, I do find it appropriate
to point out problematic viewpoints. Plan Cordillera seems to exhibit the
technocratic and paternalistic impulses antithetical to a community-based
approach to conservation. Questions remain as to whether Plan Cordillera alone
could adequately represent eampesino interests.
If Junta Salvaguarda seeks to encompass all the concerns of the residents of
the watershed, if participation is the goal, then it should include the grassroots
groups in the region. The value of a stakeholders’ approach to conservation issues
is that it incorporate a wide range of legitimate interests. It must be remembered,
however, that all interests are not created equal, and that some bear with them
more power and influence than others. In writing about of the role of institutional
actors in community-based conservation, Marshall Murphree notes this
shortcoming of the stakeholders’ approach:
The danger is that this perspective easily can transform interest into a
conceptual collective proprietorship by a vast and amorphous circle of
stakeholders. Those stakeholders who have invested the most in
professional expertise and monetary capital form the board of directors.
But this accounting procedure is false. Communities' investment in their
environments - their land, their resources, their labor, their local
environmental knowledge, their managerial presence, and their stake in
the future -■>■is in the aggregate and, by social accounting, is far higher than
that of all external actors put together.27
Without genuine grassroots participation, groups such as Salvaguarda

run the

risk of employing the long-standing top-down approach to conservation strategies.
These are often imposed from above and or outside; the locals generally have little
to no say in what's carried out. Such attempts run contrary to a growing body of
research focusing on community-based conservation. That approach can be seen
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in the desire to regain control over local resources, a sentiment widely expressed
by many campesinos in the upper Yaque del Norte. In the summer of 1995, a
federation of farmer and women's groups in the watershed formed to take a
proactive stance on protecting their watershed, the source of their livelihoods. This
group, JuntaYaque, though still in its infancy, could be an appropriate vehicle for
initiating community-based conservation efforts. This is not to deny the legitimate
concerns of national groups like Salvaguardas, nor to denigrate the contributions
they could make; rather it is to call for some melding of the two approaches. No one
has a more intimate knowledge of the watershed than the campesinos who live
there. What they lack are the technical and financial resources -- resources
national groups could contribute -- to effect much needed conservation measures.
In the next section, I look at the response at the grassroots, and some of the
difficulties faced by communities striving to control their land and lives.

JuntaYaque
The road from Los Dajaos gains more than a thousand feet in elevation as it
climbs the mile to Los Marranitos, one of the poorer communities in the watershed.
On a rutted red clay road the wood houses are unpainted, the tin roofs rusting and
the seemingly ubiquitous colmado, the little store that sells Dominican staples
such as rice, beans, rum, sugar, and oil, is absent. To buy these requires a trek
down the mountain to Los Dajaos. Until the early 1990s, there were no latrines in
Los Marranitos. At more than 5,000 feet in elevation, the village offers a vantage
point on over half the Yaque del Norte watershed. That vista has changed
dramatically in only the last dozen years or so, according to Sonia, who moved to
her husband Hector's community in the early 1080s.
A 29-year-old mother with four children, Sonia has been the health promoter
for La Obra Social, a church-affiliated NGO in Jarabacoa, for the last five years.
“When I arrived here, in this area where we work, lots of children died of fever, of
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vomiting, of diarrhea. And the mothers didn’t know what to do. But today the mother
knows, more or less, what to do when her child has a fever through us the
promoters.”
Today sanitation has made gains in the community; with the help of a Peace
Corps volunteer, latrines were built for all but two houses in the community. Still
the root source of many of the illnesses remains: “The other cause is water; we
don’t have water." There once was a small aqueduct for the community, though it is
all but dried up. Another aqueduct passes through Los Marranitos destined for El
Manguito, a mile below, and some residents siphon water off it, causing conflicts
with their downstream neighbors. Most people, however, get their water from a
small intermittent stream that trickles out of the denuded hillside. “If you saw it, you
would just die," she says.
Sonia recalls the forest loss around Los Marranitos was dramatically
noticeable in her early years in the village, especially between 1984-1986. During
those years, which coincided with the International Monetary Fund's imposition of
structural adjustment measures on the country, many residents depended on
charcoal-making for incomes. Equally damaging to the area's forests during those
especially tough years were the the conucos and the fires. “I, myself, remember
when Hector, one time to make a conuco, knocked down a tree -- so big it pains me
to say - big, big trees... Today I see it and it pains me. He was really young, and
they were trying to get ahead, not really knowing what they were destroying. To
destroy a forest is to destroy one’s life"
Still Sonia is optimistic about her and her family's future in the watershed.
Indiscriminate burning has decreased over the years. "They used set fire and burn
everything, not considering those who would come later. This has changed a lot."
Her husband Hector, a member of the farmers' group ASADA, farms on the steep
slopes above Los Dajaos using soil conservation measures, a change from the old
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ways: Changes in the use of the forests have come largely as a result of greater
education, the realization that the forest base was dwindling, and the recognition
that if they don't act themselves they may be acted upon. “People are getting a little
1
scared. It has been said that they are going to evict (us) and this has got people
scared. For that reason we have this junta, JuntaYaque. To orientate, to make
conscious that people should not attack the forests.”
Thus the JuntaYaque can be seen as a local attempt at exerting control over
the campesino's land and their own lives. The group formed in the summer of 1995
as an outgrowth of the local farmers' association (ASADA) in the community of Los
Dajaos. The idea, according to JuntaYaque president Evaristo Bautista, grew out of
the recognition that the upper Yaque del Norte had suffered serious degradation,
and that many downstream users rely on Yaque water for agriculture and power
generation. The JuntaYaque strives to encompass the diverse concerns of the
watershed. Communities represented vary in socioeconomic standing and local
custom. Los Dajaos, for example, seems more affluent than a community like Los
Marranitos. Lack of arable land is a much greater problem in Manabao than Los
Dajaos. Still the Junta seems an attempt to band together disparate groups into a
cohesive body, with a conservation aim. The task of protecting the watershed,
Evaristo notes, was too large for one group:
We have to form a junta of associations to protect the watershed because one
association alone cannot protect the watershed. It's too big. We've seen the
danger it is in. We are in the highest part of the Yaque, and we have got to take
care of the forests. We have to pay attention to all the Cordillera Central. All of
our rivers are born here. We need to sincerely recognize that the eampesino
lives in the campo, and that in the campo are the forests, and that the
eampesino can best take care of the forests.
Evaristo is in his late thirties, and has lived in Los Dajaos all his life. He and his
family run a colmado.

His father first came to the area during the logging era in

the 1940s. When I first met Evaristo he was working other members of ASADA in
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the community nursery hanging shade cloth for tree seedlings. One goal of the
JuntaYaque is to promote community efforts at reforestation through creation of
nurseries in each community. In addition to working toward critical rehabilitation
goals, reforestation could augment meager eampesino incomes. But the
JuntaYaque wants more than jobs in the forests: It wants greater control over the
watershed itself. Evaristo continues:
They [government officials] have invested millions of pesos in things that have
shown no result. Why not invest them in the campo and put the campesinos to
work in the forests. They can live by taking care of the forest, like a park, but still
be able to produce food to eat. This is a good solution. We say the creation of
work here in reforestation is one of the things that is going to protect the Yaque
watershed....My principal interest is that the upper watershed of the Yaque del
Norte be managed by the campesinos. We need an agreement that gives that
opportunity to the eampesino. On the contrary, if I as a eampesino, if I am not
considered important, then I am not going to give importance to the forests.
Concerning the other Junta, Bautista says if its resources are invested
downstream it will resolve nothing in the watershed. Still Bautista hopes
cooperation is possible, between the two juntas and the government agencies as
well. "Together with the institutions that are working to care for [the watershed], we
ought to unite our efforts. Neither them alone nor us alone." An adversarial
relationship achieves nothing. "When there are two enemies, it's not a good thing.
The authorities believe they are taking care of the forests, but they are making life
impossible for the campesinos. And it is causing the eampesino to hate the forest."
If the animosity that some campesinos exhibit toward the forest is to change, it'll
require education on both sides, the Foresta and the campesinos. Bautista says it
would be easy to educate Foresta officials. '
For me I think they need to change their attitude, change from repression of
to reforestation with the campesinos. That would be educating them.
Foresta ought to part of the civil society. Foresta should not be part of the
army. This resolves nothing. The army is here to defend, but here there is
no war.
■
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Educating the campesinos of the watershed is also part of the JuntaYaque
agenda. “It is necessary to change traditional agriculture. You can’t do away with it
altogether; people will always have a little bean field.”

Indeed, agriculture in parts

of the watershed may be already changing. The farmers and residents of Los
Dajaos, through their group ASADA, are looking toward a variety of alternatives.
The watershed, with its cool yet frost-free climate and abundant rainfall, is suitable
for some new forms of agriculture. Once dominated by the cultivation of red beans,
agriculture in the watershed now looks to crops such as strawberries, citrus,
flowers and nuts. Ultimately the goal is to farm less land but grow higher value
crops, and to diversify the livelihood strategies of the watershed residents. New
agriculture, forestry work, penned livestock, fish-rearing, small crafts, and perhaps
even ecotourism are among possibilities often discussed. Ultimately, he says, the
aim is the maintenance and betterment of a way of life for the rural residents of the
watershed.
For the junta, what we are looking for are ways that the eampesino can
continue to live in the Yaque watershed, and live better, not only for the
short term but the long term as well. We want to see them live better
without being evicted...!A person from the campo has to do whatever they
have to because no one is going to die from hunger. In the campo, there
are trees. Here, in the campo there is no industry for the people to work in.
Here a person has to cut in order to live. How can we improve this
situation? Look for solutions like we are, the association here....For
precisely that reason we formed the junta to spread knowledge to the other
communities we have here. To do that we need a lot of resources. Right
now the junta is walking on foot, like a burro.
One thing for certain is that restoring and protecting damaged watersheds will
not come cheaply. New groups, such as JuntaYaque and its 450 members,
undoubtedly are cash-strapped, and within its relataively small membership and
the entire watershed there exists no chance that the funding will be self-generated.
This means groups must look outside for financial support. Groups like ASADA ,
through the efforts of one particularly dynamic and.well-connected member, have
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had reasonable success soliciting donations from international donors. One donor
agency active in the watershed is the Inter-American Foundation, a progressive
and relatively autonomous agency funded by the US government. The IAF, unlike
the Agency for International Development, answers to a board rather than
Congress or the president, thus better shielding it from US politics. The InterAmerican Foundation, according to one of its officials, supports "several thousand
projects emanating from organizations of and for poor people who lack access to
adequate income, information, social networks and participation in the decisions
that affect their lives.” Increasingly, the IAF is funding more environment-related
projects such as agroecology, environmental education, forestry, and watershed
management, than previously.28
JuntaYaque may have to look to a variety of sources, including external
agencies such as the IAF, to fund its efforts. Reliance on outside donors, however,
raises questions about the efficacy and adverse consequences external funding
carries. The issue of donor agency paternalism and community dependency has
been explored in depth elsewhere, particularly in Roland Bunch’s Two Ears of
Corn.29

Murphree succinctly characterized these problems as the “initiation of

unsustainable capital development projects and localized bureaucratic structures;
communities tactical acceptance of objectives that are inconsistent with their own
perspectives; and the introduction of power differentials within the community.” 30
Indeed, the Dominican Republic, like many nations subject to the development
programs, is rife with examples of community wells that worked until the pump
broke for the first time; or farmers who use soil conservation measures as long as
they were paid to do so; or communities divided by the infusion of outside money.
Murphree asserts that despite problematic nature of external funding, it is
justifiable especially at the outset of a program. The difficulties faced by the
JuntaYaque exemplify this. The key aspect of donor funding is that it should
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“further community interests rather than buy the donor a stake in the community’
resources." 31 This is a critical distinction: The urban-based Junta Salvaguarda is
in a far better position to fund project work in the watershed than the JuntaYaque.
The danger is that such funding could be used to impose exogenously determined
programs, which most often fail.
In discussing the two Juntas, Junta Yaque and Junta Salvaguarda, it has not
been by my intent to paint one as good and the other bad, or to portray them as
rivals. Both groups are new, and dynamics between the two remain to be seen.
The hope here is to open up space for understanding and cooperation. External
institutional actors can play an important role in community-based conservation.
These actors -- groups like Junta Salvaguarda - could help to implement
community-established economic and environmental agendas, rather than having
a community adopt an externally-derived agenda.32 Rather than play the role of a
traditional NGO, the Junta Salvaguarda could act as a grassroots support
organization (GSO).' These organizations bring with them no set agenda, but rather
serve as a conduit for services and resources between community groups and
goverment and donor agecies. 33
In this chapter I have attempted to look at the discourses behind the different
efforts made to protect the upper watershed of the Rio Yaque del Norte. Foresta,
the Junta Salvaguarda, and the JuntaYaque all have their own interests,
discourses, and assets. Despite conflict that exists among them, their interests
need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. All contend they want to protect the
Yaque del Norte. Conflict resolution could serve as a means of reconciling
competing interests. If watershed conservation is to be achieved, Foresta must
yield some of its authority, and shift its focus from paramilitary enforcement to
education and extension. Junta Salvaguarda could play a integral enabling role in
watershed protection as a grassroots support organization. It could marshal
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resources and offer technical support where needed. It is critical that external
organizations recognize the local knowledge base found among the campesinos of
the watershed. Defending their homes and their livelihoods, they are the ones with
the most at stake in the protection of the upper Rio Yaque del Norte.
The call for cooperation among conflictive elements may sound quixotic, and it
is easy to fall into cynicism. It vyould be easy to say that the government would
never devolve authority to its rural poor, or that urban powers will do as they wish
because they can. But the value of a discursive approaches that it can identify
multiple and conflicting positions and point to or open up spaces for considering
the seemingly unworkable. This chapter is but a modest step toward that muchneeded end.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Conservation policies and schemes which fail to balance environmental
protection and human welfare are likely to result not only in increased
hardship for certain groups but also in forms of social conflict, clandestine
activities, non-cooperation or apathy which undermine the possibility of
effectively arresting environmental degradation, let alone rehabilitating the
natural resource base. - Peter Uttig1

This thesis is a story about a small watershed in a small country. Although
there may be some wider lessons, I have not made an attempt here to extract
generalities that might explain other situations of environmental and social conflict
in regions outside the Dominican Cordillera. Instead, I have tried to share the
concerns of the inhabitants of region with whom I have spoken, and for whom
destiny has been largely controlled by outside forces. In my own examination of the
situation in the Yaque del Norte, I have attempted to trace the contours of power as
they shape the physical and social landscape of the watershed, as well as some
of the campesinos' perceptions and reactions to them.
In mapping those contours, I found that the region's history has been shaped
by forces emanating from the urban centers of power - Santo Domingo and
Santiago in particular. The greater Dominican society - through its political bodies
and economic development strategies -- has fomented a climate in which
agriculture has been practiced at the, expense of the watershed's forests in the
Yaque del Norte. A small economic elite once benefited handsomely from the
unhindered exploitation of the region's forests. A handful of weatlhy land owners
continue to benefit as much of'the converted forest is now pasture. Still, today some
urban groups express indignity at the abused state of the watershed, and call for
decisive action.
I would be equally remiss to hold domestic urban governmental and economic
elites solely accountable for that climate. The role of US imperialism must be
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acknowledged in looking at the shaping of Dominican affairs. Twice in this century
the United States has sent the Marines to the Dominican Republic to intervene in
the nation's matters. The 20th Century Dominican Republic is many ways the
product of American foreign policy. Forest conversion in the upper Yaque del
Norte, then, is just the outermost ripples of imperialist splash made by American
intervention.
In reflecting on the history of forest conversion in the upper Yaque del Norte, I
see a need for a redistribution of responsibility. I have tried to challenge the
simplistic, state-backed notion that irrational, ignorant, or backward campesinos
are clearing forests because they know no better, or worse yet out of malicious
intent. Popular discourse embodied by governmental agencies, such as Foresta,
and some nongovernmental ones as well, has considered the campesinos the
chief agents of destruction in the nation's forests. What I have attempted to show is
that campesinos' actions are colored by their existence on the margin of
Dominican society. Given their circumstances, they have acted rationally, that is to
say they have done what they have had to do to survive. But I have also tried to
show the ways the campesinos have responded to their situation. Many of the
campesinos I spoke with realize their adaptations to societal conditions have
brought great destruction to their forests. They know now that they must act to
protect what remains and try to restore what has been lost. They look to society i.e. the government, the urban powers - and the international community to give
them the opportunity to be the chief agents of forest protection and restoration.
Indeed, I believe they are looking in the right direction. “Knowledge of the
historical underpinnings of current difficulties is fundamental to understanding the
functioning of community-based conservation," writes Brazilian senator Fabio
Feldmann 2 In the case of the Yaque del Norte historical analysis serves to
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broaden the scope of assigning responsibility for forest conversion, and to
illuminate the roots of repressive and counterproductive conservation practices.
The aim of this thesis has not been to disparage or undermine the notion of
forest conservation. Rather it has been to point out that traditional, that is
technocratic and managerial, approaches to conservation or environmentalism are
not inherently benign forces,, or an unqualified good, particularly in the places like
the Dominican Republic. At best, they can fail to achieve their aims; at their worst
they can be repressive to rural people. This view, 1 realize, may be construed as
hopelessly anthropocentric. The goal, after ail as some might argue, is to protect
the forests, not necessarily the forest dwellers. In my own life, I may aspire toward a
biocentric ethic, though I realize that this perhaps reflects an advantaged socio
economic background. I can afford it; in other words, my own "livelihood struggles"
are not elemental in the way that a campesino's are. It's unlikely I'll, ever face
hunger as a fact of life. When issues of social justice colfide with environmental
concerns, or particulary when power acts on the powerless in the name of
environment, I find anthropocentric views warranted.

In this thesis I call for a

melding of social and environmental concerns: environmentalism with a human
face. If that is possible, some suggest it will be through a community-based
approach to conservation.3

Community-based Conservation
The task of protecting and rehabilitating a watershed is undoubtedly a daunting
. one. Watershed management projects in the in the Cordillera Central of Dominican
Republic have been undertaken in the past 15 years with variable results. Some
like Plan Sierra, in neighboring watersheds of the Yaque del Norte basin, have
made some gains, though recently the project was undermined by party politics.
Other projects have floundered and at great expense. In 1981, the Management of
Natural Resources Project (MARENA) sought to promote soil conservation in two
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watersheds in the southern slopes of the Cordillera Central and also to build
institutional capacity of the Secretary of Agriculture (SEA) and its sub-secretariat of
natural resources (SURENA). Funded by the USAID, at a cost of $11 million, the
project drew on the efforts of several state agencies, the Catholic Church and
several community groups. A 1993 World Bank report notes that funds aimed at
strengthening government agencies achieved little. More important, the project
showed initial success with its promotion of soil conservation measures, though
these practices were linked to farmers’ access to credit. Another critical problem
with the project was that much of the funding for the project never left the capital,
Santo Domingo, “leaving meager and delayed field level disbursements to the
project." Furthermore, none of the funding reached community level groups.4
The variable success of past watershed projects points out the need for new
approaches to watershed conservation. The traditional top-down, technocratic,
governmental attempts, exemplified by the MAR ENA project, have largely failed to
achieve their aims. Sociologist Michael Cernea raises some important concerns
regarding the difficulties faced in watershed projects:
A single watershed may contain a broad diversity of tenurial
arrangements, stratified social groups, and various farming systems and
land use patterns. Moreover, the rehabilitation of deforested watershed
demands much more than watershed forestry and massive planting of
trees. It involves flood control and soil conservation; often bench terraces
need to be built with massive excavation and refill work;.farming systems
need to be adjusted to ecological characteristics; and there may be
changes in the land rights system, in the rules of land transmittal, in
settlement patterns and the number of inhabitants.5
All that, Cernea argues, is well beyond the capacity of individuals, thus calling
for group action supported by technical agencies. The difficulty, then, is to find a
way to “engineer the formation of a group out of discrete and not necessarily
organically interactive farmers." 6 The establishment of the JuntaYaque seems a
step toward that goal. But even more important it is an approach that seeks out, and
embraces local knowledge and participation. "Participation" is a word that ought to
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be viewed critically; too often it is used in reference to local people providing labor
for development projects that have been conceived by outside consultants. Peter
Uttig, in his book Trees. People and Power writes that participation is more than
just involving communities in project design, implementation and evaluation. "It is
also about ‘empowerment,’ or the organized efforts of marginalized groups to
transform patterns of resource allocation and increase their control over material
resources and resource management decisions.’’7 This essentially is what
JuntaYague says it wants: to manage its own watershed. This desire reflects a
new take on environmentalism, that of community-based conservation (CBC). Two
of the field's leading advocates, David Western and R. Michael Wright, describe
the new approach:
Community-based conservation reverses top-down, center-driven
conservation by focusing on the people who bear the costs of conservation.
In the broadest sense, then, community-based conservation includes
natural resources or biodiversity protection by, for and with the local
community. ...The deeper agenda for most conservationists, is to make
nature and natural products meaningful to rural communities. As far as the
local communities are concerned the agenda is to regain control over
natural resources and, through conservation practices, improve their
' economic well-being.8
While CBC offers a new approach to resource management, it still faces
substantial challenges. For example, essential tp CBC is empowering local level
organizations, or more specifically, opening up channels of political access.
“Political pluralism and a strengthened democratic process are the most
fundamental preconditions for conservation," writes Feldmann. With this in mind,
Feldmann sees environmental education not merely as a means of informing
communities about ecological issues, but more importantly an instrument for
"assisting communities in the exercise of their full rights as citizens.” 9
This exercise of citizenship may prove to be the most significant challenge to
CBC initiatives. It follows that such an exercise requires the state to cede some of
its authority to communities. Community-based conservation cannot proceed
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without state recognition, in the Dominican Republic, with its long history of
authoritarian and nominally democratic regimes, devolution of power may prove
improbable. Many CBC projects strive for control of state lands. In the Dominican
case, the state -- through Foresta and the army -- exerts authority over all lands,
state and private alike. If the state were to relinquish its authority over private lands
alone, it would be an improvement over the current situation. The next step would
be allow greater community control over state lands -- most of which were
historically communal -- in perhaps some form of comanagement scheme. Ideally,
under such a strategy, the government would facilitate community-generated
forest management efforts.
Murphree, however, notes that this seldom happens. “The inbuilt tendency of
government structures is to assert power and claim authority, even when they lack
the resources to fulfill the implied responsibilities.”10 As illustrated throughout this
thesis, this proclivity is especially true of Foresta, which, unable to carry out its full
mission, has focused on enforcement of the cutting prohibition as a means of
maintaining control over the nation's forests. The failure of Foresta's approach is
amply evident, though it remains to be recognized.
Recently, however, a new window of opportunity may have opened. The
political situation long dominated by the 90-year-old Balaguer and his Social
Christian Reformist Party (PRSC), who controlled the Dominican Republic for 22
out of the 30 years between 1966 and 1996, may have come to a close. In the
1996 election, Leonel Fernandez of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) became
the nation's youngest president. A Santiago native raised in New York City,
Fernandez calls himself a centrist and a reformer. Thus far, he has taken steps to
retire two dozen generals, a bold move given the history of military interference in
civilian affairs. Still, Leonel must contend with a Dominican congress, judiciary and
military dominated by Balaguer loyalists. He and the nation face huge problems
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with chronic power shortages, growing crime rates and a slew of other economic
and social problems.11
The shift in the political climate should neither be over-estimated nor
downplayed, but rather viewed with guarded optimism. The new government is
centrist, and thus not likely to push for dramatic populist reform. Fernandez is from
Santiago, the regional center of power and the prime determinant of the
watershed's fate. The change in governments, however, offers a critical
opportunity for reforming managing the nation's forests. Whether he and his party
have the interest or ability to reform the Foresta remains to be seen.
The change in government, and the retiring of the numerous generals, could
bring a chance for a civilian-headed Foresta, and perhaps a new direction. What is
needed is a severing of ties to the military, as many campesino leaders point out.
The Foresta should be an enabling agency, hot an enforcer. Toward that end, the
agency should redirect its resources and personnel toward educational and
extension efforts. The recent change in government could reveal whether the
authoritarianism wielded by the agency is institutionally inherent or merely
reflective of Balaguerista politics. Thus far, the governmental presence in the
forests of the Yaque del Norte has served only to exacerbate problems.

Future Research Agendas
My work here -- essentially descriptive and diagnostic -

addresses perhaps

the simplest part of the problem in the Yaque del Norte. Of course, further
research- drawing on both the social and natural sciences - is needed in order to
inform action. Specifically, what is required are the nuts and bolts of how to protect
and restore the watershed, but in ways that mesh with the local ecological and
social situation. There are three particular areas that need to be further understood;
first how to apply a community-based conservation approach to watershed
protection in the Yaque del Norte. Empowering historically unprivileged viewpoints,
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such as those of the farmers of the region, is critical to this. This means on-theground community organizing, institution-building, fund-raising and the
development of links to outside - domestic and international - sympathetic
institutions.

One risk to CBC is the possibility that the approach could be used to

co-opt local leaders and movements. Outside forces, both governmental, business
and non-'governmental, could use community participation in planning to modify
pre-conceived projects, rather than truly generate them from the community itself.
One good research question then is how a group like JuntaYaque can link itself to
outside forces and still maintain the direction of its efforts, or keep its agenda
intact?
Related to this is perhaps is the need for conflict resolution, perhaps one savvy
to the nuances of power and language. There are numerous institutional actors in
the watershed. Conflict varies in degrees between the various actors, high for
example between some individual farmers and the Foresta, and low between
different NGOs working in the region. Still, recognizing and reconciling these
competing interests is of critical importance.
The second principal area of investigation would be research and extension
that examines strategies to "settle" the hillside conuco. There is much about the
old Arawakconuco to be admired from an agroecological vantage. But
conuquismo today has become problematic. As I discussed in chapter 2, socio
economic and political factors preclude much of a future for shifting cultivation as
currently practiced. While groups such as ASADA look to sophisticated methods,
such as the biotechnology of the future, to develop new market crops, a look back
may be needed as well. The Arawak conucos, permanent farm plots that were
productive, ecologically sound, low maintenance once established, stationary and
long-lived, offer a possible model for the future of subsistence farming, the bedrock
of rural self-sufficiency. Indeed, elsewhere in Latin America, particularly across the

121
Caribbean on the Central American mainland, there is a small but growing effort to
develop alternatives to the two predominant agricultural practices: swidden and the
high yield-oriented "modern" agriculture. In Honduras, where there are parallels to
the Dominican situation, World Neighbors, a US based grassroots support
organization, has promoted a new approach to agricultural research, one that
invokes empowerment and self-reliance as an asset, and that values farmers'
knowledge.12 Inter-American Foundation representative Jim Adriance describes
the outlines of the new approach:
Throughout the Central American isthmus, thousands of campesinos are
working with a growing number of visionary yet pragmatic grassroots support
organizations (GSOs) to reinvent agriculture. In this new agriculture, farmers
don't wait for the 'experts' to guide them. They do their own experiments and
they share their finding with other farmers. Farmers look beyond this year's
harvest to the long-term health and richness of their soil, and the natural
environment has become an ally, not an enemy to be conquered.13
There are research centers in the Dominican Republic focused on organic
agriculture and soil conservation. In Rio Limpio, in the western Cordillera near the
Haitian border, the Regional Center for Alternative Rural Studies (CREAR) offers
training sessions in soil conservation and organic agriculture. How can low-input
agronomic, farmer-centered technologies be used and transferred in the region?
The third, though no less important than the first two, is how to nurture
participatory forest management regimes in the watershed.

“What is required to

make the concept of participation viable is proprietorship," writes Marshall
Murphree, "which means sanctioned use rights, including the right to determine the
t

mode and extent of management and use, rights of access and inclusion, and the
right to benefit fully from use and management.”14 This laudable but politically
difficult in the Dominican Republic. Campesinos in the watershed today do not
even possess these sorts of rights to their own property let alone to land belonging
to the state. Still, there is need to invest the communities with some literal sense
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that the watershed belongs to them, not to the state, not to a Santiago NGO, and
not to an international donor.
One possible idea is to investigate the possibility of establishing a grassroots
Cordillera conservation corps. Such a group -- endowed with recognized rights to
the use of land in the watershed -- could identify, design, and implement forestry
and agricultural projects in the watershed.

Ideally workers in the such a group

would not consider themselves working for the government, or any other
institution, but rather for themselves. Aside from augmenting agricultural earnings,
such work could possibly further a conservation ethic, one that links the health of
the land to the health of campesino families.
These are suggestions, and suggestions are easy to make, and may sound
hopelessly naive. It would be easy to end this thesis on a pessimistic note. It would
be easy to say that the campesinos of the Yaque del Norte are relics of an age
past, a people whose adaptations to societal conditions have contributed to the
ecological degradation of Cordilleran forests. This could easily be a declensionist
storyline, that of the decline of a rural people and their land. It is conceivable that
the Foresta could continue its war of attrition, pressuring farmers until the point
where they give up. More dramatic would be an overt eviction and resettlement of
the campesino communities. This would not be inconsistent with much of
Dominican history. In the Dominican Republic, the power to act has never been
tempered by a moral conscience.
Campesino lifeways could also meet a demographic demise. A common sight
on the road up from Jarabacoa are the Pathfinders and Landcruisers Of city people
flying upcountry to their summer homes. Increasingly, the Yaque del Norte is
becoming the second home to many urban professionals. As more and more
urban people move to the countryside, farm families -- through distress sales -could be bought out of existence. The landscape, once the object of commercial
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exploitation, could be commodified and consumed in new ways as scenery, as
nature, or as a bucolic retreat. The future for the region, which despite it substantial
forest loss still offers a pleasant climate and pastoral vistas, could center around
summer homes for the affluent urbanites, and ecotourism for affluent visitors. It is
perhaps a prescient fact that recently a bed and breakfast has been established
outside of Manabao. The influx of new, affluent urbanites is not inherently bad for
the locals, as some newcomers, like Jose and Naty Cruz, bring a genuine concern
for their neighbors, as well as a variety of resources. In looking at environmental
and rural issues, nothing is clear-cut, black and white. But it would not be difficult to
imagine a not-too-distant future in which the campesino, who no longer exists as a
maligned actual figure, becomes a symbolic one, an object of nostalgia, a reminder
of a simple, yet tragic, agrarian past.15
Thus continued governmental pressure, or the changing demographic face of
the campo could bring about the complete dislocation of a rural people, and the
disappearance of a historic agrarian way of life. Many farmers in the Yaque del
Norte express skepticism about continuance of their agriculturally-based
livelihoods in the region. It could be argued that while regrettable, this is progress,
a triumph of modernity over "backward" country ways.
But as a North American observer, I feel I am not entitled to any more cynicism
that what is held by campesinos and campesinas like Moro, or Aquiles or Sonia.
They are forthright in expressing their frustrations, yet manage to act constructively
on them as well. The formation of the JuntaYaque seems the institutional
embodiment of both their grievances of today and their aspirations for tomorrow.
For fledgling groups like the JuntaYaque, operating in a highly political context, the
desire for self-determination is likely to meet opposition. Those who wield power
are likely to relinquish it only reluctantly. But the campesino families of the Yaque
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del Norte have too much at stake to do nothing. And more importantly, they realize
that if they don't act, they will be acted upon once again .
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